Adams, Bob; Trevino, Robert; Havens, Kitty. Date: January 9, 1986. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr. 22 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Adams describes involvement of Extra Vehicular Activity Team with ST planning from 1981; recalls his observation of and participation in water tank tests at Marshall Space Center. Adams relates development of ST EVA tools, including wrenches and foot restraints, for earlier missions. Adams, Trevino and Havens recall their EVA experiences prior to their involvement with ST and describe their EVA specialties. Trevino comments on institutional setting of ST EVA team at Johnson Space Center. Discussion includes changes in NASA's and contractors' definitions of ST's repairability and the effects of EVA experience with other payloads such as Solar Max (1981-2). Havens comments on NASA staff turnover and its effects on institutional memory, noting compilation of ST EVA tool catalogue. Havens also describes crew training and the writing of flight procedures manual. Additional thoughts on the changing timetable for preparing ST repair missions. Conversation concludes with comments on possible effects of space station and EVA team's contacts with Institute scientists.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Adams describes the long-term involvement of Extra Vehicular Activity team with ST planning; tool development
2 Adams recalls his involvement with ST beginning 1981
2-3 Adams' predecessors on EVA team
3 Learning about the ST payload in Marshall Center's water tank
3-4 Adams' observations of EVA procedures in water tank
4 Adams' contact with Main Systems Division representative at Marshall
4-5 Adams outlines his non-ST EVA duties
5 Trevino describes his crew training and hardware development responsibilities
5-6 Trevino's initial involvement with ST and Solar Maximum Satellite in 1981-2
6 Use of ST wrenches for earlier missions
6-7 Sharing information among EVA, Marshall and Lockheed personnel; developing foot restraints, wrench sockets
7 Adams discusses importance of Solar Max to devising ST Orbital Replacement Unit procedures
7-8 Development of foot restraint designs
8 Discussion of Johnson EVA team's physical separation from Marshall water tank; Trevino discusses friction between Johnson and Marshall centers over EVA training
8-9 Adam's and Trevino's contacts at Marshall
9 Design changes affecting ST's in-flight repairability
9-10 Effects of experience with Solar Max on concept of ST repairability
10 Trevino recalls his initial skepticism about ST repairability
10-12 Input of EVA crews on Shuttle, ST designs; adoption of EVA specifications for Shuttle bay doors; Trevino discusses repairability in context of ST system redundancy; eg., solararrays
12 Trevino briefly reviews development of ST Maintenance and Refurbishment plans; success of EVA procedures on Solar Max, Orbital Refueling System and West Star Retrieval Mission
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Havens briefly outlines her EVA responsibilities
13 Havens reviews her EVA duties with Solar Max, ORS
13-14 NASA turnover and transmission of Apollo and Gemini experiences to young staff
14 Trevino's Apollo experience; involvement of other EVA engineers with Skylab
14-15 Compilation of EVA tool catalogue
15-16 Adams and Havens discuss use of films of Skylab and other previous EVA missions
16 Thermal-vac tests of maintenance mission tools, such as portable foot restraint
17 Fit-checking ST maintenance tools
17-18 Adams discusses participation in neutral buoyancy exercises at Marshall
18 Havens outlines crew training flight procedure responsibilities
18-19 Delays in writing flight procedures manual
19 Trevino discusses designing tools and equipment for Block 2 Orbital Replacement Units; Trevino discusses new responsibility for ST repairs immediately after launch
19-20 Possible need for repair missions on short notice
20 Havens offers overview of her, Trevino's and Adam's respective EVA specialties
20-21 Effects on EVA procedures of proposed space station
21-22 Contact with STScI scientists
22 Scientific contacts through Jay Apt
Aucremanne, M. Date: November 21, 1983. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Allan Needell. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 25 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Aucremanne recalls joining NASA as first project manager under Mort Stollar. Describes his educational background and positions at NASA (1959-1968). Describes organization at Headquarters and relations with Marshall Space Flight Center. Discusses origins of Grand Orbiting Telescope and manned version. Describes Astronomy Missions Board and its support for Large Space Telescope. Discusses competition between Goddard and Marshall as LST moved into Phase A. Describes role of planetary astronomers in debate between ground-based observers and LST advocates. Discusses question of data management once LST was deployed. Describes principal concerns of '70s including mirror and overall project organization. Discusses phases of LST development. Describes NASA's role in influencing Congress. Discusses LST budget and role of the shuttle.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-10 NASA Project for Explorers and Sounding Rockets
1 Joining NASA; first project Manager under Mort Stollar
2 Educational background
2 Positions at NASA 1959-1968
3 Relations with Goddard Space Flight Center
4 The managing aspects of establishing and promoting programs
5 Organization of Headquarters
5-6 Relations with Marshall Space Flight
6 Origins of Grand Orbiting Telescope (GOT) and Manned Orbiting Telescope (MOT)
7-8 Astronomy Missions Board
8 Supporters of Large Space Telescope (LST) on the Astronomy Missions Board
9 Itek
10 Competition between the Office of Space Science and the Office of Manned Space Flight
10-25 Program Manager for Advanced Programs and Technology
10 Getting LST into Phase A
11 Competition between people at Goddard and at Marshall
12 Presentation to George Low
12-13 Car pool with Roman, Ashworth, Holtz and Dubin
13 Anderson from OAST and funding
14 Debate between ground-based astronomers and LST advocates
15 Role of planetary astronomers in this debate
16 Competition between Goddard and Marshall to become the lead center
17 Debate of how to manage the resulting science, or data
17 Organization at Headquarters
18 Major concerns in the seventies: the large mirror project
19 The project's structure and organization; Downey, O'Dell
20-21 Moving from Phase A to B, and from Phase B to Phases C and D
21 Headquarter's role in influencing Congress as to LST
22 Roles of Lyman Spitzer, Bahcall, and O'Dell and the LST budget
23 The intended effect of supporting LST
23 Discussing the size options being considered
24-25 The Shuttle
Bahcall, John N. Date: November 3, 1983. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 30 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Bahcall recounts his scientific biography, including work at CALTECH, changing interests from physics to theoretical astronomy, and joining the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study in 1971. He describes his involvement with Space Telescope Phase B planning, especially his advocacy of a photometric scientific instrument and the "serendipity mode" of ST camera observations. Bahcall concludes with an extensive discussion of the astronomers' 1973-77 lobbying campaign on behalf of ST funding, covering such topics as Congressional attitudes toward ST, the shaping of an astronomers' consensus in favor of the instrument, tactics and argument used in lobbying congressional staff and representatives, and the key astronomer participates in the effort
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Academic background; career at CALTECH, move to Princeton Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) in 1971; research objectives ca. 1970s
3 Awareness of Large Space Telescope (LST) at Princeton in early 1970s
3-4 Contacts with C.R. O'Dell concerning LST, 1973
4-5 Bahcall's career, cont.: transition from theoretical physics to astronomy, 1960s
5-6 Current concepts for LST design at the time Bahcall joined the Phase B LST Science Working Group, 1973: ASTRA proposals
6-7 Discussions of LST design scope, 1973-4
7-8 Bahcall's efforts to have a photometer included in LST/ST Phase B instrument planning
8-10 Bahcall's advocacy of a "serendipity mode" for ST camera observations
10 Neta Bahcall's involvement with LST/ST Phase B
11 Early awareness of Congressional doubts about LST, ca. 1973-74
11-12 LST deleted from Congressional appropriations, ca. 1973-74
12-13 NASA attitudes toward LST, 1974
13-14 Restrictions on lobbying actions by NASA personnel
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Organization of 1974 scientists' campaign for ST; roles of Bahcall, Spitzer, Field
17 Pace of Bahcall's lobbying activity, summer 1974
17-18 Lobbying tactics employed in the pro-ST campaigns
18-19 Bahcall's and Spitzer's reception on Capitol Hill, 1974; reactions to scientist lobbying
20-21 Role of potential ST contractors in scientists' lobbying campaign
22 George Wallerstein's role in ST lobbying campaigns
22-23 Arguments used to advocate ST to various constituencies
23-24 Greenstein Committee report and ST funding
24 Jesse Greenstein and ST
25 Relationship of federal funding for ground-based astronomy to funding for space-based astronomy
25-26 NASA attitudes toward ST, cont
26-29 Astronomy community's response to LST/ST, 1973-75
27 Jesse Greenstein and ST
29-30 C.R. O'Dell and the astronomy community
Bahcall, John N. Date: December 20, 1983. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Bahcall comments on his lobbying activities on behalf of Space Telescope (1974-77). He describes astronomers' reactions to ST, potential budget conflicts between ST and planetary probes, OMB influence on ST planning, various legislators' and congressional staffers' reactions to ST, the role of the NASA Congressional Office in ST lobbying, ST contractor lobbying, NASA Administrator's Office reaction to ST, and the role of the Presidential Science and Technology Advisor. Bahcall also discusses optical astronomy in the era of big science, site selection for the ST Science Institute, ESA participation in the ST project, and the selection of a detector for the ST Wide Field Camera.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 ST and geosynchronous orbit
1-2 ST status ca. 1983; FGS performance
2-3 Bahcall's Louisiana background as source for political contacts for ST lobbying
3 ST lobbying compared to physicists' lobbying
4 Opposition to ST within astronomical community
5-6 ST and planetary science; ST and Solar Max, JOP
6 Preston Committee of 1975; origins of STScI
7 ST and OMB
7-8 Relationship between space- and ground-based astronomy
8 Impact of astronomers' lobby on ST approval
9 Lessons for astronomy from the ST lobby effort
9-10 Government funding in relation to astronomy
10 Contrasts between individual and group science
10-11 Congressmen's reactions to ST scientist lobbying
12 Bahcall and Congressman Max Baucus
13-14 Bahcall enlists Cong. Lindy Boggs for ST
14 Cong. Edward Boland's reaction to ST
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 Boland and ST, cont.
15-16 Bahcall lobbies Sen. Proxmire's staff for ST
16 Boland's staff and ST
17 Joe Allen, the NASA Congressional Office, and ST
17-18 Bahcall's broad arguments for ST before Congress
18-20 ST scientists meet with James Fletcher, 1976
20 Fletcher's response to ST
20-21 Possible budget tradeoff between ST, 5th shuttle orbiter
21 Frank Press as ST advocate to Pres. Carter
21-22 Bahcall's contacts with media on behalf of ST
23 Martin Marietta publicity for ST funding
23 Relation between science and industry lobbying for ST approval
24-25 IR instruments for ST; Garry Neugebauer and JPL
25-26 1980 Science Working Group (SWG) discussion of removing spectrographs to reduce ST costs
27-28 Distribution of ST observing time
28-29 SWG reaction to ESA participation in ST
29-30 ESA impressions of the ST arrangement
30-31 Bahcall's interest in CCDs for ST cameras
31 The Princeton-Lyman Spitzer camera team
32 The CALTECH CCD camera team; Jim Westphal
33 Princeton as site for ST science institute
Bahcall, John N. Date: March 22, 1984. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 28 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Bahcall discusses Congressional reaction to Space Telescope proposals ca. 1975-77. He reviews early proposals for a Space Telescope Science Institute, and describes lobbying and committee activity in favor of the idea, ca. 1972-77. He discusses the Hornig and Keller reports of 1976-77 on Institutional Arrangements for ST, and the resulting NASA Announcement of Opportunity for university consortia to build and manage an ST Institute. Finally, he describes at length Princeton's role as a site for the Institute proposals of three consortia, compares the five final competing consortia proposals, and discusses Princeton reaction to the selection of the AURA-Johns Hopkins proposals as the winning Institute bid.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Congressional sentiment on Space Telescope (ST) funding, ca. 1975-77
1-2 ST funding and Galileo/Jupiter Orbiter-Probe
3 Congressional understanding of space observatories
2-3 Ramsey Committee Report on institutional arrangements for space astronomy and LST, 1966
3 LST/ST Phase B Science Working Group support for a Space Telescope institute; C.R. O'Dell's role
3-4 Concepts for a broad space astronomy institute
4-5 Balancing service and research at science institutes; institutes and universities compared
6 Staffing the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI); research at STScI
6-7 Scientist advocates of the ST institute concept; lobbying NASA Administration Robert Frosch, late '70s
7-8 Astronomers' attitudes toward NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
8-9 GSFC interest in ST institute concepts, ca. 1975
9-10 NAS Hornig Committee Report on Institutional Arrangements for the Space Telescope, 1976
10-11 NASA's Keller Report on ST arrangements, 1977
11 Astronomers' reactions to the Keller Report
11-12 NASA response to the Hornig Report, 1976-77
12-13 Issues concerning STScI's role in the NASA Table of Organization
13 NASA Announcement of Opportunity for STScI management proposals
13-14 Princeton's role in STScI proposal competition
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Computer Sciences Corp. and the Princeton site proposals for STScI
14-15 AUI and Princeton scientists involved with AUI's Princeton-based STScI bid
15-16 NASA Source Evaluation Board (SEB) for STScI bids
16-17 Bahcall's role in persuading consortia to propose Princeton as their STScI site
17-18 NASA SEB's STScI contractor decision; AURA's bid
19 Selection of Princeton as STScI site in AUI, USRA, and Battelleproposals
20-21 AUI-Princeton and AURA-Johns Hopkins STScI proposals compared
21-22 Princeton Institute for Advanced Study and STScI
22-23 New Jersey political support for Princeton bid
24-26 Bahcall as designated STScI director in AUI bid
27-28 Reactions at Princeton to success of AURA STScI bid
Bahcall, John N. Date: March 28, 1984. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Bahcall briefly reviews Phase B reduction of the projected scope of the Space Telescope. He reviews early concepts for an infra-red instrument for ST, as well as the final proposed IR instrument designs. Bahcall discusses European participation in ST science through the Faint Object Camera, as well as US scientists' reactions to that participation. He recreates discussion of emerging CCD technology as a potential detector for the Wide Field Camera, and recounts the decisions which went into final selection of the CALTECH CCD proposal. Bahcall concludes with a thumbnail sketch of the origins of other SIs and a discussion of difficulties associated with achieving the limiting magnitude required by the ST fine guidance guide star system.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Concepts of a 'minimum' space telescope ca. 1974; LST/ST Phase B Science Working Group
1-2 Phase B discussion of ST core scientific instruments (SIs); Infra-red (IR) SI concepts
2-3 ST final SI wavelength coverage; IR SI, cont
4 SI selection process, ca. 1977
4-5 European Space Agency (ESA) participation on ST SIs: the Faint Object Camera (FOC)
5-6 Phase B Science Working Group (SWG) debate on ESA participation in core Sis
6-7 Guaranteed observing time for ESA scientists on ST
7-8 Phase B SWG discussion of planetary science's role on ST
8-9 Alternative detectors for the Phase B ST Wide Field Camera design: film, SEC Vidicon
9 CCDs as an emerging detector technology ca. 1976
9-11 Bahcall's insistence to Lyman Spitzer that a CCD be coupled with the SEC Vidicon-based Princeton Wide Field Camera design
11 Princeton scientists involved with the SEC Vidicon
11-12 Discussions with Spitzer on promise of CCDs
12-13 James Westphal of CALTECH
13-14 Bahcall discusses need for a CCD-based ST camera with Westphal, James Gunn
14-15 Relation of CCDs to cutting edge of known technology, ca. 1976-77
15 Origins of the ST Faint Object Spectrograph
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Selection of the ST High Resolution Spectrograph
16-17 Centers of spectrograph expertise: Goddard Space Flight Center
17-18 Origins of the ST High Speed Photometer; Bahcall's role
18-21 ST Guide Star Selection System; issues concerning need to upgrade ST star tracking capability to handle 14th magnitude stars for fine guidance
21-22 "Serendipity Mode" of ST observations
Bahcall, Neta. Date: March 27, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 31 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Bahcall discusses her family background and academic career in Israel, and in the United States at CALTECH and Princeton. She describes the evolution of her research interests from physics toward astrophysics, and her peripheral involvement in early Phase B Space Telescope issues particularly consideration of 'serendipity mode' observations. Dr. Bahcall then discusses her career as head of the Space Telescope Institute General Observer Branch from 1983 to the present. Topics covered include the GO Branch's role as the chief liaison between ST and the general astronomy community, the ST proposal process, and the proposal review process. She comments on numerous particular challenges the GO Branch faces, including distributing observing time among subdisciplines, conducting long-range planning, working with the Space Telescope Advisory Committee planning for 'key projects', and determining the distribution of the guaranteed European 15% in ST observing time. Dr. Bahcall concludes with observation on the working environment at the ST Science Institute.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Background of family; family interest in science; early interest in medicine
1-2 Development of own interest in science and math
2 Hebrew University of Jerusalem; takes teaching degree; Willy Fowler
2-3 CALTECH; studies nuclear physics
3 Weizmann Institute; John Bahcall; Meets and marries John Bahcall
3-4 Kellogg Laboratories; Tommy Lawrenson; Willy Fowler; takes PhD with Willy Fowler; first time works on problems in astrophysics
4 Solar neutrino problem; CALTECH; Princeton; Bahcall's move to Princeton
4-5 Martin Schmidt; Walt Sargeant; Jesse Greenstein; Fritz Zwicky; moves into clusters of galaxy research; contacts with astronomers at CALTECH
5 Princeton; Peebles; LST; John Bahcall; Lyman Spitzer; no direct role in ST in 1970s; minor involvement; AUI; Battelle; Hornig Committee; Serendipity Mode
5-7 Wide Field Camera; letter from Bahcall on the serendipity mode in 1973; rationale of serendipity mode
7 Palomar Sky Survey
7 Science Institute; how recruited to the Science Institute
8 Princeton; joins Institute in early 1983
8-9 General Observer Branch; Riccardo Giacconi; perceived challenges; how she 'opened up' the Institute to the community
9-10 Baltimore; Tucson; community thoughts on efforts of Institute to 'open up' decision-making; possible 'users guide'; 'Call for Proposals' document; what it will be Instrument handbooks; plan a pamphlet for each instrument
11-12 General Observer Branch; expectation of frequency of visits to Institute
12 Space Telescope; restraints because ST is not a 'real time' observatory
12-14 TRW; designing forms for observers; photometer; Fine Guidance system
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-16 STAC; GO; how to balance science areas in GO time; use of review panels to select observations
16-17 Quasars; Time Allocation Committee (TAC); simultaneous observations using ST and other telescopes
17-18 PATRAS; STAC (Space Telescope Advisory Committee); origins of STAC; why STAC was created; NASA
18-19 Hubble Constant; Riccardo Giacconi; concept of key projects; how this arose in meetings of STAC; IUE (International Ultraviolet Explorer)
20 Malcolm Longair; ROTA Report; Mike Disney; Longair's role on STAC; influence of ROTA; report on STAC's thinking; Riccardo Giacconi
21-22 Peter Stockman; HO; comments on key projects
22-24 Reactions of astronomical community to key projects; how this has evolved
24 AXAF; SIRTF; links between using ST and using high energy physics facilities; astronomers working in small groups; Einstein; IUE
25 Copernicus; European time on ST; MOU (Memorandum of Understanding)
25-26 Calls for interest in observing has drawn responses for astronomers active in all fields
26-27 NASA; differences in working in the Institute and working in a university
27-28 GTO (Guaranteed Time Observations); need to interact with people all day long in the Science Institute
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28 Need for good research environment; early concepts of the Science Institute
29 Functional demands greater than expected
29-30 Major challenges still ahead; aim of getting best science done on Space Telescope
30-31 Interest in community in Space Telescope
Baum, William. Date: June 22, 1986. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 32 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Baum discusses his involvement with ST as a consultant to the Phase B working groups (1972-76), and as a member of the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) team (1977- ). Baum briefly discusses his involvement with pre-ST space imaging technology. He then comments on his view of the camera detector selection question during the Phase B ST design effort, and on James Westphal's successful CCD-based WF/PC proposal. He describes the internal workings of the WF/PC team, and comments on technical problems solved during WF/PC development, including UV response, QEH, the radiator issue, and the "Baum" spot. ST lobbying is briefly described. Finally, Baum comments extensively on planetary science's role in the ST project, touching on ST's potential for planetary observations, the distribution of ST observing time, and general relations between planetary scientists and astronomers.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Role on the Viking orbital imaging team
1-2 Work with photoelectric detectors at Lowell
2-3 Role as a consultant to the LST (Large Space Telescope) Phase B Science Working Group (SWG)
3 Lyman Spitzer's Little Black Book; Bob Danielson
3-4 Baum's Phase B contributions: not only planetary
4 Planetary science and ST observing time
4-5 Phase B studies of CCD technology
5-6 CCDs as detectors for the ST Wide Field Camera
6 The SEC Vidicon; Goddard Space Flight Center's bid to build the ST Wide Field Camera
6-7 James Westphal and CCD development, ca. 1977
7 Potential tradeoffs between astronomy and planetary disciplines in Phase B LST planning
8 Baum's contact with contractors during LST Phase B
8-9 ST's potential contribution to the redshift-diameter problem in galactic evolution
9 Rosendhal Committee on ST detectors
10 Baum joins Westphal's proposal to provide a CCD-Based ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC)
10-11 Developing coronene to improve WF/PC UV response
11 Contrast between the WF/PC and the Viking Orbiter Imaging Team: degree of access to hardware
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Relations between Viking scientists and engineers
12-13 Westphal's Principle Investigator position as a guarantee of control over WF/PC design
13 Hardware expertise on the Viking imaging team
13-14 Baum lobbies Cong. Edward Boland on behalf of ST
14 1977 AAS Division of Planetary Science meeting: debate on ST
14-16 Relations between space astronomers and planetary scientists in the '70s; NASA HQ concerns
17 ST observing time for planetary science; WF/PC's role in the search for extrasolar planets
17-18 Definitions of 'planetary science'
18 The ST lobbying campaign as compared to previous space science lobbying efforts
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
19-20 Site selection for AURA's bid for the ST Science Institute (STScI) contract
20 Need for space science instrument teams to have a central workplace; space limitations at STScI
20-21 Computer innovations and the feasibility of off-site management of space science missions
21 Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH) in WF/PC CCDs
22-23 Proposed solutions to the QEH problem
23 Selection of the 'light pipe' QEH solution
24 The WF/PC radiator issue; WF/PC Verification and Acceptance (VAP) at GSFC
24-26 The 'dead spot' or Baum Spot for the WF/PC
26-27 Kelsall Spots on the WF/PC pyramid
27 ST performance issues: the Fine Guidance Sensors
27-28 Challenges in troubleshooting major space science systems: Viking examples
28 Inertia in large space science project teams
29 On-orbit repair as a major contribution to ST mission flexibility
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
29 Importance of the WF/PC to the ST system; James Fletcher and WF/PC imaging capability
30-31 Establishing WF/PC photometric calibration standards
31-32 Challenge of propagating esoteric requirements through the ST project
32 WF/PC activity during the post-Challenger delays; importance of thorough preparation before beginning ST operations
Belton, Michael J. S. Date: October 11, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: .5 hr.; 11 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce.
Belton discusses his role in planning and establishing the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) (1975-77), and topics relating to planetary science observations with ST and to detector technology. He begins with a discussion of a study he prepared of institutional arrangements for a proposed ST while on the staff of Kitt Peak National Observatory for KPNO director Leo Goldberg. He then traces the evolution of that report into a working paper for the Hornig Committee of the NAS, which established guidelines for ST institutional operation. He discusses his role on that committee, and its recommendation for an ST science institute. Finally, Belton touches on NASA HQ efforts to secure planetary science support for ST, and on the selection and subsequent development of CCDs as the ST radial camera detectors.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Belton joins the Hornig Committee on ST institutional arrangements as a representative of planetary science interests
1-2 Belton detailed by Leo Goldberg to lead a pre-Hornig study at Kitt Peak National Observatory (KPNO) of ST science institute (STScI) concepts and the potential for AURA/KPNO involvement
2 Efforts to locate STScI in Tucson, near KPNO
2-3 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) as an STScI site
3-4 Belton's KPNO group presents its study to AURA; AURA submits a revised version to the Hornig Committee
4-5 Representing planetary science in the Hornig Group
5 Workings and conclusions of the Hornig Group
5 Ralph Bernstein and the Hornig Group's STScI data handling recommendations
5-6 Hornig Group discussion of STScI science staffing
6 NASA reaction to the Hornig Report
6-7 Upper-level ST project efforts to secure planetary community support for ST: 1976 NASA HQ meeting
7-8 Planetary community's interest in ST relative to planetary probes, ca. 1976-77
8-9 Robert Danielson as an ST Project advocate for planetary science
9 Selecting CCDs as the ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera detectors
9-10 JPL work with CCDs probe camera detectors
10 Challenges in CCD development
10-11 CCDs developed for the Galileo Project
11 JPL CCD research relation to Westphal's CCD-based ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera
Belton, Michael J. S. Date: December 12, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 32 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce.
Belton reviews his contact with the ST Project as an occasional consultant (1977-84) on the use of the ST system for planetary observations. Opening discussion includes an extensive account of Belton's family and academic background, and his involvement with Kitt Peak National Observatory's Space and Planetary Divisions (1962-76). ST topics covered include work on very early Kitt Peak-AURA studies of concepts for LST/ST institutional arrangements, including a potential ST science institute, as well as consulting activity for Princeton's bid to host STScI. Other topics include planetary scientists' reactions to ST ca. 1977-84, planetary science representation at STScI, and planning for ST planetary 'key projects'.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family and early academic background
2-4 Astronomy studies at St. Andrews Univ., Scotland
4 Enrolling at Berkeley for PhD studies
5 Studies at Berkeley; US Higher education
6 Work with John Brandt and C. R. O'Dell at Berkeley
7 Belton joins the Space Division at Kitt Peak National Observatory (KPNO)
7-8 Dissertation on comet interaction with solar wind
8-9 Observations of Halley's Comet, ca. 1984
10 Spectroscopic observations of Mars using the KPNO McMath solar telescope
11 KPNO Space Division activities: Aerobee payloads, KPNO budget constraints
12 Rocket launches end; Space Division becomes the Planetary Division
12-13 Space Division involvement with planetary probes
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Space Division develops KPNO's remote control 50-inch telescope as testbed for space applications; the Space Division rocket programs, cont
14 Space/Planetary Division relations with other KPNO divisions
15 KPNO reorganization under Leo Goldberg: Solar and Planetary become Solar System Division
15-17 Administrative changes at KPNO, mid-1970s
17 KPNO/AURA studies of ST institutional arrangements
17-18 Records of such studies
18 Role as a consultant for Princeton's bid to host the ST Science Institute (STScI)
19 Belton and Steven Strom's interest in locating STScI in Tucson
20 Polarization of East and West Coast astronomy; western STScI site as a unifying factor
21 Debate over ST at the 1977 AAS Division of Planetary Sciences meeting
22 Involvement with Goddard Space Flight Center's proposal to provide a CCD-based ST camera
23 Presentation to the 1979 Princeton ST Colloquium on solarsystem observations using ST
24 Work with Neta Bahcall of STScI on planning ST planetary `key projects' Planetary science representation at STScI
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25 Relations between planetary scientists and deep space astronomers
26 Working Group on Planetary Science of the Field Committee
27 Belton's objectives in his Field Committee work
28 Planetary science community interest in ST. The Solar System Exploration Committee report; planetary science as an independent community
29 Field Committee and planetary science, cont
30-31 The ST solar system `key project' working group
32 Planetary science community interest in ST, cont. ST `key projects,' cont
Bensimon, Marc. Date: October 5, 1983. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 28 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Bensimon describes events during his tenure as the Space Telescope Program Manager (1982-83). He briefly recounts his NASA career before ST (1966-82), and then discusses numerous points surrounding the rebaselining of the ST Project in 1982 and 1983, and the subsequent project review boards. Topics include the nature of the 1982-83 ST issues, investigations of the status of the ST effort at Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation and Perkin-Elmer, increasing ST's budget projections, the establishment of review committees to examine the ST project, Space Telescope Science Institute, and NASA HQ involvement in the 1982-83 ST issues.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Program Manager for Space Telescope
1 Joining NASA in 1969
2 Joining Space Telescope in 1982
3 Why the project had a bad reputation
4-5 Communications between Marshall and Headquarters
6-7 Becoming aware of problems
8-9 Briefing the administrator (Beggs) on the status of Space Telescope
10 Figuring out whether the problem is with Lockheed or with Perkin-Elmer
11-12 Fred Speer's presentation to Beggs
13 Investigation of the Perkin-Elmer situation by a Marshall team with Bill Sneede
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 Increased budget propositions by Don Fordyce and then Fred Speer
16 Discussing alternatives with Frank Martin and Sam Keller
17 Art Reetz' visit to Perkin Elmer to try to figure out the situation
18-19 A briefing with Sam Keller
20-21 Establishment of the Review Committee
22 Bensimon's versus Speer's analysis of the problem
23 Review on instrument building
24-25 September program review and Gerry Burdett; Giacconi
27-28 AXAF; six-man recovery team
Bensimon, Marc. Date: December 5, 1983. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 44 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Bensimon discusses events during his tenure as the Space Telescope Program Manager (1982-83). He covers issues arising from the 1982-83 rebaselining of the ST Program. Topics discussed include ST budget projections of 1982 vs. 1983, the nature of the schedule issues at Perkin-Elmer, changes in P-E management, activities of the 1982-83 ST Program review committees, the final reports of the committees, NASA HQ involvement in the 1982-83 cost and schedule issues, ST systems engineering, relations between ST contractors and centers, and the magnitude issue regarding the ST Fine Guidance Sensors.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 ST budgeting for the 1984-85 Fiscal Year (FY)
2 FY 84 budget for ST
3 Schedule slippage, late 1983; review teams created
4 Changes in P-E management
4-5 Systems engineering at Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) ST division
5-7 The James Welch review committee
8 The Welch Committee Report
8-10 Bensimon's relations with P-E, 1982-3
10-12 Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) budget and schedule negotiations with P-E, 1980-82
13-14 Changes in P-E management, 1981-2
14-15 Bensimon's review of ST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16 NASA management of ST
17-18 Manpower questions at P-E, 1980-82
18-19 Relations between MSFC and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) ST offices
20 Cost limits on ST
20-21 Submission of Welch and Congressional Committee Reports, and the ST Science Working Group (SWG) Report, 1983
21-22 Impact of 1983 ST review reports: cost inflation
23 James Beggs's reaction to reports
24 Jim Welch appointed to ST Project
25-26 Reasons for creating the Welch ST management team
26 Responses to the 82-83 ST difficulties
26-27 NASA HQ presents ST funding increases to Congress
27-28 LMSC management of ST efforts
29 Views of management differences between P-E, LMSC
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
30-31 Manpower flexibility at primary ST contractors
31 Scheduling at LMSC while awaiting OTA
32 Assembly and Verification (A&V) planning at LMSC
32-33 Relations between contractors
33 ST systems engineering
34 Upper level ST management reaction to problems
35 Relations between NASA HQ and MSFC, 1982-3
36 Issues other than the OTA in the 82-3 period
36-38 Goddard Center (GSFC) management of ST duties
38-39 Changes in ST management, 1983
39-40 Delays with Scientific Instruments (Sis); lack of backup components
40-41 Bensimon's push for prioritized performance requirements throughout the ST project
42 The 'magnitude issue' and the P-E Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) project
43-44 Bensimon's reflections on his ST association
Bless, Robert C. Date: November 3, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3.25 hrs.; 54 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Bless recalls educational background and early exposure to V-2 rocket astronomy at NRL. Recalls working with Art Code at Wisconsin and origins of Wisconsin's space astronomy program: use of balloons and X-15. Describes involvement with OAO project. Discusses attitude of ground-based astronomers toward large-scale funding of space observations. Describes his own promotion of space astronomy among ground-based observers. Discusses effect of IUE's success on scientists' concerns. Describes early studies for Large Space Telescope. Discusses Instrument Definition Teams and members' relations with contractors. Discusses lobbying effort for LST. Discusses his design for photometer and its selection as LST instrument. Discusses division of management between Goddard and Marshall: relations between them and differences in operating styles. Discusses ST's cost and complexity. Describes Marshall's relations with Perkin-Elmer, quarterly reviews, and problem handling. Discusses contacts between Headquarters and project management and degree of HQ's involvement with ST. Describes origins of and accountability for 1982 delays. Discusses origins and role of STOPAT. Discusses relationship between proposed 1980 scientific instrument cuts and political climate at Marshall. Discusses his own scientific objectives and justifications for his instrument: High Speed Photometer. Discusses early development of STScI and AURA's role in US astronomy. Discusses composition and organization of Science Working Group and problems generated by members' inexperience with space astronomy. Notes that STScI draws heavily on Wisconsin and X-ray space astronomy communities.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early graduate career at Cornell; move to Michigan to study with Bill Linder
2 Early exposure to V-2 rocket astronomy at NRL
3 Bless joins Art Code at Wisconsin; origins of Code's Wisconsin space astronomy program
3-4 The first Wisconsin instrument - a balloon-borne sky brightness photometer
4-5 Use of the X-15 for space astronomy sparked by Aerobee's lack of stable pointing; problems with X-15 altitude performance and pilots' concerns about re-entry
5 Involvement with the OAO project; division of responsibilities: Ted Houck and John McNall
6 Contrast between Wisconsin's conservative and SAO's radical detector design for OAO-A
6-7 Launch delays and orbital failure of OAO-A; Wisconsin team's disappointment
7-8 Attitude of ground-based astronomers toward large-scale funding of space observations; Roman and GSFC's relations with ground-based astronomy
8 OAO project, continued; Wisconsin offered chance to duplicate OAO-A experiments on OAO-A2
9 OAO-A2 final payload; successful launch; scientists working on OAO project
10 OAO-A2 as a 'non-user friendly' machine; poor public relationsfor OAO 2 vs Copernicus
11 Astronomers' debate over the pace of the drive towards a large space telescope; OAO as a large technical advance
12 Bless promotes space astronomy among ground-based observers
12-13 Antipathy of West Coast astronomers to Goddard and its effect in later years on LST
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Astronomers' attitudes towards NASA's political nature
13-14 IUE's success key to dispelling scientists' concerns
14 Early studies of a large space telescope; STAR
15 Copernicus sparks interest in space telescopes
15-16 NASA selects the non-evolutionary, fast-paced LST approach to post-OAO optical space astronomy
16 Bless and other scientists join LST Phase B IDTs
17 Rationale for the IDT design approach
17 LST IDT members' relations with contractors
18 Debate between engineering and science concerns in Phase B
19 The lobbying effort on behalf of LST
20 Astronomers' lingering skepticism about the LST project
20-21 Near-closure of the Wisconsin lab in mid 1970s
21 Bless proposes a simple photometer for ST in Phase C, without expecting to be selected
22 Bless is selected to develop his proposal into the full-scale High Speed Photometer
23 Bless comments on the effect of dividing LST management between Marshall and Goddard
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24 Origins of the division
25 Relations between GSFC, MSFC, and PIs
25 NASA as a mature agency
26 Difference in centers' organizational and laboratory styles; GSFC familiarity with university science
27 MSFC's and GSFC's operating styles
28 Tom Young and Noel Hinners support ST at GSFC
29 Scientists relations with MSFC and GSFC
29-30 Underestimation of ST's costs and complexity
30 Marshall's relations with Perkin-Elmer
31 Quarterly project reviews at MSFC; handling of problems; influence of Bill Lucas
32 Problems with systems testing, 1983-4
33-34 Confusion over responsibility for overall systems engineering between P-E, LMSC, MSFC
34-35 The 1984 swing toward systems engineering approaches throughout the project; limits to information at Science Working Group
35-36 Relation between Speer-Burdett-Guha management style and the 1980 cost/schedule crisis
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
36-37 Contacts between NASA HQ and the project management; Nancy Roman and Ed Weiler's relation to the ST; reaction to Speer's revelation of project problems
37-38 Influence of scientists with NASA HQ; weight of Bahcall,Spitzer, and O'Dell's opinions
38 Degree of HQ involvement with the ST project; Speer's reaction to the project status in 1980
39 Origins of the 1982 rescheduling; HSP team member Evan Richard's quarterly progress polls
39-40 Distribution of blame for the 1982 delays and overruns between LMSC, P-E, and NASA centers
40 Role of scientists in identifying 1982 problems; Ed Weiler's committee
41-42 Origins, and role of STOPAT; membership to include O'Dell, Weiler, Boggess, Bless
43 Administrator Keller's concern with project during and after the 1982 crisis
43-44 US PI's form 'Gang of Four' to pool information about the status of the project in 1980
44-45 Relationship between the proposed 1980 SI cuts and the political climate at MSFC, especially Bill Lucas' management style
45-46 Bless' scientific objectives and justifications for the HSP
46 Frustrations of finalizing SI design years before launch; effect of scientific advance on ST priorities
46-47 Importance of fine guidance for HSP performance
47 Relation between Art Code's informal committee on an ST Science Institute and the Hornig Report
47 Scientists' support for the Institute concept
47-48 Spitzer's and Ed Groth's reactions to the choice of Baltimore over Princeton for the STScI site
48 AURA's role in US astronomy; Code's support for AURA
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
48-49 Bless expresses sympathy for Fermi Lab's proposal for the science institute; notes Fermi Lab's response to NASA bureaucracy
49-50 Bless notes that the relative interest of space science subdisciplines in ST is determined by the presence or absence of dedicated missions of their own
50 Bless relates ST's and AXAF's cosmological design biases to the preferences of the US observing community
51 Composition and organization of the SWG; size of SWG necessitates smaller STOPAT
52 SWG problems include members' inexperience with space astronomy; backgrounds of Brandt, Westphal, Schroeder, and Caldwell
53 Small number of experienced space astronomers is linked to the risks, managerial distractions inherent in the field
53 STScI draws heavily on Wisconsin and X-ray space astronomy communities
54 Proliferation of paperwork and meetings in modern space science
Bless, Robert C. Date: February 21, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: .75 hrs.; 13 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Continuation of interview on November 3, 1983. Bless discusses effect of prosaic problems on evolution of complex science project using OAO as example. Discusses problems with experiment packages, operating constraints, shift from test situation to real observation, establishment of observation targets and schedules, shift toward focused questions. Relates interesting discoveries made by OAO-A2
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
56 Ability of prosaic problems to affect complex science; OAO examples
57 Degree of support NASA and Grumman provided the OAO following launch, and during on-orbit trouble
57 Minor problems with OAO-A2
58 Similarity of OAO-A1 and A2 experiment packages
58 Roles of Wisconsin scientists in OAO-A1 and OAO-A2; Ted Houck, John McNall, Art Code, Bless
58-59 Operations planning for OAO-A2; Cecil Barker
59-60 Goddard and Wisconsin negotiations over ground support of OAO-A2; Wisconsin ground support equipment; university vis a vis industry science
60-61 Exploring the operating constraints of OAO-A2
61 Collimating the photometers
61-62 Moving from testing to scientific observing
62 Priority of observation targets; OAO observing schedules
62-63 Bless and Lillie in charge of early OAO-A2 ground support, with aid from Code and McNall
63 OAO Command Tape; necessity that 24-hour detailed control instructions to be sent to the satellite
63-64 Curt Hecox and the OAO-A2 ground operating software
64 Primitive operation planning conditions; early attempts to perform space orbital planetary astronomy of Venus
65 Contractor support for OAO; Code and Bless' efforts to ensure good relations with GSFC support staff
66 OAO-A2 observing as a mixture of survey and specific target approaches; shift toward focused questions; determination to observe planets
67-68 Interesting discoveries made by OAO-A2
Bless, Robert C. Date: November 11, 1986. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: .75 hrs.; 13 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Discusses ST Assembly and Verification Working Group test plans in 1983. Considers Working Group members' experience with rocketry and space experiments. Discusses response of Goddard management to test concerns and efforts to develop systems engineering at Goddard in 1983. Reviews development of test criteria; testing electrical connections. Evaluates work of Lockheed and use of systems tests. Recalls development of Spacecraft Automated Test System software. Compares ST's development with that of military satellites. Recalls 1983 review of test plans. Considers how decisions are made and implemented in ST project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Bless discusses state of Assembly and Verification test plans in 1983
1-2 Assesses preliminary planning for A & V testing
2-3 Discusses Science Working Group's relative inexperience with rocketry and space experiments
3 Recalls presenting concerns about testing to A & V Working Group meeting
3-4 Responses of Goddard management to testing concerns
4 Recalls attempts to develop systems engineering at Goddard in 1983
4-5 Development of test criteria; characterizes Lockheed's testing philosophy
5 Dividing test responsibility among small groups
5-6 Discusses resistance to systems testing
6 Testing electrical connections; break-out boxes
6-7 Characterizes attitudes at Goddard, Marshall and Lockheed toward systems testing
7-8 Work of Pat Eddy at Lockheed
8 Changes in attitudes toward systems tests
8 Dissolution of A & V Working Group
8-9 Bless considers differences between ST and more numerous military satellites
9 Development of Spacecraft Automated Test System software
9-10 Creation of second-generation SATS for ST
10 Compares ST's complexity to prior Lockheed satellites
10 Lockheed's experience with highly complex satellites
10-11 Emotional and physical strains of rapidly developing test program
11 December, 1983 review of test plans
11 Discusses ST project's institutional inertia
11-12 Relations between Goddard and Marshall
12-13 Bless considers how ST managers' decisions are implemented
13 Difficulty of making changes in ST project
Boeshaar, Greg. Date: May 20, 1986. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 27 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce.
Examines Boeshaar's involvement with ST as an employee of Computer Sciences Corporation assigned to the ST Science Institute (STScI) team working on developing the Science Operations Ground System (SDAS) software (1982-84). Topics discussed include STScI in its formative years, and TRW's role in SDAS development. Boeshaar also covers his work as a BDM employee assigned to the NASA HQ ST Development Division (STDD), including involvement with ST ground testing software, and with planetary tracking software issues. General issues covered include the attitudes of scientists and engineers, and the philosophy of software development.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background; early interest in astronomy
2 Graduate study at Ohio State University; postdoctoral career: University of Washington
3 Boeshaar joins Computer Sciences Corporation's (CSC's) ST Science Institute (STScI) on-site software development group, 1982
3-4 AURA rearranges CSC's STScI operations; Boeshaar joins the Science Data Analysis System (SDAS) team
4-5 Composition and skills of the rearranged CSC team
5 Atmosphere of STScI in early years, ca. 1982
6 Relations between CSC and AURA workers at STScI; contractor and academic cultures
6-7 Challenges of SDAS development: defining system requirements, securing development funds
7 SDAS project management structure
7-8 Communication between the STScI SDAS team and the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) contract office
8 Contrasts between scientific and engineering culture
8-9 CSC's IUE experience; CSC team strengths and weaknesses
9-10 Changes in GSFC's ST project management
10 Management at and of STScI
10-11 STScI manpower levels
11-12 ST Science Operations Ground System (SOGS); STScI and TRW's understandings of SOGS requirements
12 SOGS Science Planning and Scheduling System (SPSS) issues, ca. 1983; contrast between ST and IUE observation scheduling
12-13 STScI involvement with monitoring TRW's SOGS efforts, post-1983
13-14 Boeshaar's enjoyment of STScI work; role as 'firefighter' against systems-level problems
14-15 Contrasts between hardware and software development
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Table of organization of STScI SDAS efforts; distribution of authority and responsibility among STScI software development managers
17 Boeshaar transfers from CSC to AURA at STScI; leaves STScI and joins BDM Corporation; joins the BDM staff assisting ST Program management at NASA HQ
17-18 BDM's ST Program computerized management system
18 Oversight of ST ground software development; troubleshooting ST ground test software at Lockheed Missiles and Space Corp. (LMSC)
19 Role as an additional bridge between various ST software development centers and managers; lessons of ST management experience for future major space science initiatives
19-20 ST Program management at NASA HQ before 1983
20 ST Program appreciation of the complexity of the system it was developing
21 Complexity of AXAF and SIRTF compared to ST
21-22 Suggestions for a management structure for future major space science initiatives
22 Preparing reports to Congress on lessons of the ST Project, and on ST on-orbit maintenance
22-23 Propagation of experience between NASA projects
23 Correlating development of SDAS and SOGS; the SOGS moving target observation issue; upgrading SOGS to track planets, but not planetocentric features
23-25 GSFC moving target issue review board; upgrading SOGS to track planetary satellite motion
25-26 Challenger accident delays: effect on ST software development's corporate memory and manpower
26-27 STScI data archiving software; software challenges remaining before launch
Boggess, Albert, III. Date: April 20, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 4 hrs.; 48 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Boggess recalls astronomy education and interests in non-visible wavelengths and instrumentation. This interest leads to work for NRL on solar data; at NRL, Boggess continues work on UV and near-UV data and problems of instrumentation. After Sputnik and formation of NASA, Boggess joins NASA and sounding rocket program. Characterizes effects of "NRL way of thinking" on NASA. Boggess then heads OAO-B program; discusses at length the OAO and difficulty obtaining funding for it and compares space- and ground-based astronomy. Discusses plans for IUE and his early involvement with ST. Comments in detail on competition for resources between ground- and space-based astronomy. Discusses instrumentation requirements of ST, comparing them with those of ground-based instruments. Recalls design of High Resolution Spectrograph and ST design changes. Boggess also comments on early problems with STOPAT and SOGS; concerns about ST testing.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background; influence of Irvin Krause
2 Summer work at McDonald Observatory; graduate work: U of Michigan; interest in instrumentation
2-3 Work with Bill Lillie on photoelectric devices
3 Lawrence Aller, thesis advisor; thesis: photometry and diffuse nebulae (1954); comments on Aller; job at APL with Francois Frankill studying turbulence on sun
4 Densitometer; comments on turbulence work
4-5 Recruited by NRL to interpret solar data; comments on Dick Tousey
5 Echelle spectrograph; Jim Milligan and DeWitt Purcell build device to obtain Lyman alpha images of sun (1956)
5-6 Comments on Tousey's research; interest in nonvisible wavelengths
6 Solar work; interest in distant objects, air glow; discovery of stellar orientation technique
7 UV photometer developed for rocket payload; near-UV work with Larry Dunkelman; far-UV and X-rays, by Herb Friedman and Jim Kupperian; comments on results (28 March 1957)
8 Riccardo Giacconi's later work; near-UV work included both conventional stellar photometry and observations of Mars and Jupiter; excitement over data from 1300 A: large luminous areas around hot stars; unexpected nature of results
9 Unsuccessful attempts to interpret and reproduce these data; data as instrumental artifact from internal scattering
10 Instrumental artifact: stimulus for further research; comments on interpretation of unexpected data; other work going on at NRL: satellite tracking
11 Reaction at NRL over Sputnik launch; personal excitement
12 Early discussions re: formation of NASA; transfer of sounding rocket engineers from NRL to Beltsville Research Center (now, Goddard); John Lindsay to work on solar physics; Kupperian to head astronomy branch with Boggess, Milligan and Dunkelman as principal researchers; uncertainty as to location of bestfuture research opportunities
12-13 Attempts by NRL to persuade Boggess to stay on; appeal of working independently at NASA center
13 Division of turf among four principals; Boggess continued sounding rocket program
13-14 Problems: inability to reproduce early 1300 A results; question of who should point out error: NRL or NASA; much effort by both groups in dealing with this
14 Work on instrument development: detectors and guidance; move to buildings near NRL while Goddard site under construction (1961)
14-15 Comments on proximity to NRL
15 At NASA could continue research but at faster rate; impetus of new program
16 Carryover of NRL approach and organization to NASA; attempts to articulate "NRL way of thinking"; differences in approach to research problems between physics and astronomy; Goddard's superposition of physics approach on astronomical research
17 Problem of defining Systems Engineering; influence of NRL: establish goals before beginning design; involvement in OAO-B; Milligan given task of starting up project
18 Failure of first OAO flight; Milligan moved to solar project after death of John Lindsay; Boggess left in charge of OAO-B; need to develop group to handle future data
18-19 Discussion of decision to launch OAO-B according to original schedule
19 Modification of original design; dealing with failure of OAO-B; plans for OAO-D under consideration before launch of OAO-B
20 Comments on support for OAO-D project; SAS-D (now IUE) under consideration before launch of OAO-B; SAS-D visualized as facility instrument: next step beyond Copernicus
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
20 Comments on need for developing grassroots demand for OAO-D in wake of OAO-B failure; competition intense for project support; OAO-D shelved in '72 budget
21 Princeton campaign for support of Copernicus in late '60s; solar physics campaign for OSO series in competition with OAO-D and SAS-D; difficulty of getting support for both OAO-D and SAS-D; scrapping of OAO-D
22 ST as difficult challenge; comments on complexity of engineering
23 Comments on ASTRA; space vs ground-based astronomy: competition for limited resources
23-24 Comments on possible limitations of space astronomy
24 Guest observer program and wide application of Copernicus generate broader support
24-25 Geographic distribution of space vs ground astronomers linked to availability of large telescopes; space-based program at Kitt Peak short-lived
25 Gradual broadening of interest among wider elements of astronomical community as space capabilities improved
26 Perceptions of NASA's handling of IUE project led many tosupport STScI; Plans for IUE: different from OAO 27 Goddard plans for IUE; comments on inclusion of astronomical community in project; Goddard and STScI proposal
27-28 Involved in Phase B design studies: high dispersion spectroscopy; member of Science Working Group (SWG); dropped out after Phase B; discusses role in organizing ST; discusses role of Spitzer, John Bahcall, Bob O'Dell and Nancy Roman
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
29 Inclusion of planetary astronomy in ST program
30 Sacrifice of wavelength spread to requirements of durable optical system; limitations on size of ST imposed by engineers
31 Main competitive advantage of ST: superior to ground-based telescopes in visible; must be capable of maintaining this advantage in face of improved ground-based technology; money that has gone to ST, could have been spent on this
32 "Science driver" for ST: cosmology
33 SWG important in determining telescope specifications; ESA involvement
34-35 Selection of Marshall over Goddard as lead center: causes and reactions
35-36 Modularity of scientific instrument design at Goddard and Marshall's approaches; component replaceability not built into design
36-37 Selection of SEC Vidicon
37 Concerns with SEC: large size, stability, analog not pulse
38 ESA participation provides more options for investment in technological development: Boxsenberg detector, CCD; after launch monitoring device becomes ESA's worry
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
38 Bid for high resolution spectrograph
39 Goddard and instrument selection; area detector most coveted spot; decision to submit spectrograph proposal in addition to area detector; Jack Brandt as PI
40 Work on spectrograph proposal with Sally Heap, Andy Smith and optical man at Ball Brothers; problems of grating design
41 Responsibilities as member of Instrument Definition Team (IDT); reactions to position of project scientist for operations
42 Comments on taking this position during developmental stage of STScI; involvement of Frank Carr and Chuck Fuechsel
43 Design problems with ST; repairs to be ground-based
44 Retrieving ST and returning to orbit; ST as satellite project
45 Formation of STOPAT: mechanism for channeling scientists' concerns
46 Sam Keller's role in STOPAT
46-47 Concern with SOGS
47 Concern with operability, ability to test ST properly; importance of the A and V schedule; role of Lockheed in testing ST; need to limit surprises after launch
48 Suggests talking with Jim Kupperian, Frank Purcell, Jesse Greenstein
Brandt, John. Date: May 15, 1989. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Joe Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.75 hrs.; 52 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Brandt reflects on education at University of Chicago and early professional appointments. After becoming interested in rocketry and satellites at Kitt Peak, Brandt joins Goddard Institute under Robert Jastrow and then Goddard Space Flight Center. Following work with Orbiting Solar Observatories, Brandt joints ST project. Brandt describes division of ST responsibilities between Marshall and Goddard centers, evaluating each Center. Discusses proposal for High Resolution Spectrograph and selection of detectors for it. Recalls planning for and evaluating ST scientific programs, then discusses history of relations between NASA, civil service and astronomers; role of STScI. Describes at length changing launch schedules through 1980s and significance of Quarterly Meetings. Brandt also recalls ST project's 1980 reorganization and changes in instrumentation and software design, especially of SOGS. He also reflects on STScI, NASA's launch and management philosophies and the ST Science Working Groups. Discusses in detail NASA decision-making process and its effects on ST testing; evaluates performances of Center directors and long%term NASA trends. Concludes with observations of ST project's uniqueness and its institutional momentum and possible future criticisms of ST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Brandt graduate education, professional appointments
1-2 Graduate studies at University of Chicago; early research interests
2-3 Discusses astronomy community's, U. Chicago's attitudes towards solar system research
3 Post-doc year at Mt. Wilson
3-4 Discusses Mt. Wilson resistance to JPL interest in planetary astronomy
4 Years at Berkeley, Kitt Peak
4-5 Kitt Peak space astronomy division; remote control telescope
5 Kitt Peak rocket, satellite plans
5-6 Discusses Goddard Institute (New York) and Robert Jastrow; heads Solar Physics branch of Goddard Inst.
6-7 Contacts with Columbia University
7 Solar physics group at Goddard (Greenbelt, MD); attempts to extend series of Orbiting Solar Observatories
8 Recruiting support for OSOs; prohibition on NASA employee contact with federal legislative branch
8-9 Successful "selling" of OSO program
9 Recalls little interaction with OAO group; Brandt's early involvement in Space Telescope
9-10 Preparing estimates of ST Institute costs
10 Involvement with International Sun-Earth Explorer
10-11 Goddard's Solar Physics and Optical Astronomy laboratories; Goddard initially declines to run ST
11 ST responsibilities divided between Goddard, Marshall
11-12 ST funding, responsibilities at Goddard and Marshall; Brandt evaluates split center arrangement
12 Marshall's astronomy expertise
12-13 Merging Goddard's laboratories; Brandt's initial ST involvement
13 Decision to propose High Resolution Spectrograph, imaging instruments
14 Selection of Digicon detectors
14-15 Previous experience designing Digicon detectors
15 Detectors and Brandt's OSO experience
15-16 Proposal; instrument design; scientific goals
16 Planning scientific programs for ST
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16-17 Planning scientific programs for ST
17 Hedrik van Hulst criteria for telescope projects
17-18 ST timetable; Brandt's 1980 prediction of 1988 launch
18 Brandt recalls changing perceptions of ST project
18-19 Resistance to Goddard influence on ST plans; Hornig Report
19-20 Warren Keller committee; recalls disputes over role for Institute
20 Distrust of Goddard's ability to operate ST; historical distrust between NASA, astronomers; importance of civil service
20-21 Recalls Goddard's handling of SAS, International UV Explorer programs
21 Astronomers' perceptions of IUE program; 1987-8 relations between scientists, ST management
21-22 Debate on expected ST efficiency required for launch
22-23 Brandt's fear of reduced observing time
23 Suggests alternate ways of allocating time; polarization of scientists, management, Institute
23-24 Quarterly meetings at Marshall; informal contacts with engineers, contractors
24 Launch date predictions
24-25 Progressive budget cuts
25-26 Readiness state of instruments & spacecraft in 1986
26 Communication among Principal Investigators
26-27 Proposal to drop spectrographs from ST
27 Scientists' participation in managing ST
27-28 Describes post-Challenger launch planning
28 Quarterly meetings; presenting optimistic schedules
28-29 Unofficial schedule predictions censored at Quarterly meetings
29 Careful planning of Quarterly meetings
29-30 Discusses dissent from Marshall management positions
30 Beggs' testimony to Congress; role of Bill Lucas
30-31 Learning of schedule problems from informal contacts with contractors
31 Discusses contributions of Jim Welch, Sam Keller
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
31-32 Brandt discusses project reorganization of 1980
32-33 Proposal to eliminate spectrographs
33 Budget pressures; production of spare parts
33-34 Evaluates software capabilities
34 Input into writing Science Operations Ground System software; budget pressures; Institute's use of SOGs
34-35 Discusses funding of Institute, ST operations
35 Characterizes NASA launch philosophy; NASA management system
35-36 Management incentives and evaluation criteria
36 Different ways of measuring success
37 Discusses uniqueness of ST project; letter from Doug Brown; entry of BDM to ST Development Division
37-38 BDM and NASA systems engineering
38-39 Evaluates effectiveness of Science Working Groups
39 Discusses STOPAT, other groups
39-40 Means of making changes, reversing decisions
40 Concerns about health of ST spacecraft
40-41 Alterations since last thermal vacuum test
41 Media coverage of ST preparations; anticipates future alterations of, additions to ST
41-42 Brandt recalls decisions to forgo second thermal vacuum test
42-43 Influence of budget constraints on testing process
43 Describes long-term trends within NASA
43-44 Evaluates Goddard Center directors
44 Evaluates Marshall Center directors; interaction of Marshall, Kennedy, Johnson directors
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
45 Characterizes philosophy of Johnson Center; solar cycle problems; characterizes different approaches of scientists, administrators
45-46 Describes top-down decision-making process
46 Brandt's travel schedule; coordination and scheduling of large meetings
46-47 Discusses large meetings
47 Compares administration of ST with that of other space science projects
47-48 Discusses NASA HQ's involvement with Goddard and Marshall on ST
48 Anticipates criticism of high cost if ST fails
48-49 Possible role of future criticism in 1983 decision to restructure ST budget and timetable
49 Discusses institutional momentum of large projects
49-50 1987 appointment to University of Colorado; Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph
50-52 Infra-Red Astronomical Satellite as example of successful launch
Brown, Robert A. Date: April 3, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Public
Reviews Brown's research at the Harvard University Center for Earth and Planetary Physics (1975-79), and the University of Arizona Lunar and Planetary Laboratory (1979-82); discusses his work at the Space Telescope Science Institute (1982-83), and as ST Project Scientist (1983-87). After a discussion of family and academic background, Brown discusses his early exposure to ST, and the role of planetary scientists in the ST project. He covers in detail efforts to include a planetary tracking capability in ST's ground and flight software.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background
1-2 Secondary education
2-3 AB study at Princeton; German language, Physics
3 PhD studies in the Harvard physics department
3-4 Limited astronomy interest and training; PhD in nuclear physics
4-5 Effect of physics training on Brown's astronomy; physics-astronomy relationship
5 Nature of scientific training
6-7 Brown joins Richard Goody at Harvard's Center for Earth and Planetary Physics (CEPP), performing microwave studies of Venus under NASA funding
7-8 Preparation for the CEPP position: Fourier Transform interferometry of the Galilean satellites
8-9 Interferometry, cont.: impact of physics training
9 Measurements of the Uranus rotation rate
10 Radio emissions from the Galilean satellites
10 Brown as a solo, ground-based, instrument-oriented planetary scientist; application of physics- rather than astronomy-based methods
11 Brown's reaction to probe-based planetary science
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Probe-based planetary science, cont
12-13 '79 move to Arizona Lunar and Planetary Lab (LPL)
13-14 Academic climate at LPL as compared to CEPP
14-15 First awareness of ST: Brown attends 1976 meeting of planetary scientists at NASA HQ to discuss ST planetary capabilities
15 ST planetary IR capability
15-16 Brown's interest in ST planetary spectroscopy
16 Brown's reaction to ST after the 1976 meeting
16-17 Second exposure to ST: 1979 Princeton IAU meeting on ST science
17 Brown's awareness of George Field's remarks on ST to the 1977 AAS Division of Planetary Sciences meeting
17-18 ST astronomers' reactions to planetary science participation in the 1979 Princeton meeting
18 NASA's commitment to ST's planetary capability
19 Measures instituted during ST development to ensure its ability to track planetary targets
20 Brown moves to the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI); discovers gaps in ST ground and flight software ability to track planets
20 Nature of investigations planetary scientists require if ST is to contribute to their work
21 Discrepancy reports submitted to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), detailing modifications required in the ST Science Operations Ground System (SOGS) software if it is to instruct ST to track planetary observing targets
22 Bringing the planetary issue to the STScI director's attention, and to the ST Science Working Group (SWG)
22-23 GSFC and SWG reactions to the planetary issue
23 Modifying ST flight software for planetary work
23-24 Changes to SOGS to support planetary tracking; joint GSFC-STScI redesign teams
Brown, Robert A. Date: June 7, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 27 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Discusses Brown's involvement with Space Telescope planetary tracking capability during his tenure at the Space Telescope Science Institute (1982-3) and as ST Project Scientist (1983-87). Brown discusses modifications to the Lockheed Missiles and Space
Corporation ST flight software. He covers in detail Goddard Space Flight Center's and the ST Science Working Group's reaction to deficiencies in the ST Science Operations Ground System when applied to tracking planetary features, and to proposed remedies for those deficiencies.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Modifications required to both ST flight software and the Science Operations Ground System (SOGS) software to instruct ST to track and observe planets
2 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) reaction to the SOGS planetary tracking issue
2 Efforts to raise the planetary tracking issue
2-4 Observations planetary scientists wish ST to perform; real-time offsets and ephemeris information required to accomplish them
4-5 Establishing ST's own orbital parallax: GSFC's Orbital Support Control Facility
6 Motions which must be accounted for in tracking specific planetary features
6-8 ST SOGS and planetary tracking
8 ST flight software's ability to perform complex planetary target tracking
9 Lockheed Missiles and Space Corp. (LMSC) employees contributing to planetary flight software
9-10 Documentation of 1982-84 efforts to provide a planetary tracking capability
10-11 GSFC and TRW reaction to the planetary tracking issue, cont
11 Attempts by Wide Field/Planetary Camera team members to provide SOGS with exact WF/PC shutter opening times for real-time offsets
12 ST Science Working Group (SWG) oversight of planetary tracking requirements
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Brown presents ST planetary tracking issues to the 1982 AAS Division of Planetary Sciences meeting
13-14 SWG oversight of planetary requirements, cont
15 Space Telescope Observatory Performance Assessment Team (STOPAT) support for SOGS planetary capability upgrades
16-18 Reactions of individual STOPAT members to the planetary issue; discussions of the original ST planetary tracking performance requirements
18-19 Planetary Target Implementation Team (PTIT) report to the SWG
19 Proposals to write SOGS planetary upgrade software at the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI), rather than at TRW
20-21 Costs of the SOGS planetary upgrade
21 Deferring a SOGS planetary upgrade until after ST launch
22 Use of planetary targeting of asteroids during ST instrument calibration
22-23 Importance of planetary images to ST public relations; public appreciation of the planets
23 Public affairs planning throughout the ST project
24 NASA upper administration interest in decontamination of the ST primary mirror
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25-27 NASA administration interest in decontamination of the ST primary mirror, cont
Bulkin, Bert. Date: January 11, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.25 hrs.; 21 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Bulkin discusses his role in the ST project as Program Manager for Lockheed Missiles and Space Company's (LMSC's) ST efforts (1972- ). He describes LMSC's Phase B ST study activity, and discusses changes in ST design. Bulkin reviews cost reduction decisions including selecting a 2.4-meter aperture, reducing man-tending activity, and adopting a protoflight development approach; he also notes the impact of cost constraints on LMSC manpower curves. He discusses LMSC's relations with ST scientists, and with the NASA centers managing the project. Bulkin reflects on the nature of decision-making and management in spaceflight engineering, and on the role and practice of systems engineering. Finally, he comments on the major obstacles LMSC confronted in constructing ST, and on the remaining project milestones ca. 1985.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Bulkin's move to LMSC's LST study efforts, 1972; role of Max Hunter
2-3 LMSC perception of major LST challenges in Phase A/B: the pressurized compartment, active light shield, control moment gyros, solar arrays
3 Evolution of the initial LST concept; role of concept changes in increasing engineering feasibility
4 Engineering and cost differences between the 3-meter and 2.4-meter ST concepts; scientists' reaction to the 2.4-meter concept
4-5 Effect of congressional opposition to ST on LMSC's work crews; LMSC marketing efforts
6 Expenditure of LMSC discretionary funds on LST in Phase A/B
6-7 Effect of the Space Shuttle on spacecraft design; relationship between spacecraft reliability and the cost of preflight testing
8 Relationship between spacecraft weight and cost
8 Impact of the protoflight approach on spacecraft design
9 Relationship between expected difficult areas in ST design, and the areas which actually proved to be problems
9-10 Phase B design periods as exercises in tradeoffs; synergy between cost/schedule requirements and engineering
10-11 ST Solar Array as an example of the Phase B tradeoff process
11-12 Balance between the contractors' freedom of design and NASA's expectations during the Phase B study process
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 The nature of decision-making in spaceflight engineering: evaluating multiple inputs; the role of intuition
13 The 'style' of project management; time scheduling, establishing priorities
14 The role of interfaces in project management; the importance of timetables
14-16 Relations between LMSC and the ST scientific community; Marshall as the sole true authority over LMSC's activities
16 Strains between the subdivided design of the ST Program and the conception of ST as an integrated observatory
16-17 Definition of a systems engineer; true scope of the ST Program
17 Bulkin's efforts to involve LMSC systems engineers directly with the ST hardware
18 The LMSC ST group's use of in-house scientists to increase the scientific input to the group
18 Scientists as engineers: Jim Westphal
18-19 LMSC's response to winning the ST contract in Phase C; manpower requirements
19-20 ST group staff continuity within LMSC
20 LMSC's major achievement with ST: the protoflight approach
20-21 LMSC's remaining challenges: spacecraft integration and testing
Burbidge, Margaret E. Date: November 29, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce
Burbidge discusses her involvement with Space Telescope first as a member of Phase A/B working groups (1972-77), and later as a Faint Object Spectrograph scientific instrument team member (1977- ). She reflects on her early exposure to ST in the 1960s, and on astronomers' reactions to ST proposals. Burbidge discusses Phase B ST Science Working Groups proceedings, including instrument definition, determining the ST mirror size, and writing the 1977 Announcement of Opportunity for Phase C. She also discuss FOS team issues, including detector selection, FOS management, the place of the FOS team at U. Cal. San Diego, and changes in the FOS team leadership. Burbidge concludes with a discussion of the Hornig Committee and the origins of Space Telescope Science Institute.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Burbidge's early 60s background; McDonald Observatory
1-2 Early space astronomy advocates: George Low, Homer Newell, Lyman Spitzer
2 Burbidge reviews NASA proposals; contacts with Nancy Roman
2-3 Large Space Telescope (LST) proposals reviewed by the Greenstein Committee and the NAS Space Science Board (SSB)
3 Robert Danielson; SSB committee on LST
3-4 Reducing LST mirror size from 3 meters to 2.4 meters
4 Changing the project name from LST to ST
5 Astronomers' reactions to LST: late 60s-early 70s
5-7 John Bahcall's dedication to promoting ST to astronomers and legislators
7 Astronomers' meeting with James Fletcher, '76; mobilizing the ground-based community for ST
8 Early LST-ST instrument definition working groups
8-9 Selecting the ST Scientific Instrument (SI) group for the '77 Announcement of Opportunity: no IR
9-10 Origins and acceptance of U.C. San Diego's (UCSD) Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS) SI proposal
11 FOS planetary science capabilities
11-12 Martin Marietta's choice of FOS detector subcontractors; FOS costs
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 FOS costs, cont.; reviewing FOS management, 1978
12-13 Demands other than FOS on the personnel and facilities of the UCSD Physics Department
13-14 Reorganization of the UCSD FOS team and budget
14 Burbidge named to manage various FOS efforts
14-16 Changing role of FOS Principle Investigator within UCSD and FOS
16-17 Revisions in the FOS team's observational goals
17-18 Current FOS activity at Lockheed, ca. 1984
18 Astronomers' early support for an ST institute
19 NAS-Hornig Committee as ST institute supporters
19-20 UCSD's bid to host the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI); the AURA-Baltimore bid
20-21 AURA's selection of a director for STScI
21-22 Ramifications of the selection of Johns Hopkins-Baltimore as the AURA STScI site
Rev. 10/13/95