Seamans, Robert. Dates: December 4, 1986; February 25, April 9, November 2, and December 8, 1987; January 19, March 23, April 15, May 13, and December 15 and 16, 1988. Interviewers: Martin Collins (10), Joseph Tatarewicz (1), Michael Dennis (1), and John Mauer (1). Auspices: GWS. Length: 33 hrs.; 473 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Seamans initially reviews his upbringing, education, and work at MIT and Wright Field during World War II. He then discusses his career at MIT from 1945 to 1955, including working under Stark Draper at the Instrumentation Lab, teaching, and earning a PhD in instrumentation. Seamans next describes moving to RCA in 1955 to head the new Airborne Systems Laboratory and the various projects he worked on until his departure to NASA as an associate administrator in 1960. Many aspects of his career at NASA are then extensively covered by Seamans, including impressions of Jim Webb, involvement in the manned space flight program, role of the Source Evaluation Board, increase in responsibilities after various reorganizations, effects of the Apollo 204 fire, NASA/DOD relations, and use of contractors. He also explains the background of a number of key NASA documents from his personal files.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
FAMILY BACKGROUND
1-2 Background of father and mother; description of father's Depression unemployment
2 Discussion of paternal grandfather and family member Otis Tufts
2-3 Maternal grandfather Bosson; impression upon Seamans at an early age
3-4 Relationship with brothers Donald and Peter
EDUCATION
4-5 Early education at the Tower School
5 Childhood interest in athletics
5-6 Description of the varied curriculum; foreign language programs
6-7 Activities outside the classroom; family interests
7-8 Choosing a boarding school; attending Lennox instead of Kent
8-9 Parents' control over destiny; their assessment of the qualities of Lennox and Kent
9 Philosophy and rules at Lennox School
9-10 Curriculum and development of interest in science and mathematics
10-11 College Boards in mathematics at the sophomore level
11 Description of course work
11-12 Influence of Gardner Monks, headmaster
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Fulfillment of requirements for religious studies
12-13 Encouragement and support from Headmaster Monks
13-14 Summers away from Lennox School; tennis and sailing at Marble Head
14 Four college entrance exams; application to Harvard
14-15 Lennox School's active role in student placement at universities
15-16 Reasons for enrollment at Harvard; family influences
16-17 Engineering sciences as first field of concentration
18 Divisions within the engineering department; possibilities in electrical or mechanical engineering
18-19 Influence of Bill Bollay and Alan Puckett; course work in aeronautics
19-20 Courses with Den Hartog in mechanical engineering; civil engineering with Hartline
20 Surveying course in summer school
21 Visiting family in Europe
21 Beset by illness while in Europe; visits to several doctors
21-22 Return to the US; diagnosis of heart murmur and scar tissue on heart valves
22 Back to the university; enrollment in a cross-section of engineering courses
22-23 Cardiologist Paul White; diagnosis of rheumatic fever
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23-24 Effect of illness upon activity level
24 Possible interest in attending medical school
24-25 Further discussion of courses with Bill Bollay in aeronautical engineering
25 Decision to transfer from Harvard to MIT
26 Admission to MIT as a graduate student; thoughts of pursuing a Master's Degree in Instrumentation
26-27 Outline of course work requirements
27 Parents' expectations and response to the transfer
27-28 First course with Stark Draper; basic instrumentation at the graduate level
28 Freshman physics requirements at MIT
29 Realization of the focus of a Master's Degree in Instrumentation
29 Early association with Robert Gilruth during his years at the NACA
29-30 Types of activities and work done by the Instrument Laboratory
30 1940-41 at MIT; course work in LaPlace transformers
31 Position as research assistant to Barney Oldfield
31-32 Assistant instructor to Draper in the fundamental instrumentation course 1641
32-33 Correlation between improving performance and designing instrumentation
34-35 Awareness of international events during the late 1930s; recollection of conditions in Nazi Germany
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
35-37 Isolationist sentiment in the US
37 Effect of war in Europe upon graduate studies
37 Applying for the Navy V-7 program; denial due to color blindness
38 Involvement in classified work for the Navy and Air Force while at MIT
38-39 Discussion of changes at the Instrumentation Laboratory as a result of WWII
39-40 Personal perceptions of the general atmosphere in the US during WWII
40 Further discussion of rheumatic fever and its effect upon Seamans' academic career
40-41 Former classmates now prominent in fields such as publisher
41 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
42 Course work required for M.S. at MIT
42-44 Instrumentation course with Dr. Draper; courses in engineering and aeronautics
44 Selecting Dr. Draper as an advisor for the Master's Program
44 Courtland Perkins and others who studied under Doc Draper
45-46 Draper's personal appeal and dynamic character
45 Advantage of enrolling in courses at MIT, the forefront of engineering
45 Rauscher, Koppen, and Oburn - examples of excellent faculty at MIT
46-47 Graduate program at MIT; research assistantship with Barney Oldfield
47 Development of a Master's thesis; direction from Doc Draper
47-48 MIT laboratory work with Sperry Gyroscope Company
48-49 Genesis of the Instrumentation Laboratory; Draper's work with the British Navy
49-50 Responsibilities as an instructor at MIT
50 Work in the vibration measurements laboratory
50-52 Discussion of Master's thesis topic
52-53 World War II and resulting changes in the laboratory
53 Instrumentation work with Walter McKay
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
53-54 Work on the A-1 Bomb Gunsight for the Armament Laboratory at Wright Field
54-55 First concentrated work with gyromechanisms
55-57 Draper's method of operations research
57 Draper's supervision of design and testing
57-59 Navy instrumentation project; development of antiaircraft gunsights
59-61 Draper's approach to the target acquisition problem
61-62 Importance of Draper's students to the success of the Instrumentation Laboratory
62-64 Designing, developing and delivering equipment to the Navy during WWII
64 Attachments of CIC to weapons; use of radar mechanisms
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
65 Development of design test technologies
66 Description of contract procedures between the Navy and Sperry Gyroscope
66-67 Sources for project funding
67 Draper's notion of simplicity; emphasis upon critical elements in design
67-68 Organizing project work for corporate contractors; resulting problems in laboratory
69 Former students Walter Wrigley and Hugh Willis; facilitation of contracts with private industry
69-70 Selling ideas to Sperry and other corporations
70 Relationship between the Instrumentation Laboratory and the Office of Industrial Cooperation
70-71 Nat Sage's notion of contract negotiations
71 Contact with the Radiation Laboratory
71 Connection between departments and activities at MIT
POSTWAR ACTIVITIES
71-72 Description of the tracking control program; discussion of automatic control issues
72-74 Laboratory transition from wartime activities to postwar period; working on the Gunnar I
74-75 Plans for the Instrumentation Laboratory during the postwar period; internal assessment of the laboratory's mission
75-76 Draper's intuitive sense of technical needs; his concept of organization
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
76-77 Draper's interest in solving "real world problems"; motivation to keep everything in motion
77 Nat Sage's relationship with Draper; input concerning the Laboratory's future
78 Obtaining support for the industrial liaison project
78-79 Draper's academic role; support for other laboratories
79-80 Arrangements and responsibilities within the aeronautical engineering department; Hunsacker as department chairman
80-81 Proliferation of laboratories by 1952
81-82 Draper's philosophical view of technology's role in society
82-83 James Webb's attraction to Draper's philosophy
83-84 Discussions with James Killian concerning Project Meteor
84 Ed Snyder and MIT's relationship with the Bureau of Ordnance
85 Description of contracting practices on Project Meteor
85-86 Establishment of working nucleus for Project Meteor
86-87 Interaction and work with Bell; problems with missile design
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
88 Cancellation of Project Meteor
88-89 Name change to Flight Control Laboratory
90 Opportunity to set up a laboratory for RCA
90 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
91-93 Discussion of government contracts and patent issues in the Draper Laboratory
93 Positions held at MIT and the Instrumentation Laboratory
93-94 Working towards a PhD, 1948-51
94-95 Instrumentation as a major, mathematics as a minor
95 Systems engineer on Project Meteor
96 Early insight and understanding of the management process
97 Acting as systems integrator on Project Meteor
98 Interaction with the Bureau of Ordnance
99 Building a nucleus for project work; discussions with Killian
99-100 Hunsacker's notion of academic freedom and understanding of management issues
100-102 Discussion of the procurement and contract process
102 Role of Guy Stever in the aeronautics department
103 Walter Wrigley and the weapons systems division of the Aeronautics department
103-104 Departmental interest in missiles during the postwar period
104 Draper's preference for inhabited vehicles
104-105 Management problems during transition from department member to project director
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
105-106 Relationship with Draper during Project Meteor
106-107 Draper's influence upon Seamans' management techniques
107 Draper's relationship with administrative personnel
107-108 Nat Sage and his role at MIT
108-109 Discipline within the Instrumentation Laboratory
109-110 Instrumentation Laboratory's development of the model for the Flight Control Laboratory
110-111 Organization and development of the Flight Control Laboratory
111-112 Acceptance of position offered at RCA
112-113 Work at the RCA laboratory in Boston; hiring Joe Aaronson
113 Assessment of RCA's motivation to venture into fire control
113-114 Transition to laboratory work in a corporate setting
114-116 Growth at RCA; move to new building
116 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
YEARS AT RCA
117-118 Influence of Art Malcarney; work on the APCHE
118 Malcarney's work on the BMEWS program
119 Discussions between Webb, Seamans and Malcarney at NASA; decision to hire Brainerd Holmes
119-120 Malcarney's management style; development of the organizational structure at RCA
120-121 Discussion of contract number 28007; RCA's production of a fire control system for fighter aircraft
121 Marketing RCA's capabilities to develop the electronics for the CF 105
121-122 Methods of contract bidding
122 Division marketing representative Ralph La Montague
122 Chief Executive officer John Burns
123 Confidence in RCA's research and engineering capabilities; need for top technical people in Camden area
123-124 Discussion of initial problems and strengths at RCA
124-125 Discussion of the existence of guiding assumptions of how research and development should be conducted at RCA
125-126 Importance of Defense Electronics Products activity to RCA
126-127 Characterization of corporate culture at RCA
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
127-128 Motivations for Seamans establishment of the laboratory; Malcarney's interest in cutting edge technology
128-129 Camden laboratory activities; involvement in the Atlas Program and the SD-1 Project
129-130 Description of the SAINT Project and general attitudes towards satellites
131 Position changes from manager of the Airborne Systems laboratory to Chief Systems Engineer; discussion of resulting organizational changes
132-133 Assessment of managerial role and activities
133-134 Description of a typical day in the division
134-135 Aspects of technical marketing; use of Independent Research and Development
135-136 Comparative relationship with the military while at MIT and RCA
136-137 Management training programs at RCA
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
137 Description project tracking process
138 RCA facilitation staff management education
138-139 RCA attitude towards personnel issues and procedures
140-141 Further discussion of RCA management attitudes
142 Diefenbacher and his cancellation of the Canadian defense effort
142-143 Cancellation of the 28007 contract; subsequent reduction of staff by 33%
143-144 RCA involvement in the Atlas program
144-145 Position as chief engineer, Missile Electronics and Control Division
145-147 Discussion of departure from RCA; consideration of KeithGlennan's offer for a position as Associate Administrator at NASA
147 Cortland Perkins' recommendation of Seamans for the NASA position
147-148 Discussion of the Subcommittee on Automatic Stability and Control; NACA's future involvement in space activities
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
148-149 NASA's Advanced Development Program for Guidance
149-150 Responsibilities as a consultant to/member of the Scientific Advisory Board
150-151 Relationship between the Air Force, and the Scientific Advisor
151 Level of industry representation on NACA Boards and the AF Advisory Board
YEARS AT NASA
151-153 Orientation at NASA early meetings and discussions with Robert Gilruth, Don Ostrander, Abe Silverstein
153 Trip to Marshall; first impressions of Wernher von Braun
153-155 Initial meeting Keith Glennan and President Eisenhower; budgetary discussions
155-157 Eisenhower's opinion concerning the development of civilian communication satellites
157-158 The question of discontinuity between the Glennan and Webb administrations
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
159-160 Seamans' transition to government environment
160-162 Initial responsibilities at NASA as associate administrator
162-164 Methods of evaluating project progress
164-165 Dr. Glennan's establishment of reliability office
165-167 Monthly meetings to monitor center activities
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
168-170 Organization and responsibilities of NASA centers
170-173 Congruity of political outlooks of Glennan and Eisenhower
173-175 Pace of technological advancement as it related to budget constraints
175-177 Description of the reporting structure within NASA; institution of bi-weekly project status review
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
177-178 Working relationship of Dryden, Seamans and Glennan
178-180 Contact with the scientific community
180-183 Procurement issues; NASA-contractor relationship
183-185 Industry conferences as means of communication
185-187 Seaman's involvement in personnel management
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
187-188 Question of RCA stock as conflict of interest in procurement
188-192 Relationship with the media; public interest issues
192-193 Glennan and Webb's recommendations for dealing with the media
194-196 Further discussion of the transition to the Kennedy administration
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
198-201 Charlie Bartlett and discussions of the Wiesner Report
201-205 Webb's expectations of an associate administrator
205-208 Glennan and Webb's attitudes towards Congress
208 Working relationship with Hugh Dryden and James Webb
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
208-211 Overview of Hugh Dryden's contributions to NASA
211 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
212-216 Seamans' role during the early months of the Kennedy Administration; his January 1, 1961 speech to the Richmond Chamber of Commerce in which he portrayed the Eisenhower Administration as too conservative re: the space program; overview of NASA programs and operations re: lunar landing, manned spaceflight, communications satellites, spinoffs from the space program; Glennan's reaction to the speech
216-221 January 1961 meeting of the Space Exploration Council to develop a coherent agency statement; Seamans describes his initial concerns (1960), re: proper management of Mercury, Ranger, and Surveyor programs and for planning beyond Mercury; trip to California to look at Convair's Centaur; discussions with Don Heaton and Al Kelly about the feasibility of a moon landing; Abe Silverstein's view
221-222 Keith Glennan's memo on January 16, 1961, "Authorized Development Projects," which included his approval of the Apollo program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
223-224 NASA's Planning Office, under Abe Hate, and its role in the ten-year plan
224-225 Seamans's impression of what Jim Webb thought NASA's priorities should be in 1961; Webb's management style
225-227 The report of February 24, 1961 on the meeting of McNamara, Gilpatric, York, and Dryden; presentation to the Bureau of the Budget regarding the acceleration of NASA's current program
227-233 Webb's memo of February 27, 1961 to Dave Bell on coordination of DoD-NASA affairs; Webb's March 17, 1961 memo to Bell on acceleration of the NASA program; arguing for government funding of satellite program, rather than industry, as had been Eisenhower's policy; money for manned spaceflight; increasing NASA's manpower; Webb's memo of May 23, 1961 to President Kennedy (result of meeting with JFK) on current funding and recommended new funding which resulted in more money for bigger launch vehicles but non for Apollo; subsequent flight of Gargarin and discussions with Congress, re: prospects for manned spaceflight
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
233-235 Dave Bell's march 1961 briefing memo for JFK, prepared prior to the meeting, questioning the value of manned spaceflight competition; assesses validity of NASA's budget figures and policy implications and makes recommendations to JFK
235-236 Seamans assesses the role of the Bureau of Budget as going beyond verifying the validity of NASA's budget figures; NASA's struggle with other agencies (NOAA) over the responsibility for satellites; Seamans' assessment of how JFK weighed these issues
236-238 Document 20, an agenda for NASA's conference with the Bureau of the Budget; part 1, a more complete assessment of what various funding levels would buy, and part 2, the question of whether to launch an aggressive manned spaceflight program (Apollo); discussion of the technical difficulties of accelerating thebooster program, as opposed to the policy considerations
238-239 The question of how JFK evaluated whether NASA was capable of doing what it said it would do; the effect of Alan Shepard's Mercury flight on demonstrating NASA capability
239-240 Discussion of Shepard's flight; pre-flight considerations involving JFK, Dryden, PSAC, Ed Welsh; questions of safety; degree of involvement of people outside NASA
240-244 Seamans describes Congressional hearings at which he, Webb and Dryden testified before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics on the Soviet manned space shot and the progress of the Apollo program; Congress blasts NASA for not doing more; Webb letter of April 21, 1961 to Kenneth O'Donnell, assessing Seamans' performance; fall-out in the White House and Bureau of the Budget from the hearings; speculation about White House reaction to the hearings
244-246 JFK's April 20, 1961 memo to Johnson (LBJ) asking about space programs which might promise "dramatic results" LBJ's April 28, 1961 memo to JFK concluding that the Soviets were ahead in technological accomplishments; argues for strong US effort
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
246-249 The space program as a means of influencing the international situation and as an element of prestige; Seamans' discussion with Webb and others about the international implications of the space race; description of Webb, Dryden and Seamans working together, "minding the store" at NASA while moving ahead on the space race; Seamans speculated on why LBJ fought the advice of Wernher von Braun, why LBJ chose who he did to advise him; discussion of letter from von Braun to LBJ, re: evaluation committee
249-251 Webb memo of May 5, 1961 to O.B. Lloyd, conveying that LBJ had requested of him and McNamara a space program for JFK to send to Congress, and requesting a PR program to accompany it; Webb and McNamara's May 8, 1961 memo to LBJ, recommendations for a national space program, emphasis on Apollo manned lunar landing, question of beefing up the Ranger program, DoD agenda; Seamans discusses how this document was produced and his role in it; working with John Rubel to put the report in final form
251-256 Seamans discussions the primary purpose of the May 8, 1961 report - an assessment of the Soviets - and what he did not like about the report; space too marginal a topic in report; the issue of national prestige takes precedence; others who worked on it; Rubel, Silverstein, Shapley; description of final submission to LBJ
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
256-258 Continuation of discussion of the May 8, 1961 report; who participated in the final preparation; Seamans' view that the report gives the Soviets more credit than they deserved
258-260 Discussion of the question of whether the Soviets were planning a manned expedition to the moon; United States performance information Soviet boosters; points on which Seamans disagreed with the May 8, 1961 report; Webb's willingness to use a DoD document as the basis of a presentation to the president andvice-president; Webb's confidence in McNamara
260-262 The NASA-DoD relationship; NASA's programs as an aid to national security and its use of this argument before Congress; DoD's view - did not want space programs under umbrella of national security; Kennedy's view - saw a two way relationship; the Gemini Review Committee; possible DoD benefits from NASA programs; spinoffs
262-265 Seamans' afterthoughts after submitting the May 8, 1961 report to LBJ; NASA's sense of excitement at the prospect of embarking on a national space program; JFK's remarks about an expanded national space program in his State of the Union message; Webb and Seamans' review of the space portion of the speech prior to its presentation; discussion of specific portions of the speech: budget, time tables; beginnings of mobilization for Apollo program; search for a manager for the program; reasons against choosing von Braun and Dryden's misgivings about von Braun
265-267 Seamans discusses the question of when NASA began to get a sense that JFK would support the manned lunar project; further discussion of mobilizing for the Apollo project and the search for a leader
267-271 Webb to LBJ, May 23, 1961 - laying the ground work for a national space program and enlisting major national support; choosing a headquarters location; why Houston was chosen - political and technological considerations; Webb's desire to have Rice University involved; Seamans describes his emotional reaction to Kennedy's announcement that the program would go forward; closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
272-279 NASA decision to go to the moon; assessment of in-house vs. contractor capabilities
279-281 Cost-plus arrangement with Bellcom; Bellcom interaction with NASA centers
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
281-284 Contractors as systems integrators; potential conflicts
284-285 Webb's approach to systems integration
285-289 Refinement of procurement system within NASA
289-290 Seaman's role in procurement process
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
290-293 Initial stages of procurement at NASA; Request for Proposal
294-295 Differences between NASA and DOD procurement procedures
295-296 Working with industry to define contracts
296-299 Procurement process for finalizing contracts; requirements for Apollo
299-300 Description of contracts used by NASA
300-301 Industry reaction to change from cost-plus-fixed fee contracts to incentive contracts
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
302-303 Center staff views on change to incentive contracts
303-305 NASA approach to aerospace industry; coordination of efforts with DOD
305-308 Discussion of the source selection process
308-312 Responsibilities of the Source Evaluation Board
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
312-314 NASA selection of contractors when capabilities were similar
314-318 Discussion of press release on NASA selection of North American for the Apollo spacecraft contract
318-321 Increasing contractor competitive capabilities
322-323 Role of the individual centers at NASA; Sam Phillips' opinion in recent study
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
323-324 Including funds for scientific and basic research in industry contracts
325 Closing
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
325-326 Reasons and motivations for the 1963 reorganization
326-328 Extent of James Webb's interest in decentralized management; the reorganization of 1961
328-330 Seamans' role as general manager immediately following the 1961 reorganization
330 Management and organization study carried out by Al Siepert and Jack Young in the office of administration
330-331 Discussion of how Seamans's responsibilities charged as a result of the 1963 reorganization
331-333 Changing associate administrators' responsibilities; greater emphasis upon management; Brainerd Holmes' difficulty with this issue
333-334 Effect of 1963 reorganization upon Seamans' relationship with NASA centers and another agencies such as DOD
334-335 Reasons for the creation of a position known as the assistant administrator for technology utilization and policy planning
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
335-336 Discussion of Webb's planning style and procedures; lack of interest in a 10-year plan
336-337 Seamans's involvement in synthesis of future planning and ongoing efforts
337 Use of contractor studies in planning efforts; Webb's concern about congressional or executive branch reaction to future programs
337-338 George Mueller's latitude in disseminating his long-term plans
338-340 Feedback on the progress of programs and projects; the success of this element in the 1963 reorganization
340 Use of formal feedback mechanisms such as the project status review
340-341 Information sharing between NASA and the Air Force
341 Associate Administrators' access to the top of the organization
341-343 Relationship between the staff functions at the top of headquarters and their relationship to analogues and program officers in the centers
343 Disparity between formal organizational relationships and execution of activities
344 Managing under the reorganization; discussions with Homer Newell and Ed Cortwright concerning applications
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
345-346 Importance of Hugh Dryden's role at NASA
346 Discussion of interim period after Dryden's death; effect upon the organization
347 Development of independent staff structure at NASA HQ
347-349 Discussion of later organizational charts from 1966-68
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
350-352 Discussion of NASA organization chart from November 1, 1963
352-353 Variety of uses of Michoud plant by NASA; building the first stages of the Saturn rocket
353-355 Assessing program performance; use of Mission Success chart for flight records, 1958-1965
355-357 Importance of "Project Approval Document" in NASA management
357-358 Description of management within the Apollo Program
358-360 Centers' opposition to Headquarter's program control; discussion of alternative approach
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
360-362 Positive and negative aspects of Apollo management approach; critical analysis of quality control measures
362-364 Discussion of the NASA procurement process; importance of contractors to Apollo
364-365 Significance of Configuration Control Board, chaired by General Samuel Phillips
365-367 Responsibilities as associate administrator under Keith Glennan
367-370 Tracking project goals; Gemini 6 and Gemini 7 as examples
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
370-372 Events surrounding Apollo 204 fire; Seamans' contact with Robert McNamara
372-374 Comparison of Apollo Accident Review Board and the Rogers Commission
374-375 Problems with Shuttle program; difficulties in attracting quality personnel
375-376 Suggestions for improved quality in NASA programs
377-378 Process and phases of project elimination
378 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
379-380 Complexities of NASA-DOD relationship; relationships with other government agencies
380-381 Establishment of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board as framework for interrelationships
381 John Rubel's involvement in decision to proceed with Apollo
381-383 Determination of support, facility and programmatic responsibilities; importance of Corps of Engineers' contributions
383-385 Impact of budgetary considerations upon DOD contributions
385 Involvement of National Space Council and Congress in operational interrelationships
385-387 Issues of interagency agreements and classified programs
387-390 Criteria for technology transfers between NASA and DOD; Webb-Gilpatrick agreement
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
390-391 Nick Golovin and Jerry Wiesner's interest in systems reliability studies
391-394 Reasons for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's scrutiny of Dyna-Soar and Gemini projects
394-397 McNamara's political use of NASA to deal with Air Force problems; interest in Blue Gemini and Manned Orbital Laboratory
397-399 Discussion of geodetic satellite programs
399-400 Air Force personnel contributions to space program management
400-401 Assessment of management styles: George Low, Robert Gilruth and Brainerd Holmes
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
401-402 Further discussion of management style
403-404 External factors that shaped NASA-DOD interaction; OMB's role in assigning program responsibilities
404-407 Effect of Seamans' and Rubel's decision-making upon health of aerospace industry
407 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
408-410 Overview of NASA-contractor relationships prior to 1967 Apollo fire
410-411 Assessment of North American's responsibilities and performance; management styles of Lee Atwood and Dutch Kindleberger
411-412 "Tiger team" review of contractor performance
412-413 Sam Phillips' role in assessment of North American; subsequent findings in form of "Phillips Report"
413-414 Seamans' decisions concerning post Phillips Report procedures
414-416 NASA's recommendations for change at North American; question of Harrison Storm's management abilities
416-417 Status of North American contract at the time of the Apollo fire
417-419 NASA's ability to assess contractor effectiveness prior to the fire
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
420-421 Working with Sam Phillips and George Mueller; project management control
421 Joe Shea's role in communications of pre-fire conditions
422-424 Follow-up procedures for contractor concerns; Hilliard Paige's reactions while at Valley Forge
424-426 The Finger operation and management changes in NASA
426-427 Webb's attempt to "perfect" NASA management
427-429 Individual contributions to management review process; influences of Stark Draper, Keith Glennan, James Webb
429 Organization and Management Office's responsibilities vis-a-vis those of the Associate Administrator
429-430 Webb's use of triad in NASA central administration
430-431 Reaction of program offices to organizational change
431-432 Brief description of Webb's management style
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
432-433 Seaman's ability to understand Webb's management expectations
433-440 Detailed discussion of the Apollo fire; Seamans' knowledge of circumstances and responses; "Memorandum for the Apollo 204 Review Board"
440-441 Formation of task group to consider possible changes in North American contract
442 Need for enhanced integration capabilities
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
442-444 Public relations; dealing with the media
445-446 Webb's post-fire relationship with the media
446-449 Circumstances surrounding Seaman's decision to leave NASA
449-451 Reasons for Webb leaving NASA
451-453 Post-fire recovery process
453-454 Webb's understanding of the political process
454-455 Discussion of legal staff preparations for Congressional testimony
455-457 Gathering of fundamental information relating to the Source Evaluation Board
457-458 Issues and concerns for Seamans during fire recovery period as outlined in specific memoranda
458-459 Outlined activities of Harry Finger; further discussion of organizational role
459-461 Summarization of Seamans' role and activities in addition to work with 204 Board
461-462 Addressing Congress and the public concerning R&D projects
462-464 Characterization of the NASA management control process; confidentiality issues relating to contractors
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
464-466 Manifestations of Shea's reaction to Apollo fire
466-467 Rationale for careful consideration of releasing Phillips Report
467-469 Question of potential merger of two aerospace companies
469-470 Establishment of administrative review panel to address contract issues
470-473 Boeing's role in assisting NASA in changes at North American; Bernie Moritz' role in negotiations
473 Closing comments
Shapley, Willis. Dates: April 12, May 2 and 11, 1989. Interviewer: John Mauer. Auspices: GWS. Length: 6 hrs.; 104 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Shapley focuses on various aspects of his first stint at NASA as an associate deputy administrator for budget affairs from 1965 to 1975, beginning with an overview of the decision to build the shuttle, the significance of costs in the ultimate decision to build the reusable shuttle, NASA's need for a new direction after Apollo, NASA/OMB conflicts during the post-Apollo period, and his impressions of key personalities at NASA and OMB in the early 1970s. He then discusses in detail the various stages in the development process of the shuttle; the conflicts with the White House, OMB, and certain segments of the scientific community over continued manned spaceflight and other issues and programs; and the roles of Don Rice and others in the planning and budget process for NASA. Shapley finally describes the background and work of the Space Task Group established in 1969, Allowance for Program Adjustments, leadership styles of different NASA administrators, and the fate of such NASA projects as the nuclear rocket program.
April 12, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Shapley's summary of his role as associate administrator for NASA under administrators Robert Seamans, Thomas Paine, George Low, and James Fletcher; Shapley's background in management and budget
2-3 Overview of decision to build shuttle; issue of reusable versus non-reusable designs
3-4 Shapley's view of budget constraints on NASA; attitude towards budget issues of NASA and OMB
4-6 Concept of fully reusable shuttle emerges in response to cost concerns; relationship between space shuttle and space station proposals; concepts of shuttle as launch vehicle and as prototype space station
6-7 Summary of shuttle's desirability as next step in manned space program; studies by Mathematica and others
7-8 Context of early post-Apollo planning by NASA; stance of Thomas Paine, James Webb
8-9 Paine's strategy of using public interest in Apollo to secure commitment to space program
9-10 Bureau of Budget's efforts to restrain NASA initiatives; FY 1970 budget
10 Opposition within scientific community to manned spaceflight
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
10-12 NASA budget process
11-13 NASA FY 1971 budget; importance of establishing a post-Apollo manned space direction; White House commitment to manned space
13-15 Retrenchment of NASA programs following Apollo build up; elimination of Electronic Research Center; discussion of closing centers; disagreements between NASA and Bureau of the Budget on cut backs
15-17 Difference between NASA/Bureau of the Budget relationships during Apollo and post-Apollo periods; tone of negotiations
17-19 FY 1971 budget; recollections of Robert Mayo, Thomas Paine
19-20 Wernher von Braun's congressional testimony to promote NASA development
20-21 Impact of 1970 restructuring of Bureau of the Budget into the Office of Management and Budget; role of Bureau of the Budget in Management issues; recollections of Keith Glennan, James Webb
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21-22 Political aspects of OMB
22-25 Recollections of Don Rice; application of systems analysis
25-28 Final selection of shuttle design: role of George Shultz, Oscar Morgenstern, Don Rice, Caspar Weinberger
May 2, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
29-32 Role and origins of Space Task Group established by President Richard Nixon in 1969; function of Planning Steering Group headed by Homer Newell; role of Russ Drew and Office of Science and Technology; role of Bureau of the Budget; recollections of Thomas Paine and Robert Seamans
32-35 NASA effort to establish long-term post-Apollo mission; Mars mission; contributions of Thomas Paine, George Mueller, Russ Drew, Homer Newell
35-39 Bureau of Budget guidance to NASA; negotiations of FY 1970 and 1971 budgets between NASA and BOB
39-40 Function of Allowance for Program Adjustments; manned space flight situation and role of Bill Lilly; unmanned space science cost overruns; development of internal cost control systems in NASA; function of Program Approval Document
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
41-42 Shapley's reflections on leadership styles of Thomas Paine and James Fletcher in the budget negotiation process; different political contexts for their administrations; cancellation of nuclear rocket program; closing of Electronics Research Center
42-43 Role of Congress in budget negotiation process
43-44 Discussion of NASA role early in Nixon Administration
44-46 Process of deciding to develop shuttle; negotiation with Bureau of the Budget for new NASA commitments; Space Telescope
46-47 Role of Bureau of the Budget in negotiation process
47-51 NASA administrator's final appeal to the president; process of reaching decision to proceed with shuttle; recollections of Lyndon B. Johnson, James Webb, Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixon, Peter Flanagan, Robert Mayo, Clay T. Whitehead
51-52 Fighting bad budget decisions by Robert Mayo; possible closing of some NASA centers as budget cuts
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
52-54 NASA budget difficulties '69-'70; Flanagan's negotiations with Mayo; two ratchets decrease NASA budget
55-56 Budget cuts stopped concurrent development of space station and space shuttle; space shuttle viewed as object in its own right
57-58 NASA budget funded from discretionary side; voted on by Congress every year
58-59 Mayo approach to budget seen as going-out-of-business; Apollo viewed as go to the moon and get back safely
May 11, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
60-62 Preliminary planning studies for the space shuttle, including Phase B, Alternate Phase A, Mathematica, Boeing, Grumman stage-and-a-half reusable studies; costs as a factor in selecting shuttle design
62-64 Source of NASA concern for cost factors; operating and development costs; recollections of George Low, William Lilly, Dale Myers
64-66 Goal of a balanced NASA program, with attention to space science and space applications as well as manned space initiatives; struggle with OMB to continue space applications program, especially earth remote sensing [ERTS]
66-67 Criticism of OMB's role in interagency-managed programs; global climate change; Rover nuclear rocket program
67-70 Department of Defense role in the shuttle; different perspectives within the Air Force; recollections of Robert Seamans, Johnny Foster, Gene Fubini, James Fletcher, Dan Taft; studies of military uses of space; posture of OMB defense examiners
70-71 Meeting to discuss staged approach, Thanksgiving 1970; factors involved in choice between two-stage reusable design and Grumman stage-and-a-half concept; peak year funding concerns
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
71-80 Thanksgiving 1970 meeting (continued); advantages of Grumman concept
72-74 Timing of various studies and commitments to contractors; JSC in-house studies; informal exchanges of information resulting from studies
74-76 Shapley's position and role within NASA under different administrations; relationships with George Low, James Fletcher, Don Rice; recollections of Charlie Donlan
76-80 Impact of Mathematica Klaus Heiss study and impact of report from DeMarquis D. Wyatt on shuttle stage design choice; findings from those studies concerning development costs of shuttle
80-81 White House position on manned spaceflight; NASA efforts to demonstrate to president and staff the importance of continuing US manned spaceflight
81-83 Space Council and role of William Anders; recollection of Peter Flanigan
83 Shapley's role in earth resources issue
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
83-85 White House and Office of Science Technology positions on manned spaceflight; opposition from scientific community and liberal political community to manned spaceflight; general budget-cutting climate
85-86 Struggle between OMB and NASA over earth remote sensing program
86-89 Recollections of Don Rice and his role within OMB; recollections of Jack Young, Hugh Loweth; relationship between NASA and OMB examiners
88-89 OMB staff transfer out of Old Executive Office Building; impact on staff morale and on OMB's political sensitivity
89-90 Rice's background in RAND and weapons systems analysis
90-91 Shapley compares his role in Bureau of Budget with Rice's in OMB; nuclear propelled aircraft; MOL and Dyna-Soar issues
91-92 Discussion of Rice's and OMB's position on the shuttle and its design in 1971
92-94 "Constant budgets" as feature of NASA's proposal to OMB for shuttle development; commitment also requested from OMB to maintain balanced NASA program, to include space science and applications; subsequent disagreement between NASA and OMB as to fiscal commitment made at meeting where shuttle development was agreed to
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
95 Ongoing dispute between NASA and OMB concerning budget commitment to NASA; recollections of Dale Myers
95-97 Impact of reductions in funding on shuttle development; NASA's subsequent insistence that front-end development funding is crucial; Shapley's belief that shuttle needed further engineering and systems development work prior to its construction; unanticipated technical issues in shuttle design and engineering
97-98 Impact of inflation on shuttle budget planning; Allowance for Program Adjustment (APA)
98-100 Decision to use solid rather than liquid rocket boosters
100-101 Final negotiation of shuttle development budget figure at San Clemente meeting; impact of shuttle development of reduction of that figure
101-102 Timing of RFP and contractor selection process
102 NASA response to OMB May 1971 directive that NASA budgets would receive no funding increases for several years
102-103 OMB annual budget preview process; role of NASA in that process
103-104 Evolution of decision to use parallel burn design for shuttle
104 Flax Committee and Fletcher's strategy concerning its impact
Silverstein, Abe. Dates: March 10, 11 and 13, 1989. Interviewer: John Mauer. Auspices: GWS. Length: 7 hrs.; 116 pp. Use restriction:
Permission required for access.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing and education in mechanical engineering, Silverstein discusses his career at NACA from 1929 to 1958. He discusses his early work at Langley on engine design; transfer to Lewis in 1943 and responsibilities there in the aircraft engine and rocket propulsion fields; the effect of World War II on NACA; influence of Dryden, Lewis, Ames, and others on NACA; and the research process at NACA. Silverstein next describes his career at NASA beginning in 1958, including his initial administrative duties at headquarters; contacts with the Bureau of the Budget, ARPA, and other government agencies; the background of bringing von Braun and the other German scientists to NASA and their effect on the organization; impressions of Webb, Paine, and other NASA administrators; and his return to Lewis as director in 1962 and the projects he was responsible for there.
March 10, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Childhood and early family life; decision to become Mechanical engineer; scholarship to Rose
3-5 First job offer with NACA; surviving the 1930s
5-7 Early colleagues - Russ Robinson, Jack Parsons, Manley Hood and Jim White; work with Smith (Smitty) De France
7-8 Work at Langley; initial impressions
8-10 Wind tunnel construction
10-11 Significance of degree in aerodynamics
11-12 Management and supervision techniques
12-13 NACA's appreciation of need for research facilities
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
13-14 Working with the radial engine
14-16 Relationship with Hugh Dryden; description of Ed Sharp
16-17 Engine testing
17 Funding procedures and cost estimates
17-18 Request for transfer to Lewis
18-19 Transition to engine research
20-22 Comparison of research parameters between NACA and NASA
22-23 How creation of Ames changed NASA
23-25 Position at Lewis; relationship between power plant and aerodynamics people
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
25 Configuration of shuttle engines; concepts promoted by Pratt-Whitney and Rocketdyne
25-27 Relationship with Dr. Lewis; leadership qualities
27-29 NACA during WWII years - growth and expansion
29-30 Decision-making process in determination of research
30-31 Resolving gravity problems - concept of sweepback
31-32 Discussion of German and British wartime research
32-33 NACA security regulations during late 1930s
33-34 Effect of rapid growth upon decision-making at NACA and early NASA
34-35 Ray Sharp - his management style
35 Importance of technical capabilities in technical leadership positions
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
36-37 Assessment of James Webb's leadership abilities; choosing talented people
37-38 Sharp's management skills
38-40 Examples of NASA administrative problems, particularly with the shuttle
40-41 Working with ramjets; interest in supersonic flight and testing the I-16 engine
41-42 Decision to work only with jet engines, 1947-48
42-44 Post-war relationships with the military; internal and external research efforts
44-46 Development of analytical, theoretical or planning groups; studies on turbojet application
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
46-48 Center reorganization; 1948-49
48-49 Group communication techniques; meetings and presentation
49-50 Handling flow of information within the center
50-51 Relationship with Dr. Ames and Dr. Hunsacker
51-53 NACA/NASA interaction with Congress; Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston
53-56 Role of committees at Langley and Lewis; creation of the liquid hydrogen program
56-58 Creation of Wallops Island facility; relationship with Gilruth, Thibodaux and Faget
March 11, 1989
TAPE 5, SIDE 1
59-60 Advancement to associate director at Lewis, 1952; June 1952 meeting of the Committee on Aerodynamics
60-61 Research in rocket propulsion
61-63 Role NACA experience played in preparation for NASA responsibilities
63 Initial thoughts on possibility of spaceflight; seminar for industry on space-related activities
63-65 Importance of Dryden's philosophy; support of theoretical and experimental work
65-68 Impact of incident over unitary wind tunnel plan during the late 1940s; rivalry between
TAPE 5, SIDE 2
68-69 New developments in propulsion systems; liquid hydrogen as fuel
69-70 Development of the U-2 and the B-project
70-71 Transition from NACA to NASA; idea of putting humans in space
71-73 Reaction to Russian launch of Sputnik I and II; subsequent developments in US space program
73-76 U S military reaction to Sputnik; NACA center's perceptions of transition to NASA
76-78 Formal study on research in space technology, 1958
78 NASA's mission in research and hardware development
TAPE 6, SIDE 1
79-80 Negotiations to bring von Braun into NASA
80-81 Relationship with Harry Goett
82 Reasons why Dryden not chosen as NASA administrator
82-85 Initial organizational structure for NASA, 1959; Webb's reorganization
85-86 Political aspects of NASA testimony before Congress; Silverstein's record while at Headquarters
TAPE 6, SIDE 2
87-89 Dryden's impact upon NACA/NASA transition; role in budget and program negotiations
89 Headquarters activities during transition, 1958; work with Dee Wyatt, George Low, Will Sanders
89-90 Gilruth as representative of manned program interests
90-91 Early responsibilities at Headquarters - program organization, budget development and work with NRL group
91-92 Description of contact with ARPA
92-93 Determination of NASA as a civilian space agency
93-95 Procurement - contract negotiations and monitoring
95-96 Use of contractors at Lewis
March 13, 1989
TAPE 7, SIDE 1
97-98 Political environment's effect upon short- and long-range planning
98-100 Budget negotiations for fiscal year 1960; Kistiakowsky as critic of the space program
100-101 Contact with BOB
101-102 Administrative leadership and the shuttle; early planning during late 1960s
102-104 Homer Newell's "Integrated Space Plan"
104-105 Paine as administrator of NASA; effect on Lewis Research Center
105-106 Return to Lewis as director; work on Agena and Centaur
TAPE 7, SIDE 2
106-108 NASA relationship with the AEC
108 Transfer of Centaur from Marshall to Lewis
109 Lewis transition to development capabilities; constructing separate facility
109-111 Assessment of von Braun and his German team; influence of Goddard on von Braun
111-113 Committee recommendations to Keith Glennan regarding rocket development
113-114 Further discussion of relationship with von Braun; German contributions
114-115 Expense of reuse vs. new construction of hardware
115 Working as center director under James Webb
115-116 General relationship with Headquarters; importance of previous assignment in Washington, D.C.
116-117 Review of photographs
Soergel, David. Date: February 20, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Public.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing and undergraduate education in engineering, Soergel (b. 1921) discusses joining General Electric in 1943 and working for the firm during the war at MIT Radiation Laboratory on radar display systems and later at New London on underwater sound transmission and other problems. He then describes working on radar and other projects in General Electric's Industrial Engineering Section after the war and being accepted into the firm's Creative Engineering Program. Soergel next discusses his move to an electromechanical research group at Washington University, and then leaving this group to join North American.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-4 Family background; initial interests in woodworking, machines, radio
3-5 Attends University of Wisconsin; active in athletics and honorary fraternities; encounters racial discrimination; work during college years; undergraduate engineering curriculum
5-13 Employment with General Electric Company; study in GE Advanced Engineering Program; decision to leave GE; reminiscence of John Moore; work for GE at MIT Radiation Laboratory on radar display system; inventions while at GE; work on mercury arc rectifiers as test engineer
13-15 Work at New London on underwater sound transmission and radar; work on FM transmission
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-17 Continued discussion of work at New London; reminiscence of captured German boat; exposure to wire recorder; research on submarine-to-submarine communication; GE receives contract for APS-20 radar production
17-19 Soergel joins GE industrial engineering section after the war, works on automatic bobbin winder that used servomechanism control system
19-21 Soergel accepted into GE creative engineering program
21-22 Soergel's first exposure to a sales engineer
22-24 Soergel approached by John Moore to join research group doing electromechanical research in dynamic systems at Washington University in St. Louis; reasons for leaving GE
22-23 GE Advanced Engineering Program standards for admission
24-25 Soergel's thesis on servomechanism design; invited to give paper on thesis at North American; hired by North American
26 Soergel's education in applied mathematics
Storms, Harrison. Date: June 21, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 32 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After briefly reviewing his undergraduate education and post-graduate education including a M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from CALTECH, Storms discusses his career with North American which began in 1941. He initially describes his work during World War II on such problems as the P-51's stability, North American's military and civilian aircraft programs in the immediate post-war years, his role in some of them as chief technical engineer, and North American's design and production processes during this period. Storms next reviews his expanded responsibilities as chief engineer of the Los Angeles Division on such projects as the B-70.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 High School and college education at Northwestern University, including engineering course work; reminiscence of Larry Clausing; work on wind tunnel; employment with National Youth Administration at Northwestern; masters' degree from Northwestern
3-8 Earns Aeronautical Engineering degree at CALTECH; reminiscences of Theodore von Karman, Clark Millikan, and others; Millikan's effort to enlist Storms in the Navy; Storms' marriage
5-6 Decision to seek employment with North American (Ed Horkey, Irv Ashkanas)
6-8 Storms' initial interest in aeronautical engineering
8-11 North American work in aerodynamics and Storms' role; P-51 stability problem; development of basic data and dimensional data manuals to standardize data; generation of manuals through mathematics and testing
11 Storms' description of earlier design approaches not based on engineering analysis
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Discussion of failure analysis
12-14 Development of hydraulic systems for jet aircraft; backup systems for hydraulic failure; design and testing of B-45; design of F-107; design of X-15; development of ALICE control system
14-15 Diversification of North American after World War II; interaction between aircraft work and Autonetics
15-16 Development of hydrazine-fluorine engine for X-15; reminiscence of General Curtis LeMay; attitude of North American management to X-15
16-17 North American management initial objection to bidding for Apollo contract
17-18 North American initiatives in immediate postwar period, particularly Air Force contracts: Sabreliner, Navion, X-15, MISS program, F-107, B-70, F-108
18-19 Storms' responsibilities as chief technical engineer
19 North American Los Angeles Division responsibility for design of Columbus Division aircraft: T-28, FJ-1, FJ-2, AJ-2
19-20 Storms' role in design process as chief engineer of Los Angeles Division
20-21 Negotiation of shape of radar dish with Autonetics (Jim Elms)
21-22 Chief technical engineer's staffing, stability and control reports
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Relationship of flight testing to chief technical group at North American
23 Storms' role as chief engineer for division
23-25 Application of systems concepts to design of B-70; Storms' definition of systems engineering; application to F-100 design
25-26 Initial WWII interest in systems engineering at Wright Field (Hal Estes, John McCoy)
26-29 Impact of electronic considerations on Air Force design requirements; problems of unstable aircraft; development of electronic capability at North American; Storms' effort to attract electronics industry involvement
29-30 Storms' reflections on Air Force procurement of updated models of aircraft; Storms' discussion with Air Force of possible mission-related modifications
30-31 Contact between Storms and Air Force as chief technical engineer and as chief engineer; flight testing of F-107
31-32 Procurement of new aircraft design through change orders vs. RFQ
Webb, James. Dates: February 22, March 8, March 15, March 22, March 29, April 12, September 10, October 15, and November 4, 1985. Interviewers: Martin Collins (4), David DeVorkin (8), Joseph Tatarewicz (8), Allen Needell (4), Linda Ezell (1), and Michael Dennis (1). Auspices: GWS. Length: 18 hrs.; 270 pp. (w/appendices). Use restriction: Open.
Webb (b. 1906) initially reviews his upbringing, undergraduate degree in education, enlisting in the USMC Reserves in the early 1930s, being admitted to the North Carolina bar, career at Sperry from 1936 to 1944 as an assistant to the president and director of personnel, active duty service with the USMC the next two years, service as Director of the Bureau of the Budget and later Undersecretary of State under Truman, and the jobs he held thereafter until his appointment as NASA's administrator in 1960. He then discusses his recruitment to NASA; management style; contacts with Kennedy, Berkner, von Braun, and others; establishing the lunar landing program and the obstacles overcome in doing so; relations with contractors and contracting procedures; and relations with the USAF and other government agencies. Following this, Webb covers Levine's and Rosholt's works on his tenure at NASA, relations with Congress, establishment of the project centers and their roles in NASA, the contributions of various persons to NASA, and internal conflicts.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Family Background
1-3 Father's career
3-4 Early interests and work
3-8 University of North Carolina, 1924-1928
5-6 Employment with Robert Lassiter; N.W. Walker
6 Education major
6 Employment with Bureau of Educational Research
7 Development of Philosophy of Management
7-8 Employment in an Oxford law firm
9-12 Marine Air Corps Reserve, 1930
9 Reasons for entering Marine Reserve
10-11 Training
11-12 Competition with other trainees
12-13 Continued interest in law
13-17 Employment with Congressman Pou
13 Joining Pou's staff; Marine active reserve
13 Contact with Lloyd Berkner
14-15 Duties
15 Contact with leading aviation figures
16 Contact with various government figures
16-17 Contact with Max Gardner
17-21 Work with Max Gardner Joining Gardner's law firm
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17-18 Leaving Pou
18-19 Support for aviation
19-21 Cancellation of air mail contracts by US Post Office, 1934; Webb's role in resumption of mail service
21 Contact with Tom Morgan
22-29 Work with Sperry Company, 1936
22-23 Personal life
22 Support for Air Transportation
23-24 Duties; various positions
25 Treasurer; role in approving contracts
25 Management during the war
25 Commitment to public service management
26-27 Role of technical knowledge in management; problem of managing people to accomplish a job; example of NASA and Sperry
27 Washington contacts while at Sperry
28-29 Development of technology at Sperry during the war; role in facilitating technological development
29-30 Post-War planning at Sperry
30-33 Marines, active duty; volunteering for active duty with Marines
30-31 Problem of monitoring production process; use of computers
31-33 Duties in Marines; development of portable radar units for combat use
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
34-35 Aviation and the insurance industry in the 1930s
35-36 National Aeronautical Association (NAA) and the promotion of aviation
36-37 Contact with General Ira Eaker and Hap Arnold; history of song "Wild Blue Yonder"
37 Special requirements of procurement of aircraft materials; government-industry relationship
37-38 Role of NAA in facilitating government-industry relationship
38-39 Contact with NACA while at Sperry
39-40 Other interests besides aviation
40 Contact with Long Range Strategic Bombing program
41-42 Informal social structure for addressing problems in aviation; example of issue of air mail contract cancellation
43 Webb's contribution to this informal social structure interested in aviation
44 Individuals in this informal social group who most influences Webb; Gardner
44-45 Management of Science in World War II; contact with Berkner; Stark Draper
46-47 Contact with Gardner after the war; work with US Treasury
47-48 Director of Bureau of the Budget; coordinating the activities of GAO, BOB, and Treasury
48 Management style; example of Joint Financial Management Program and NASA; usefulness of a three-member decision group
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
48-49 Contact with Lloyd Berkner and the Research Board for National Security; management of science after the war
49-50 Webb's role in Truman era group
50-51 Activities as Director of Bureau of Budget (BOB)
50-51 National Science Foundation, Vannevar Bush and the civilian funding of science
51-52 Truman on Bush's proposal for civilian funding of science
52-53 Tensions between Bush and Truman; Bush and the military during the war
53 Knowledge of priority of developing missile technology after the war
53-54 Activities as Director of BOB; management of Bureau staff
55 Gathering information for decision-making
55-56 Management of staff and fulfilling presidential charges to BOB
56-57 Under Secretary of State; appointment
57-58 Personal life after marriage in 1938; wife's background, assistance in his work at the State Department
58 Plans after the Truman Administration
59-61 Discussion of subjects for future interviews; work with Senator Robert Kerr; NASA
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
62-65 Discussion of Webb's management style; published accounts of Webb's management work
65-72 Management at NASA after the Apollo fire; monitoring contract with North American, Rockwell through Assistant Administrator for Special Contracts, Bernie Moritz
67 Response of Manned Spaceflight Office to new arrangement for monitoring contract; Mueller's response
67 Role of Sam Phillips in removal of configuration control from Manned Spaceflight Office
68 Morris' background at NASA; participation in analysis of Source Evaluation Board (SEB) Reports
69 SEB's method for evaluation proposals
69 Tiger Team Concept
69-70 Selecting a course of action after the Apollo fire
70 North American reaction to Boeing's Role in configuration contract after fire
71-72 Digression on disposition of Seamans' and Draper's personal papers
72-94 Appointment and early days as NASA administrator
72-73 Acquaintance with Seamans and Dryden prior to NASA
73-74 Contact with Dryden during the selection process for NASA Administrator; account of meeting with Vice President Johnson
74-75 Reluctance to accept appointment
75-77 Activities of Webb just prior to becoming Administrator
75 Knowledge of deliberations on the choice of an Administrator
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
78 Meeting with President Kennedy
78 Interest in space developments prior to NASA appointment
79 Work at Educational Services prior to NASA; influence on University Programs
80-81 Meeting with President Kennedy; Webb's policy experience as an important factor in his selection
81-82 Activities immediately after selection as Administrator designate; selection of Dryden as Deputy
82 Assessment of organizational structure of NASA
83 Early role of Seamans
83 Quality of staff at NASA
84 Activities prior to confirmation
84 Relinquishing other responsibilities after confirmation
84-85 Discussions with Lloyd Berkner on accepting position of NASA Administrator; importance of relationship with scientists and universities
86 Activities during first days as Administrator; importance of stressing innovative management
87 Developing management expertise within NASA; comparison with Glennan Administration
87-88 March 22, 1961 meeting with Kennedy; working toward decision on program priorities for NASA
88 Air Force attempt to discourage Mercury Program
88-89 Necessity to build confidence of staff in their role in decision-making
90 Contact with von Braun
90-91 DOD and NASA agreement on Booster development; difficulties in reaching an agreement
91-92 Approach to reviewing and evaluating programs
92 Guidance from the White House on NASA programs
92-94 1961 Reorganization of NASA
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
95-96 Homer Newell and the Sustaining University Program (SUP)
96-97 Inducing universities to work with NASA to satisfy NASA needs; NASA traineeships and fellowships
97-98 Encouraging universities to maximize the use of their own institutional resources to address important problems
98-99 Encouraging multi-disciplinary problem-solving at universities
99 Organization of NASA along disciplinary lines; removing OSSA from OMS
100 Contact with Berkner, John Simpson, Sam Silver
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
100-101 Homer Newell and SUP
101-102 Space Engineering Board
102 Contact with Fred Seitz
102-103 Relationship with Space Science Board (SSB); example of management style to get SSB to best serve NASA needs
103 Conference on SUP
103-104 Importance of getting capable people to contribute to decision-making and administration; example of Jastrow's Institute
104 Expanding the research capability of the nation in space sciences
104-105 Contact with Richard Porter
105-106 JPL-CALTECH relationship; issue of graduate students training at JPL
106 Relationship with Pickering
106-107 JPL's administrative strengths and weaknesses; issue of operational accountability
107-108 Influence of the Development of JSC on Rice University and the University of Texas
108-109 Discussion of the site selections of NASA facilities
110 Use of historical data to study contemporary issues; Space Station and SDI
110-111 Contact with Kennedy on site selection for JSC
111 Background to the Webb-McNamara Memorandum
112-113 Decision to pursue a lunar landing as NASA's major initiative
113-114 Importance of being able to justify the value of the program at each progressive stage
114-115 Value of program to enhance knowledge of engineering and science
114 Selling of Lunar Landing Program to Kennedy; emphasis on Webb's ability to administrate a successful program
115-116 Dealing with scientific critics
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
117-119 Influence of World War II on the importance of developing organizational and technological capabilities for the Post-War Era; exploiting the research capabilities of universities for industry and government needs
119-120 Lloyd Berkner; developing resources for science and technology
120-122 First appreciation of the need for cooperative effort between universities, industry and government in developing science and technology; experience at Sperry and in the Marine Corps
122-123 Importance of theoretical constructs in problem-solving
123 Importance of universities as a resource for problem-solving
123-124 Developing administrative concept of applying force proportional to the need while at Sperry
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
124-126 Effect of World War II on industry's concept of cooperative effort within industry and with universities and government; pre-war model of aviation industry
126-127 Influence of military in promoting cooperative efforts, especially Navy
127 Concern at NASA with secondary impacts of programs
128 Lloyd Berkner and NSF
128 Role of individuals in fostering organizational change
129 Role of universities as sources of ideas and as educators
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
130-131 Presenting the case for a lunar landing to Kennedy; lunar landing within US capability but probably beyond Soviet capability
131-132 Presenting the case for a lunar landing to Kennedy; importance of prolonged political support for program
132-133 Other possible space projects which were considered; lunar landing as a definitive goal compared to the more problematic and ambiguous goal of a space station
133-134 Consideration given to the usefulness of capabilities developed in the program for military and industry
134-135 Assurances as to political commitment for a lunar landing; President's approach was only to authorize the program and then evaluate it on its progress
135 Importance of organizing the program so as to add to scientific and technological knowledge as the program progressed from stage to stage
136 Policy for dealing with Congressional budget process; refusal to ask for supplemental appropriations
137 Possibility of stranding an astronaut on the moon
137 Innovation of "all-up-systems testing"
137-138 Reaching a decision on a technical issue such as "all-up-Systems Testing"
138-139 Monitoring the application of financial resources to specific goals; reporting systems
140 Program Reviews
140 NOVA and other rocket proposals; planned alternative in event of Saturn failure
141 Evaluation of proposals; deciding on technical workability of Saturn
142 Internal NASA support for Apollo
142 Balancing between sticking with particular designs and adapting designs as problems occurred as well as developing alternative designs
142-144 Selecting and monitoring contractors; procurement in relation to NASA goals and the pressures
144-145 Procurement and SEB; evaluation of SEB selections by Webb, Dryden and Seamans
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
145-146 Contractor hiring, procurement and the development of national capabilities in space sciences; balancing contractor capabilities versus NASA needs
146 SUP and the need to extend the base of University Research in Space Science
147 Knowledge of the capabilities of the aerospace industry and its importance in the careful procurement of contracts
147-149 Discussion with Air Force on capabilities of contractors in procurement decisions
149 Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board; contractors working concurrently for Air Force and NASA
149 Reorganizing NASA procurement under Webb
150 Monitoring contractor charges
150 Problem of informality of contract procurement at Goddard
151 Conveying to industry the NASA procurement philosophy; no toleration for change orders
151-152 Industry pressure to extend NASA program beyond established purview
152 Phase Production Planning
152-153 Establishing SUP; removing university research contracts and grants from regular procurement system; satisfying manpower needs of industry
154-155 John Simpson, University of Chicago and SUP
155-156 Harvard and SUP
156-157 MIT and SUP
157-158 Coordinating SUP with the programs of NSF, NIH and other agencies which supported university research
158-159 Caution in spending government funds for informal meetings, travel etc.
159-160 Absence of coordination between budget requests of NASA, NSF, & NIH; difference in NASA funding to universities, money to institutions not to individual students
160-161 Relation with NSF over NASA support of research and development
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
162-193 Discussion of themes in Levine's Managing NASA in the Apollo Era, Rosholt's An Administrative History of NASA 1958 - 1963
163-164 NASA as Webb inherited it from Glennan
164-165 Importance of giving Rosholt and Levine full access to everything
164 Idea of having a center representing everything NASA does
166 Factors in putting through the Apollo Program
166-168 Developing the capability in NASA Centers to work with the industrial and university sectors
167-168 Consciously building a model of how to deal with large projects
168-169 Specific day-to-day goals underlined by concerted goal to develop a capability for the US to be pre-eminent in space
169 Applicability of this model to projects of other organizations
170-171 Decision against follow-on programs and long term planning
170-174 Importance of finishing Apollo successfully before making further commitments
172-175 Long range planning at the NASA Centers; the review process, the SEB
175 Expectations for commitment from the US government to long range goals
175-177 Educating administrators; locating trainable people to operate under the proper procedures of the government
177-178 Importance of strength in science and administration
178-179 Problem of inefficiency in government
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
179-180 Importance of sound procedures for accurate feedback and reporting to Congress
181 Levine's thoughts on the 1961 reorganization
181-182 Resistance of program managers and field centers to Webb's new functional organizations
182-183 Importance of carefully choosing the top administrators
183-184 Breaking up confining administrative tendencies
184 Ensuring that the top people share the same missions and goals
184-186 Wernher von Braun as an example
186 Ensuring coordination and cooperation between the various Space Task Groups
187 Question of contracting out versus developing in-house capabilities
187-188 Contracting with IBM, AT&T
189 Political difficulties with contracting out
189 Resistance of companies to give up monopolies on information
190 Contracting with GE on instrumentation
191 Importance of simultaneously developing several approaches to one problem
192 Evaluation of Levine's conclusion that the success of the program was in making advantages work toward a single goal
192-193 Balancing out the conflicting demands of Congress for and against long range plans
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
194-205 Discussion of confidential material from Webb's State Department career for background and contextual information
194-196 Structural reorganization of the State Department after the war
196 Memo from the spring of 1950 regarding communication capabilities
196 Webb's role in the management of this information flow
196-197 Pattern of reports
197 Coordination of State Department information gathering efforts with the activities of other intelligence gathering agencies
198 Informal coordination between agencies
199 Importance of having the right attitude
199-200 Desire for unified policy positions at the State Department
200-201 Democracy as the exposing of problems of society to the largest number of able minds and resolving possible solutions through debate and persuasion
201-202 Memo from McWilliams of May 26, 1950 concerning the proper carrying out of the functions of the Department by the secretariat
202-205 Correspondence with Dean Acheson, ca. 1951-52, discussing how to handle difficult personnel problems; for example Paul Nitze, head of Policy Planning Staff
205 Discussion of NASA materials
205 Document explaining the reasoning of Dryden, Seamans, and Webb in selecting North American for the Apollo contract although Martin Marietta received a higher score from the Source Evaluation Board (SEB)
206 Astronauts' preference for North American
206-207 Importance of impressions, experience, and hard data incoming to a decision
207 Self-policing feature of the SEB
207-208 Memo indicating the efforts of a senior official to persuade members of Congress on the committee that Webb should not be administrator; jockeying for the position on the space program between Congress and NASA
208-210 Issue of supplemental appropriation; Holmes
210-211 Memo from Webb to an oil man in Oklahoma; relationship with Senator Robert Kerr
211-212 Margaret Chase Smith
212 Correspondence with Mervin Kelly, July 2, 1963, concerning the relationships between NASA HQ and the Centers
212 Management technique of not permitting a center director to put out an organization chart involving his top level management without Webb's signature
213 Computerization of all launch data as an immediate backup system
213-214 Importance of role played by Mervin Kelly
215 Getting people to see the difference between doing their job as they saw it or as Webb saw it in the larger context of the organization
215-216 Letter from President Johnson, August 23, 1964; the importance of building personal relationships
216-217 Letter to Arnold Frutkin, June 28, 1966
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
217-218 Webb's policy of encouraging people to send memoranda to Webb on their thinking about particular issues
218-219 Discussion of the Red Blaik correspondence
219-220 Communication between Congress and NASA; Clinton Henderson, Senator Kerr
220-222 Relationships with members of the House; George Mueller, Tiger Teague, Joe Martin
222-224 Red Blaik's suggestion to establish a centralized liaison office with Congress: story about Dick Callaghan
224-225 System of "scouts"
225-227 Military applications of NASA programs as a benefit in selling programs to Congress
227-229 Site selection for the Electronic Research Center
229 Normal site selection procedure
229-230 Encroachment by the nation's scientific elite upon NASA; Red Blaik's warning
230 Controversy surrounding the Manhattan Project
230-232 Controversy surrounding "Star Wars"
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
233-236 The use of history to guide administrators
233 NASA history office
233-234 Value of historical precedents during the initial stages of NASA
234-236 Effect of experience on people
236-248 Discussion of various individuals and their contributions to NASA's effort
236 George Mueller
236 Brainerd Holmes leaves NASA
237-238 Dave Wright selects Mueller
238 Reservations about Mueller
239 Theory on choosing personnel
239-240 Instilling an attitude of cooperation
240-242 Conflicts between George Mueller and Homer Newell
242-243 Tension between space science people and manned space flight people at NASA
243-245 Seaman's and Dryden's acceptance of Webb's administrative philosophy
245-246 Working out differences and possible conflicts between Seamans, Dryden and Webb
247-248 System for circulating information; making the troika work
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
249 von Braun and his tendency to step outside of NASA procedures
250 Wernher von Braun's impatience with paperwork
250-252 Taking advantage of von Braun's talent as a speaker
252-253 von Braun's disappointment with the decision on Saturn V
253-254 Harry Goett and various problems
254-255 Importance of working within the system; Abe Silverstein
255-256 Creating reserve strengths, i.e., Abe Silverstein on Centaur
256 Bellcom as a reserve strength
257-258 JPL's technical successes in the deep space network
258 William Pickering and the unwillingness at JPL to open up lunar and planetary science to any good scientist in the US
259-260 John F. Kennedy and the policy implications of NASA's work with him
260-262 Webb's policy toward Kennedy
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
263 Deliberate creation of the Source Evaluation Board as a reserve strength
263-265 Discussion of Stark Draper's speech "Human Destiny and the Engineering Method"
265-266 Similar elements in Draper's and Webb's Philosophies
266-267 Interconnectedness between engineering capabilities and limited resources
267-268 Relationship with Jerome Wiesner
268-269 Relationship with Vannevar Bush
269-270 Importance of retaining contact with the President when working for him
Appendix 1 Discussion regarding Smithsonian Museum Policy (OHI #4)
Appendix 2 Discussion regarding collections issues (OHI #5)
Wilson, Thorton A. Dates: August 25, 1988; January 13, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 3 hrs.; 39 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing and education including a M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from CALTECH in 1947, Wilson (b. 1921) discusses working thereafter for Boeing as an aerodynamics engineer on such projects as the B-55 and B-52 and being sent by Boeing in 1952 and 1953 to MIT on a Sloane Fellowship to study management. He then describes various aspects of his position as Boeing's program manager for the Minuteman beginning in 1958, including organizational procedures and controls for resolving problems and his interaction with other key figures. Phillips next reviews various aspects of Boeing's management policies and philosophies and the aerospace industry's relations with its customers and the government.
August 25, 1988
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Wilson not major player in space program; assisted in fund raising for Glennan, Webb and Seamans project
2 Subjects Wilson will not discuss during interview
2-3 Family background; education
3-4 Attending CALTECH; CALTECH faculty: Clark Millikan, Hans Liepman and Homer Joe Stewart
4-5 Duties at Boeing after attending CALTECH; nominated to MIT's management program
5 Boeing's transition from aircraft producer to missile producer
5-6 Wilson assigned to run Minutemen; preparers of Minuteman contract proposal: Pete Peterson, Doug Graves, Bill Owens and Art Phillips
6-8 Perception of different management skills required in producing the B-52 and early missile projects
6-7 Douglas and the Thor project; Boeing and Bomarc
8 Wilson's disagreement with statement that interfacing is perceived to be more complex in missile production than in aeronautics
8-9 Creation of Ramo-Wooldridge by Air Force seen as a reason for the continued perception of difficulty in missile program
9-10 Wilson's interaction with Ramo-Wooldridge as Minuteman program manager
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-11 Transfer of management techniques in military projects to NASA
11-12 Boeing as associate contractor on Minuteman; organizational problems in the B-1 and the B-52
12 Shared sense of purpose among contractors in Minuteman program
13 Minuteman concept invented by Ed Hall; Colonel Otto Glasser in charge of Minuteman program; Sam Phillips, Bill Leonard
14-15 Mechanisms for solving Minuteman problems: Production Control Board, Interface Contest Drawing meetings
15-16 Organizational control for Boeing divided into nine areas by Wilson
16-17 CSCS (Cost Schedules Controls) used as reporting technique on Minuteman
17-18 Management techniques used in Minuteman program established in previous programs
18 Closing comments
January 13, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
19-20 Relationship as project manager with outgoing management; involvement in implementation of Minuteman program
20-21 Wilson's use of communication and leadership skills as project manager
21-22 Assessment of essential lessons learned from Minuteman program
22-23 Importance of formalizing project procedures; effect upon Boeing
23-24 Key characteristics of good leadership and management
24-25 Specific contributions by top Boeing management
25-26 Implementation of annual and long-range plans during the mid 1960s
26-27 Discussion of important issues in understanding Boeing as an organization
27-29 Striking a balance between direct communication and organizational discipline
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
29 Circumvention of line organization
29-30 Encouragement of flexibility in management staff
30-32 How aerospace industry corporate behavior differs from industry in general
32 Level of commercial customer involvement in production at Boeing
32-33 Characterization of relationship between government and industry during the 1960s and the present
33-34 Critical elements in positive working relationships
34-35 Industry's view of their relationship with the government; working within necessary constraints
35-36 Problems with corporate advertising
36 Recollection of post Apollo fire meeting with Allen, Webb and Stoner
37 Nature of Webb's proposal to Boeing
37-38 Impact of TIE program upon Boeing
38-39 Later contact with the TIE program
York, Herbert. Dates: June 29, 1988; January 24, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 3.5 hrs.; 51 pp. Use restriction: Open (1); Public (1).
York reviews various aspects of his career in the 1950s and early 1960s, including his work on the USAF Scientific Advisory Board's Nuclear Panel and the contributions of various RAND personnel to the Panel; his membership on and the contributions of others like Stark Draper, Si Ramo, and General Schriever to the two Strategic Missile Evaluation Committees; and the role of Ramo-Wooldridge in the USAF missile programs. He then describes his association with the Killian and Gaither Committees, involvement with the Presidential Science Advisory Board and its Space Assessment and Missile Assessment Panels, and some of the recommendations of these panels. York next discusses his work at ARPA, various problems he encountered there, and the evolution of the space program.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Impact on physics community of nuclear weapons development
1-2 York's work on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Nuclear Panel activity, briefings; RAND contribution to the panel
2-3 Stark Draper's contribution to von Neumann committee
3-5 Discussion of nuclear strategy, cost estimates, Polaris development
5-7 York's participation in Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee; committee briefings; meeting to establish Air Force Western Development Division and Ramo-Wooldridge advisory role; reliability of intelligence about Soviets; overlap with other committees
7-9 Simon Ramo offers York a job in 1955; York's interest in space; contemporary attitudes towards "man-in-space" 9-10 Ballistic Missile Advisory Committee recommendation to develop Titan; criticism of one and one-half stage Atlas design; questions about development of two-stage systems
10-11 Roles of Ben Schriever, Simon Ramo, and Ramo-Wooldridge in ballistic panel deliberations
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-14 Special role of Ramo-Wooldridge in advising Air Force; Frank Collbohm's objections
14-15 Air Force response to ballistic panel
15-17 Issue of collaboration between industry and government; Ramo-Wooldridge special role; creation of Space Technology Laboratories (STL); creation of Aerospace Corporation; development of for-profit think tanks
17-20 York's association with Gaither panel; nature of intelligence about Soviet facilities; division within intelligence community, leaks
20-22 Killian Committee Base Assessment Panel; reconnaissance
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22 Panel recommendation to proceed with Army Jupiter launch
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
23-24 Discussion of Space Assessment Panel and Missile Assessment Panel recommendations
25 Impact of Sputnik upon Minuteman decision
25-26 Consideration of strategic implications of missile systems
26-27 Assessment of manned vs. unmanned activity in space
27-28 Scientific contribution to formulation of space policy and activity
28-30 Process of establishing priorities
30-32 Organizational questions in the context of the plan "Blueprint for Space"
32-33 Overlap between blueprint for Space Committee and the classified programs panel
33-34 Relationship with National Security Council
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
34-35 Importance of ARPA activities as a resource for Secretary of Defense
35-37 Concentration of corporate people at Livermore; staffing decisions
37-39 Project proposals and assessment; work with Roy Johnson and John Clark
39-40 Difficulties with Johnson; his problems with the White House and Killian
40-42 York's viewpoint of ARPA as expressed in his book Making Weapons, Talking Peace
42 ARPA's role in program oversight
42-44 York as DDR&E; relationship with Keith Glennan
44-45 Discussion of interservice rivalry
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
45 The Wiesner Report; review of the space program in 1960
45-46 Joint study of space program under McNamara, John Rubel's contributions
46-47 Importance of prestige in the US Space Program
48-49 DOD interest in more centralized control over space program
49-50 McNamara's management philosophy and style
50 Reactions to the evolution of the space program
50-51 Discussion of space reconnaissance activities
Rev. 09/06/96