Hall, Don. Date: May 3, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 17 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Following his interest in astrophysics, Hall went to graduate school at Harvard, becoming involved there with instrument development. In 1982, Hall joined STScI and recalls here the relationship between the Institute and NASA. He discusses the recruitment of scientists and managers and also his own acting directorship of Institute's Instrument Support Branch. Discusses role of Institute in ST development and the effects of STOPAT. Evaluates communication within the ST program, STScI managerial changes and relationship with Headquarters Assessment Team.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Discussion of early interest in solar astrophysics: infrared emission
2 Discussion of current interests: star formation, evolved stars, galactic center, active galactic nuclei; shift from solar work around 1975
3 Discussion of shift; interest in instrument development; Bob Noyes as thesis advisor
3-4 Discussion of choice of Harvard for graduate work
4 Work with Leo Goldberg and Nick Mayall; discussion of paucity of individuals trained in astronomy who have experience in instrument development
4-5 Discussion of decision to move to STScI
5 Arrival at STScI in January, 1982
6 Involvement in AURA's proposal for STScI; discussion of interim team
7 Need to become familiar with spacecraft astronomy; involvement in recruitment of scientific staff and management
7-8 Discussion of relationship between NASA and STScI
9 Hiring of people for Instrument Support Branch [ISB]; stint as acting director of ISB; decision to put someone from ESA in that position
9-10 Discussion of efforts to fill position
10 Discussion of lab facility availability for ISB
11 ISB team members eligibility to be PIs; prohibition against developing hardware at STScI
11-2 Discussion of perceived and actual role for STScI in ST development
12-3 Discussion of STOPAT and its effectiveness
13 Discussion of STOPAT's impact on morale of Pis
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Discussion of ease of communication within the program: scientist to Lockheed, e.g.
15 Discussion of potential impact of this level of communication on eventual performance of ST
15-16 Discussion of planetary tracking
16-17 Discussion of changes at STScI when Odom replaced Speer
17 Discussion of project manager's job at Marshall; interaction between Welch's Headquarters Assessment Team and STScI
Harms, Richard. Date: May 26, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 59 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After discussing sources of his interest in astronomy, Harms turns to selection of ST detectors and the campaign to secure funding for ST. Discusses detector design at length, including role of contractors, changes in team organization, budget constraints and anticipated design problems. Reflects in detail on overall project before Black Saturday (July 26, 1980) and changes after that day in spectrograph projects and PI group. Harms also recalls development of STOPAT, effects of budget and management difficulties and communication among Pis, Goddard, instrument contractors and Interface Working Groups. Also considers problems with the Faint Object Spectrograph and its detectors, as well as testing of the FOS at Lockheed. Other topics include perceived changes in project after 1983, relations between Goddard and Marshall, engineering of FOS, ST launch expectations and effects of Challenger accident. Harms also evaluates ST's management structure and the importance of personal relationships within it for resolving project difficulties.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Development of interest in astronomy; work with Carl McIlwain
2 First awareness of Space Telescope [ST] through Ed Beaver's work on Phase B study for Faint Object Spectrograph [FOS]
2-3 Proposal of digicon for ST with Beaver and McIlwain
3 Funding through NASA's instrument development group headed by Nancy Roman; Request for Proposal, 1976; competition from CCD development at JPL
4 Digicon as tested one-dimensional instrument vs. untested two-dimensional detectors; awareness of campaign to influence Congress to include ST in budget
4-5 Selection of detector type for proposal
5 Creation of proposal team; Harms as PI
5-6 Competition against Harvard group (George Field and Margaret Burbidge)
6 Ball Brothers on Harvard team; discussion with TRW; contacts through ASTRO payload
7 Contacts with Martin-Marietta through magnetosphesic [sic] and work on Spacecraft Charging At High Altitudes [SCAPA] program; work with Martin-Marietta; Martin-Marietta's experience with optics compared with other aspects of project design
7-8 Division of responsibility among proposal team members: UCSD vs. Martin-Marietta
8-9 Anticipated instrument design problems: providing necessary voltage to detectors in space; developing adequate red and near infra-red response
9 Thermal stability of optical bench; selection of graphite-epoxy material
10 Consideration of inclusion of internal focussing capability for spectrograph; comparison with camera; consideration of potential focussing problems related to shift in position of spectrograph following launch
10-11 Focussing problems in relation to proper functioning of FineGuidance Sensors
11 Notification proposal had been selected for ST
11-12 Changes in team following selection
12-14 Initial meeting at Goddard; impressions of NASA's approach to managing a project; paperwork requirements
14-17 Budgetary constraints and instrument development; paperwork management
17 George Levin, project manager at Goddard
17-18 Budgetary constraints and instrument selection
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
18 Instrument selection; view of overall project before Black Saturday (26 July 1980)
18-19 Selection of digicon manufacturer
19-20 Budgetary constraints and instrument construction
20 Black Saturday
20-21 Impact on spectrograph projects
21 Impact of cut of spectrographs on budget
21-22 Feasibility of spectrographs as add-on package
22 Impact of Black Saturday on cohesion of PI group; precursor to STOPAT; meeting of Pis in October 1980
23 Comparison of budgetary crises of 1980 and 1983
23-25 Communication between Pis, Goddard, and instrument developers; Interface Working Groups [IFWIGs]
25-26 Science Working Group [SWG]
26-27 Quarterly Reviews
27 Documenting technical problems
27-29 Managing technical problems
29-31 STOPAT; formalizing problem management
31-32 Compartmentalization of projects, budget constraints, and top level problem management
32-33 Changes in philosophy of ST program after 1983; 1985 launch viewed as imminent
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
34-35 Reduction of technical risk in program after 1983; availability of additional detector tubes to use as spares, particularly red detectors
35-37 Technical difficulties with red detectors
37 Technical difficulties with electronics, optical alignment
37-40 Lockheed testing of FOS as complete instrument
38-39 Launch tolerance of FOS alignment
39 Command sequence timing
40 Test schedule and reduction of technical risk
40-41 Work atmosphere at Lockheed during test period
41 Communication among Pis, Marshall, and Goddard during testing
42 Budget and schedule management at Lockheed during testing; change in attitude after 1983
42-43 Working with both Goddard and Marshall
43-44 Working relationship between Goddard and Marshall after 1983
44-45 PI responsibilities
45-46 Wide Field/Planetary Camera [WF/PC] and its clone as target selector for FOS
46-47 Importance of WF/PC
47 South Atlantic anomaly
47-48 Engineering style of FOS team
48-49 Hardware/firmware vs. re-programmable software in instrumentation
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
49-50 Shift in vision for FOS over ten years of development
50-51 Expectations for launch as seen in early 1986
51-52 Launch fever
52-53 Challenger disaster and impact on FOS
53 Re-establishing ST launch timetable
54 Impact of multiple-center management by NASA on program development
55 Post-1983 systems engineering effort
55-56 Role of scientists in early planning stages
56-57 Multiple-center management; impact on ST development and Space Station planning; program accountability
57 1983 program status briefings by Ed Weiler and Jim Welch
57-58 Impact of briefings on program management
58-59 Interaction with program managers at Goddard, project scientist at Marshall; Goddard vs. Marshall: perceived differences in response to scientifically driven solutions to project difficulties
59 Role of personal relationships in selecting route toward resolution of project difficulties
59 Concluding remarks
Henry, Richard. Date: November 29, 1983. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 34 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Henry recalls early educational background and work on Aerobee payloads under Don Morton and Lyman Spitzer. Discusses work under George Field on galactic cluster/missing mass problem. Discusses his own reaction to Spitzer's OAO 3 Copernicus project. Describes his own move to Friedman's team at NRL. Describes his own growing involvement with X-ray sounding rocket group. Discusses NRL's space astronomy organization and management style. Discusses his own move to Johns Hopkins. Discusses his first involvement with ST. Describes perception of NASA administrators among astronomers and effect of this on STScI decision. Describes Bland Norris and Nancy Roman. Discusses staffing of Astrophysics office and OSS during Henry's tenure. Discusses nature of NASA budget. Discusses morale and working environment at Headquarters. Discusses his own role in preparing portion of Fiscal 1979 OSS Congressional testimony and producing promotional pamphlet on ST. Discusses his own role in Keller Committee on STScI and site selection process. Discusses importance of scientific ability at Headquarters.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family and educational background; Princeton graduate studies
2-3 Involvement under Don Morton and Lyman Spitzer with the construction of Aerobee payloads to record UV stellar spectra
3-4 Work under Field on the galactic cluster-missing mass problem
4-5 Currency of the LST idea at Princeton in mid-1960s; degree of Spitzer's involvement with space astronomy
5 Henry's reaction to Spitzer's OAO 3 Copernicus; perception of Copernicus as an ambitious technical jump
5-6 Henry's awareness of Princeton's detector development work
6 Henry's move to Friedman's team at NRL
6-7 Dissertation work in spectroscopy for Stromgren at Princeton IAS
7 Henry's arrival at NRL
8 Growing involvement with Gil Fritz and the NRL X-ray sounding rocket group
8-9 NRL's discovery of pulsations in the Crab Nebula X-ray source
9 Competition between NRL and American Science and Engineering
9 NRL's space astronomy organization and management style
10 Henry's UV experiments at NRL
10-11 Difficulties experienced by NRL's IR space astronomy group
11-12 Henry's move to Johns Hopkins with Paul Feldman
12-13 Henry granted a one-year world travel leave from Hopkins, after only one year of teaching
13 Growing recognition that Henry had misinterpreted his cosmic background soft X-ray data
13-15 Results from Bill Fastie's Apollo 17 UV spectrometer
15 Henry's continuing work on the UV background radiation problem; relation between UV and the neutrino hypothesis
16-17 Henry's first involvement with Space Telescope: participation in the astronomers' meeting with Fletcher during the funding crises
17-18 Henry accepts Bland Norris' offer of the NASA Deputy Directorfor Astrophysics position
18-19 The perception of NASA administrators among astronomers
19 Effect of astronomers' reactions to NASA on the STScI decision
19-20 Character and background of Bland Norris
20-21 Character of Nancy Roman; astronomers' opinions of her
22 Henry's experience at NASA HQ; relationships between the various Space Science programs and divisions at the time
23 Staffing of the Astrophysics office and OSS during Henry's tenure; Henry's relations with Frank Martin
24 Work at NASA HQ with Don Hunten, Istiaque Rasool
24-25 Nature of the NASA budget: little discretionary funding
25 Herbert Chisholm's role under Norris in the Astrophysics Division
25-26 Morale and working environment at NASA HQ
26-27 Henry's role in preparing the Astrophysics portion of the Fiscal 1979 OSS Congressional testimony
28 Henry's involvement in producing the promotional pamphlet "Why Space Telescope"
29-30 Henry's involvement in and awareness of Spitzer's and Bahcall's ST lobbying efforts
30-32 Henry's role in the Keller Committee on STScI, and his involvement with the STScI site selection process; Keller's influence
32 Contrast between scientific justifications of space missions and economic-scientific justifications
32-33 Keller's involvement with ST during his NASA HQ tenure
33-34 Character and position of Jeff Rosendhal; importance of scientific ability at NASA HQ; NASA HQ's reaction to political influencing
Hinners, Noel. Date: October 17, 1984. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 27 pp. Use restrictions: Public.
Hinners recalls early educational background and interest in geology. Discusses decision to take postdoc appointment with Bellcomm which provides him with involvement in Ranger and Apollo space science missions. Discusses scientists' reaction to NASA's decision not to follow up on unmanned lunar exploration. Describes quality and quantity of corporate sponsored lunar research. Discusses his own work as member of Apollo 12-17 site selection committees. Contrasts Lunar Science Institute with STScI. Discusses his own decision to go to NASA and his role in Lunar Office at Headquarters. Discusses his own tenure as head of OSSA. Discusses status of LST in 1974. Discusses his plan to drop ST from NASA budget. Discusses relationship between phases of ST development and budgeting process. Discusses impact of design changes on cost estimates. Discusses scientific lobbying; conflict between ST and Galileo project. Discusses role of Congressional aides in lobbying effort. Discusses conflicts between ST and Pioneer-Venus. Describes relative funding of planetary and astrophysics missions in 1970s; differences in scientific maturity of two areas of research. Discusses purpose of SSEC study.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Academic background at CALTECH, Princeton; dissertation topic; origins of initial interest in space science
2 Divisions in the CALTECH geology department: classical geology vs. geophysics; Gerry Wasserburg
3 Decision to transfer to Princeton for PhD; exposure to asteroid studies at CALTECH
4 Princeton geology; Hinners' enthusiasm for a generalist approach to the sciences
5 Hinners takes a postdoctoral appointment with Bellcomm, on advice of Dick Holland
5 Bellcomm provides Hinners with involvement with space science missions; Ranger, Apollo
6 Geologists' role on Ranger: defusing ill-founded engineering concerns
6-7 Work on devising Surveyor experiments which could provide useful data for both science and engineering
7 Scientists' reaction to NASA's decision not to follow up the unmanned lunar exploration program
8 Bellcomm's reluctance to pursue scientific research; other industrial centers involved in lunar research in the 1960s
8-9 Corporate-sponsored lunar research: quality and quantity
9-10 Bellcomm's involvement with post-Apollo and Apollo Applications studies; lunar research
10-11 Hinners' work as a member of the Apollo 12-17 site selection committees; Farouk El Baz and Jim Head's ALSEP studies
11 The Lunar Science Institute; similarities and contrasts with STScI
12 Closure of Bellcomm in the early 1970s; Bellcomm's role as a source of ideas for NASA HQ independent from the centers
12-13 Hinners' decision to go to NASA; roles of Lee Schere, BillO'Brien, John Naugle
13 Role of Hinners' Lunar Office within the NASA HQ organization; Hinners' merger of the Lunar and Planetary Offices upon becoming head of OSSA
14 Distribution of offices within OSSA at the beginning of Hinners' tenure
14-15 The Automated Launch Vehicle Office of OSSA; competition with the Space Shuttle; phaseout of the Delta ELV
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Hinners' assumption of the Associate Administrator position in OSSA, June 1974; status of LST program in 1974
16 LST issues in 1974: Advanced Technology Development funding, new start, final primary mirror size selection
16-17 Hinners plan to drop ST from the NASA budget to galvanize community support; activities of Spitzer, Bahcall, Field; Hinners' avenues of contact with ST's scientist supporters
17-18 Factors encouraging NASA to move projects rapidly from Phases A and B to C/D; relationship between the different phases and the budgeting process
18 Impact of design changes on cost estimates
19 Assigning the order of submission to Congress for science missions within NASA; scientific lobbying
20-21 Conflict within NASA and within Congress between ST and Jupiter Orbiter-Probe (Galileo); roles of contractors, Bahcall, Spitzer, Field, Eddie Boland, Don Fuqua, and Fletcher
21-22 Role of NASA's Code C Legislative Affairs Office in the ST and JOP lobbying; roles of Gerry Griffin and Joe Allen
22 Roles of further scientist/lobbyists: Hal Masursky of JPL, Bahcall, O'Dell; lobbying freedom of JPL vis a vis the NASA centers
23 Influence of Congressional aids, particularly Dick Mallow of the Boland office
23-24 Conflicts between LST and Pioneer-Venus
24-25 Relative funding of planetary and astrophysics missions in the 1970s; success of astrophysics in obtaining new starts
25-26 Scientific differences between planetary studies and astrophysics; relative ripeness of the two for discoveries
27 Purpose of the SSEC study
Hinners, Noel. Date: November 16, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Hinners describes his involvement with Space Telescope during his tenure as NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science (1974-1979), and as director of the Goddard Space Flight Center (1982-87). Topics discussed include planetary science and ST planning, potential funding conflicts between ST and various planetary probes, and JPL interest in ST planetary imaging. Other subjects include ST detector technology, the selection of CCDs as the ST detectors, ESA involvement in the ST project, rationales for the ST Science Institute, and the role of the Science Institute.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 COMPLEX (Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration) and ST; Wasserburg
1-2 Planetary Science and ST; William Brunk
3-5 NASA ground-based telescope contracts as models for an ST institute contract
5 ST and Jupiter Orbiter-Probe (JOP)/Galileo
6 Viking mission and NASA's space science budget
6-8 Mariner Jupiter-Uranus (MJU)
8 MJU cancellation's effect on planetary science
8-10 JPL and the "Purple Pigeon Exercise": growing concern about planetary science opportunities
10-12 JOP and imaging capability
12 CALTECH/JPL interest in providing ST planetary imaging capability
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Early ST detector options: film, SEC Vidicon
13 Reasons for selecting CCDs for the ST camera
13-14 Concern over CCD availability for NASA projects
14 Strengths of JPL CCD-based Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) proposal
15 Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH) in WF/PC CCDs
16 WF/PC Clone; Structural-Thermal Axial Replacement (STAR)
17 Opposition to ESA involvement in ST; Congressional advocates of international projects: Edward Boland
18-19 Williamsburg Conference and ESA-ST link; Richard Goody, NAS Space Science Board-ESA link
19-20 US scientists' reactions to ESA ST involvement
20 Presidents' support of international space science
20-21 German contributions to Galileo
21 Other international programs: Solar-Polar, IRAS
22-23 ST funding and ground-based astronomy funding
23-24 Reasons for creating an ST science institute
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24-26 Long-term funding for NASA space science missions
26 ST as a long-term NASA science commitment
26 Orbital refurbishment of ST
27 John Bahcall as an ST Science Institute proponent
27-28 Advocacy for an X-ray space science institute
28 Other institute concepts: expanding Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) for other roles
29 ST Maintenance and Refurbishment (M&R) in orbit
Hinners, Noel. Date: December 4, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Hinners elaborates on his involvement with Space Telescope during his tenure as NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science (1974-1979), and as director of the Goddard Space Flight Center (1982-87). Topics discussed include potential funding conflicts between ST and planetary probes, the role of various legislators in ST funding proceedings, ESA participation in the ST project, the origins of the Space Telescope Science Institute, technological challenges of ST, the cost of the ST project, and the ST project management and contracting structure.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 NASA Congressional Affairs Office's role in presenting space science to Congress: Galileo
2-3 Senator William Proxmire and ST
3-4 Cong. Edward Boland and staffer Dick Malow: ST, Galileo, Pioneer-Venus
4-5 ST and OMB; long-term NASA space science support
5-7 Presidential Science Office and ST: Frank Press
7 OMB efforts to cancel Galileo
7 NASA budget coordination efforts with NSF, NOAA: ST and the Very Large Array
7-8 Richard Goody, NAS Space Science Board: Williamsburg Conference and ESA role on ST
8-9 Rationales for an ST Science Institute
10 The Hornig Committee; Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) reaction to the institute concept
10-11 Reaction to the institute inside and outside NASA
11 Keller Committee; implementing the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI)
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Hinners' ST involvement after NASA: Tim Mutch
13 NASA HQ management of space science missions
13-14 HQ management of ST
14 Technological challenges of ST: mirror figuring, Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs); alternative FGSs
15 Changes in ST during Hinners' 1979-82 absence from NASA: cost escalation
15-16 Effect of early contingency funds on ST final cost
16 Comparing ST costs to Viking and Galileo costs
16-17 Limitations of space project cost modeling
18 Technological challenges of ST, cont.: latches
18-19 Funding for developmental contingencies
19 Relations between GSFC and other ST centers and contractors
19-21 Changes in the management and organization of the GSFC ST Program (STP-G), ca. 1982-3
21-22 Impact of splitting the ST project between GSFC and Marshall Space Flight Center
22 Possible AXAF X-ray mission use of ST facilities
23 Impact of ST associate contractor structure; contractor management of NASA program funds
23-24 Relationship between NASA and military aerospace contracting
24 Scientific integrity of the ST project
25-26 Hinners' memories of other key ST participants
Hunten, Don. Date: December 14, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Hunten recalls early childhood and college preparation. Recalls early interest in auroral study and eventual recruitment by Kitt Peak space division. Describes decision to move to rocket research. Discusses interest in planetary atmosphere. Discusses research priorities at Kitt Peak. Recalls his ground-based work on Martin atmosphere at Kitt Peak. Compares ground-based and in situ measurements. Recalls membership on Planetary Astronomy Panel of NASA's Astronomy Missions Board. Describes Rocket program at Kitt Peak. Recalls origins of International Ultraviolet Explorer [IUE] and its evolution. Discusses learning to work with NASA. Recalls Kitt Peak's involvement in competition for STScI site. Describes his role with respect to Noel Hinners. Discuss congressional budget hearings for Galileo. Describes changes at Kitt Peak towards more ground-based astronomy. Describes his own increased interest in working on-going NASA planetary flight programs. Compares mainstream astronomy and planetary astronomy and discusses reaction to George Field's remarks on this issue. Describes his personal interest in situ exploration as opposed to earth-based or earth-orbital projects.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Biographical information
2 College preparation
3-4 Early interest in auroral study
5 Recruitment by Kitt Peak space division; move to rocket research
6 Study of planetary atmospheres
7 Research priorities at Kitt Peak
8 Ground-based work on Martian atmosphere at Kitt Peak
9 Ground-based vs in situ measurements
9-10 Membership on Planetary Astronomy Panel of NASA's Astronomy Missions Board
10-11 Rocket program at Kitt Peak
11 Changing name from space division to planetary sciences division
12 Origins of International Ultraviolet Explorer [IUE]
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Evolution of IUE project as a result of NASA involvement
13-15 Learning to work with NASA
15 Space Science Board and approval for Galileo and ST
16 Kitt Peak and interest in competing in site selection for STScI
17 Role with respect to Noel Hinners
18-19 Budget hearings for Galileo
19-20 Changes at Kitt Peak towards more ground-based astronomy
20-21 Increased interest in working on-going NASA planetary flight programs
21 Relationship of mainstream astronomy and planetary astronomy
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Discussion of George Field's remarks on role of planetary astronomy with respect to mainstream astronomy
23-25 Getting Congressional budgetary approval for Galileo
25 University Space Sciences Working Group
25-26 Planetary astronomers and Announcement of Opportunity [AO] for ST
26-27 Personal interest in in-situ exploration as opposed to earth-based or earth-orbital projects
27-28 Discussion of earth-orbital satellite dedicated for planetary astronomy
28-29 Discussion of planetary scientist vs planetary astronomer
Keathley, William W. Date: December 5, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 41 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Keathley discusses his tenure as Space Telescope project manager from 1975 through 1979. He reconstructs the creation of the ST project management structure, commenting on the associate contractor system, the implications of working with contractors unfamiliar with NASA procedures, the role of the two NASA centers involved in ST, and the relation of the project manager to the program manager at NASA HQ. He discusses the writing of both the Memorandum of Understanding governing European participation in the ST program, and the Request for Proposals from contractors to build the telescopes's major systems. In addition, Keathley describes specific problems and issues the encountered during his tenure, including distributing Phase B study funds among contractors, resolving pressing technological concerns, working with scientists and translating their requirements to the engineers, and resolving Phase C management problems at Perkin-Elmer. Finally, he compares the management cultures of NASA's Goddard and Marshall centers as evidenced on ST, and through NASA's history.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Why he joined NASA; Birmingham, Alabama; Pratt-Whitney; Huntsville; MSFC; Jack Weight; Skylab - joins in experiment area; Apollo Extensions System
1-2 Works in ATM Office; Manages instruments; Apollo Telescope Mount; Joins ST in OTA office in 1974 Phase B Activity
2 Space Telescope; ITEK, Boston; Perkin-Elmer, Norwalk; Becomes Project Manager at end of Phase B; Not much involved in stellar ATM; Large Space Telescope; Some ATM, move over to ST; Art White
2-3 Did not recognize any aspect of MSFC culture that affected telescope design; OAO; Goddard
3-4 Design drivers - came from Phase B activity; Man maintainability - show of driver in early program; Low cost mode of program - a driving factor to ST configuration; Risk of failure no longer in current program; Tall poles when he joined: (1) FGS, (2) polishing of large mirror, (3) truss to maintain alignment; ITEK; Breadboarded two FGS systems; Perkin-Elmer; In Phase C/D concerned at only one option for FGS; JPL
4-5 Dropped CCD concept of JPL; CCD
5 Polishes 1.8-meter mirror to demonstrate use of computer controlled machine; Perkin-Elmer; Aiming at over 60
5-6 Metering truss concerns - Boeing won contract to build a graphite-epoxy metering truss
6 Concern at tradeoff between pointing performance and optical quality; 0.007 arc seconds; Bob O'Dell; Defined "drop dead" pointing requirements; Speced ST on encircled energy
6-7 Fine Guidance Sensor; Bob O'Dell
7 Had to go to ule for mirror; Ces-Vit; Failure was in taking information from CCDs and turning into an error system; JPL
8 Outgassing well understood graphite-epoxy; Boeing; Invar very heavy (already had weight problem) and magnetic; Focal planestructure could employ aluminum or titanium
8-9 Perkin-Elmer; Problem of simplifying analytical model and getting bad data
9 General Dynamics
9-10 Gene Olivier
10-11 Modularity of Sis - did not want "lazy susan" arrangement (argument used, say, on HEAO); Kollsman SIP; That WF/PC could be an axial instrument kept radial bay free, in his "hip pocket"; Modularized Sis so as to have access to electronics but not successful, so made whole SI modular
11 Jim Westphal at SWG meeting at Smithsonian says WF/PC did not need a radial bay
11-12 Danielson
12-13 Aperture size change. Not due to Congress; A 3-meter mirror implied the SSM would sit on the back of the telescope; Control problems waited SSM over the CG tradeoffs at 1.8-meter, 2.4-meter and 3-meter. Attitude control system the big driver. Pushed and generated at ITEK. Much happier to go to 2.4-meter
13 Involvement of scientists in this decision; OTA; ITEK
13-14 Going to MAOT would have lost interest of scientists; Thinks Spitzer said if you go to 1.8-meter, you don't have a LST; Bob O'Dell; MAOT; Input of astronomers; Keathley used O'Dell as if he were PI for the Telescope
14 O'Dell moves upstairs; Stuhlinger
14-15 Warner collocated with project; Sat in on many SWG meetings; SWG were O'Dell's show
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 Planning for operations and Science Institute; New management aspects so WKC took more involvement, although O'Dell "led the charge", but not sure if any person was the leader; Bob O'Dell; Gene Olivier; Hornig Committee; Warren Keller; Noel Hinners
16 Expected NASA could accommodate Hornig's recommendations on the whole; Keller Committee; Congressional difficulties; Devastating effect on work of the project; Dick Mallow was major adversary - would somehow link ST to some other thing; long process to initiate project. Once you get a hardware set of people in place, you create problems by keeping them in the conceptual stage. Bad for contractor teams - they, however, could go to Congress and lobby. They'd advise him of who'd they'd seen. Lobbying looked after by HQ.; Goddard
16-17 UARS
17 Don Fuqua
18 Noel Hinners
18-19 Role of project manager. WK's style is to delegate out, but got more heavily involved then some so. On ST he did not delegate out as much as could be done with other programs.; Limited manpower on program. Hence big decision on systems engineers - 3 options, explain why he went for LMSC.
19-20 No. of associate contractors meant lots of interfaces so he had to get more involved - set up 4 working groups.; Evolved into one week reviews to investigate with interface problems; OTA; Did not have a large no. of people - went to a functionalorganization, not end-item oriented. Reasons why.
20 Goddard; OTA; SSM; Fred Speer
21 By '81 manpower cap have long gone; Relations between HW and field Center - ST not running in a typical mode right now; Excellent relations with Keller - Keller gave Keathley information of what was happening at HQ, but did not make Keathley's decisions for him; Warren Keller
21-22 Daily conversations with Warren Keller - excellent relations; Huntsville
22-23 Welch very much involved in day-to-day decisions; Jim Welch; Program mgr, project mgr, much important relationship; Change of management style from Phase B to C/D
23-24 Contractors behave differently in C/D; Program managers should be tied to contractors
24 Goddard; European involvement; European Space Agency; Need to keep interfaces simple; MOU; ESA; BAC; Hughes; ESA contingency fund; Maurice Delahaye; Jan Burger
25 Training a contractor to be a NASA contractor; Lockheed; Award fee structure - LMSC; Offer to accept a bottom line, should they'd paid for overruns; Explained workings of MSFC to Wright; Bill Wright; Marshall; Take care not to change contractors operating procedures; Lockheed
26 MSFC asked to change its procedures; Apollo; Skylab; Tried to change P-E as they had deficiencies; P-E bad presentations - trained them; P-E bad planning; Keathley went up every month to see what was going on; had found skill shortages at P-E
27 Dan McCarthy could not tell a lie - forthright; difficulties in planning processes; Tall poles at start of C/D - FGS (Primary mirror polishing; pointing system) Felt FGS should go to spacecraft contractor; Reasons for leaving FGS; Gene Olivier
27-28 Harris at P-E; Changes of requirements threw Harris into a flip; Reasons for associate contractors
28 Landsat put back together on an associate contractor basis - saved funds; With associate contractors project mgr. needs to "get his hands dirty" - can't be chairman of the board; Landsat; GFE
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28-29 P-E had difficulty in operating with a matrix management system; Perkin-Elmer
29 Chorsky & Kelly saw this as a problem and got it corrected; Chorsky; Gaynor Kelly; How requirements get decided - it's a difficulty of a Phase B competition; Need to write a spec that will not preclude any contractors from willing a competition; Umbrella spec; Into program, go to a specific spec; $90M put aside for this; Umbrella spec written by Marshall; Planned to have directed changes as the "general" solution went to the "specific." Arguments with Bill Lilly who took the "reserve" as reserve - he called it contingenc
29-30 SSM
30-31 Boeing; OTA
31 HQ-APA - use to make program changes; Not present system on ST
31-32 Goddard; Technology plan - using available designs, etc.; Not so easy in practice. Even components with prior flight history ar not necessarily usable
32 Will run higher risk program to offset cost - use Shuttle standard SSM computer was eliminated by Keathley - wait for DDF 224; Fletcher
32-33 Mitch ran a standard hardware office at HQ - always passed Keathley to use standard parts and use his funds to develop them; Called "low cost system office" - it didn't have a budget; George Mitch
33-34 CCS in WF/PC. Aware of tradeoff between Galileo and other CCDs; CCDs
34 Pressed for study of common hardware of digicons; Digicons; Goddard; C&DH; Raised status of GSFC's; VAP
34-35 Efforts on ST when Hinners joined GSFC; 1980 - became involved in correcting SI problem, particularly the HRS; Noel Hinners; Frank Carr
35 C&DH; IBM
35-36 Fairchild
36 When Keathley was at MSFC he found that there were wrong things he did to GSFC he's "picked the bones clean"; Had to fix those things when he went to GSFC; Goddard; Change of operating attitude; Had expected to go up for frequent reboosts; Direct insertion - can get higher but had to go to 33o inclination angle
36-38 JSC; Nature of decision making; PM never has enough time to get a full set of data - need to rely on "gut feelings" or "subconscious" or whatever; Hence essential to have a PM with prior hands-on experience
39 MSFC and GSFC style differences like night and day; Goddard; Saturn; Apollo; GSFC's history is hands-on satellite experience; von Braun; Eberhard Rees; Rocco Petrone; Bill Lucas; Do everything at MSFC to prevent a PM becoming a king; Opposite at GSFC; Have to be matched; Jim Kingsbury; MSFC designing satellite - GSFC operates it - leads to some difficulties as GSFC has a certain style; Cultural problems "...more than two ways to skin a cat."
40 JCS; Frank Carr
41 Wrap up
Keller, J. Warren. Date: November 28, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Mr. Keller discusses events during and after his tenure as Space Telescope (ST) Program Manager, 1976-1979. He briefly reviews of his background and work as Mariner Jupiter-Saturn Program Manager (1971-1976), and then describes his move to the ST program. Mr. Keller comments on the challenges foreseen for ST at the start of Phase C, and describes the origins and operation of the Phase C/D ST management structure, including the two NASA managing centers and the associate spacecraft contractors. He discusses the cost history of the program, and the influence of managerial turnover on ST history. Mr. Keller steps back to briefly reviews Phase B events including securing congressional funding for the program; he then discusses in detail the origins of the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI). Topics include astronomers' support for the idea, the 1976-77 Hornig and Keller committee reports on the concept, the formal Requests for Proposals for the Institute, site selecting a director, determining the Institute, functions, and exploring some possible future roles for the organization after ST launch. Mr. Keller concludes with a brief review of the negotiations which established the European role in the ST project, ca. 1976-77.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 University of Tennessee; Bob Newton; Johns Hopkins; Early career; Huntsville; Army Ballistic Missile; Agency; Aberdeen; Works with Bob Newton
2-3 White Sands; Alvin Nielson; General Dynamics; Convair; Van Allen Belts; Moves to ABMA; M.Sc. thesis; works on nuclear airplane program
3 Goes to work for NASA at MSFC; head of nuclear physics branch in another branch; very involved in shielding and nuclear rocket program; joins office of AR&T
3-4 Don Hearth; Becomes program manager for Grand Tour
4 Sells Grand Tour to Congress; Problems - back off to Jupiter-Saturn mission; Art Reetz; Convair; OART
4-5 Bland Norris; Bland Norris wants someone to come over to Astronomy Division to wrestle ST back from Calio; OSS
6 Leaves ST in '79 to advance career; Solar Terrestrial Division; Don Burrowbridge; Frank Carr; Acts as temporary program manager between Burrowbridge and Carr; Moves to Wallops in Dec. 1981
6-7 Marc Aucremanne; Devotes most time to ST; Marc Bensimon
7 Welch; Bill Keathley; Freed Speer; Jim Odom; Lack of continuity in program managers gave rise to problems; Speer a fall guy; loss of corporate memory when Keathley & Keller leave
8 Frosch; Bill Wright; Bulkin; Loss of continuity when Frosch left
9 Perkin-Elmer; Problem with split Centers at roots of some problems; Lucas; Cooper; Lucas & Cooper could not get agreement; Cooper wanted to work for HQ; Bland Norris took Memo of Understanding to Cooper, told him to sign it, or SI's would go to MSFC
10-11 Lockheed; Perkin-Elmer; Associate contractor problem. Govt not doing systems engineer; MSFC told by Calio not to put more than 100 people on ST
11 Keller tried to change assoc. contractor, reason: NASA-DOD agreement; Guidance system split across interfaces; Concerned over program design right at start; challenges at start of his time as program mgr.; CCDs; Westphal; AO (Announcement of Opportunity)
16-17 SEC; Princeton; Spitzer, Lyman; Disgruntled group at Princeton
17-18 Galileo; Jesse Moore; FY 1978 effort to sell ST; old nemesis Eddie Boland; Proxmire; Proxmire not serious threat
18-19 Dick Malow; Dick Mallow threat; Mallow suggests putting STScI in Boland's district; hearing from Mallow then Boland
19 Don Fuqua; Fuqua one of the best friends Agency ever had; OMB interactions
19-20 Memphis Norman; OMB takes advocacy position; Planetary community thought they might get short end of stick over ST; some of that went away with WF/PC; John Caldwell
21 One reason for putting Caldwell on STWG concern; ST would knock out planetary programs; IDT's chosen to have planetary people in; Perception of planetary community - more heavily organized group; JPL; Contribution by JPL to organization of planetary community; Fletcher; George Low; Lost Grand Tour but JPL wanted major planetary mission; thrown out by Fletcher & Low, no backing by SSB etc
21-22 John Naugle
22 Naugle gets SSB behind lobbying for Mariner-Jupiter Saturn Science Advisory Group; McElroy
22-23 Jim van Allen; Townes sends enthusiastic letter from SSB on Mariner-Jupiter-Saturn; Astronomy people not so organized; NASA & JPL have organized planetary group Advisory Groups
23-24 Fletcher; Herb Friedman; John Naugle; NASA needs the support, but sometimes does not anticipate the results; now works closely with SSB, need to as budgets tighten
25 Disciplinary committees used to sell programs in NASA as well as get advice; Science Institute; Spent a lot of time on it; gave money presentations on STScI; Goddard Space Flight Center; Science community perceived NASA and GSFC were competitors with them; not sure of origins of this feeling
26 NSF
26-27 Hornig Report; Scientists upset over part of NASA's response to Hornig; never saw a Giacconi heading a ScI; came into NASA Administrator asking for cancellation of ST and building of AXAF; only Hans Mark wanted Giacconi; URA X-ray proposal response was it was too early
27 IUE; Community very happy with UIE; Goddard; Bob O'Dell
27-28 Horning Committee; Could not believe grown men could say some of the things said at Horning Committee; no one person as architect of ScI; Riccardo Giacconi
28-30 John Bahcall; SEB; Noel Hinners; Bahcall wanted Keller as SEB chairman; scientists want guaranteed time for people at ScI
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
30 Voyager; Wallops Island
30-31 Al Boggess; Ferris; Tom Huber; 1982 Review of ScI, have to control the thing
32 Did not want ScI in too early, they would get too involved; RG tends to make decisions for purely science reasons not account of cost
32-33 Sometimes scientists want to launch an unreliable vehicles; Riccardo Giacconi; ScI could have been a very good thing; not sure if it will be; afraid it might become a monster; Scientists fought very hard on instrument development for ScI
34-35 Noel Hinners; Site selection consortia unhappy; Hinners initially against coupling; Keller got this turned around, he did not want politics in this
35-36 If these guys can't pick a site, how the hell can they run an Institute? Made the consortia go berserk, they were very upset; Spoke to people on these problems they had in picking sites; didn't want to be bogged down in Congressional litigation
36 Starting point was the Hornig Report; how they'd implement it; Noel Hinners
36-37 Hugh Loweth; Owens; George Washington University; Ron Konkel; Cameron; Ron La Court; John Bahcall; Voyager; OMB wants a person expert in management to sit in on presentation - Owens from GW; Cameron, Hornig, Owens sit in on presentation; Hornig and Owens were very positive; Bahcall said the Keller report was better than the Hornig report
37-40 Cameron wanted the diffuse center concept; "Current Concepts" SSB (Space Science Board); Keller major author of Keller report & "Current Concepts"; Hornig; Nancy Roman; Frosch; Noel Hinners; Goddard; "...they practically had nothing to do with ST"
40-41 Jack Brandt; George Pieper; Adrienne Timothy; Sciences Directorate: some support in HQ; all on Keller Committee and Bland Norris the chair on ST in HQ was in favor
41-43 Williamsburg Conference; IUE; Much negotiating with ESA; some hardnosed; Lot of discussion of what constituted 15%; Idea was to give ESA things to do that would not give us a gutache in interfacing; Hans Kaltenecher; Duccio Macchetto; Nancy Roman; Bill Keathley; Bob O'Dell; Keller was concerned they were giving away the store; tried to impose more control
43-44 FOC; FOC Review team; helped to initiate the program design; ESA complicated it considerably
44-45 Fritz Oder; Oder said ESA was ahead of NASA on the solar array; Lockheed; Boland; Shipley
Keller, J. Warren. Date: December 9, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 25 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Mr. Keller discusses events and issues during his tenure as Space Telescope (ST) program manager at NASA HQ, 1976-79. He describes the NASA HQ management team for ST in the late 1970s, and discusses relations between the Headquarters program-level managers and the Marshall Space Flight Center project-level management. He discusses the NASA selection process for contractors for the two major ST systems, including drafting the proposals, and evaluating the responses. He discusses budgeting for the program, and reflects on the cost growth ST experience ca. 1980. Mr. Keller describes changes in the project's design philosophy over its duration, especially issues relating to Space Shuttle capabilities and the 'protoflight' design technique, and discusses scientist' roles in the ST project. He concludes with a contrast of the two major ST contractors, Perkin-Elmer and Lockheed, and with a discussion of management culture at NASA's Marshall and Goddard centers, and at JPL.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 OSS; Program organization at start of Phase C/D in HQ
1-2 Nancy Roman; Visibility of ST program
2 Voyager; Reviews of ST in OSS. Bimonthly reviews of contractors and Centers by HQ management; Dr. Hinners; Tony Calio; Andy Stofan; SSM; OTA
3 Role of program in HQ; OMB
3-5 Space Science Board; Program managers should not become project managers for the project they are representing; Need for program and project manager to cooperate; ST
5 Bill Keathley; Regular communication between Keller and Keathley; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville; OMB Program managers as interface to Congressional staffers, OMB staffers, etc.; Art Reetz; Division of responsibilities with program engineer
5-6 Source Evaluation Boards; Writing contracts for Phase C/Ds; RFPs written in Marshall; OTA; SSM; RFP; Keller eases contracts through system; Contract negotiated in Sept. 1977; Perkin-Elmer; Lockheed
6-7 OTA; Keathley; OTA SEB chaired by Bill Keathley; Spike Fields; Marshall; Contract negotiated between Center and contractor
7 Umbrella Spec; RFPs: detailed technological questions not answered so leave maneuvering room in contract; built this into funding too
8-9 SSM; Funding at start of C/D. Project plan included reserves in each line item. So a reserve in SSM line, OTA line, additional to reserves at MSFC and HQ
9 Underestimation of technological difficulties at start of C/D; APA; Marshall; MSFC reserve at discretion of project manager (and his agreement with his Center manager); effort in writing Phase C/Ds to advocate a particular design; look to open-out; Shuttle; Bill Keathley; Keathley held off several items Lockheed wanted
9-10 Lockheed; Change in philosophy in orbital replacement units toand fro - in not replacing in orbit, a more extensive test program
10 O'Dell; Shuttle; Black Saturday
10-11 Black Saturday, "blew the roof off the whole place" not in presence; Pis
11 Need a level of success in a program to sustain it, easy to slip below that; Lockheed "slipped in" behind P-E - P-E's slips kept LMSC well. (P-E shielded Lockheed)
11-12 P-E in a "no win situation." P-E made LMSC look good; P-E - "good optical house with no systems engineering but they didn't know it."; Perkin-Elmer; OTA; P-E had the harder part of ST - mirror, FGS
13 ITEK
13-15 Protoflight concept; Change of program due to use of protoflight concept; need to move to protoflight due to cost. Problem is that people need to change their mental orientation; Cheaper and quicker to do the protoflight; Marshall; FOC (Faint Object Camera); Wide Field/Planetary Camera; CCDs
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 Scientists input into program; Nancy Roman
15-16 Bob O'Dell; Need for project scientists and program scientist to move in same direction. Not so early in ST's and C/D; Ed Groth; Schroeder
16 Bill Fastie; Scientists were able to impact the design - must take their concerns into account; Jim Westphal; How Keller worked off-line with the scientists; Felt close to Westphal, Bahcall politically astute; Would use Fastie on technical points; Bill Fastie; IUE
16-17 Role of Bill Fastie - high reputation in NASA; Good contacts, unquestioned expertise
17 Why used telescope scientist; Two scientists able to penetrate a contractor who would be trusted by the rest of the working group
17-18 Bland Norris; Norris cost review; Usage of reserve disturbing to people; Push for reviews after comes from comptroller's office
18 Bill Lilley; Jim Fletcher; Role of comptroller in NASA
18-19 Opinion of Bill Lilley: NASA through and through not representing OMB's interest
19 Shuttle; Shuttle's cost problems not an overriding concern for ST
19-20 JPL; Marshall; Goddard; Styles of different Centers
20 Bill Lucas; Lucas' style; Project managers at MSFV afraid to take problems to Lucas; Goddard; Center directors do set a Center's tone; Bob Cooper; Tom Young Noel Hinners; Marshall; Cooper not well liked at GSFC Hinners; GSFC; Goddard likes to tell HQs what their job is JPL
21 JPL more responsive to HQs than most NASA Centers; Wallops; Stormy relationship between HQ and GSFC. "You get medals at GSFC by screwing headquarters" comments by GSFC staff; Marshall
21-22 Project managers don't like to make a clean breast of problems; MSFC problems came to Headquarters piecemeal because managersafraid to take them whole to Lucas
22 Lucas; Quarterlies controlled by Lucas; "Kill the messenger" with bad news
23 Quarterlies were "really sterile"; Tendency of OSS manager in 1983 not to want to see dates coming in just prior to setting up BMD; Thinks program will succeed despite BMD; Shuttle
24 Yardley; Yardley was trying to engineer shuttle from HQs
25 Major achievements on ST early on (1) getting off the ground (2) major technology and achievements, like the mirror; Nature of decision-making; Project scientist role is vital in NASA project; Sees Ed Stone of JPL as epitome of project scientist; Influence of O'Dell as a member of MSFC management structure
Keller, Sam. Date: December 15, 1983. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
Keller recalls early career before joining Goddard. Contrasts Marshall and Goddard working styles. Discusses his work as joint Congressional Relations/Technology officer at Goddard. Discusses perceptions of LST at Goddard in late 1960s. Discusses reasons for designation of Marshal as lead LST center. Discusses 1982 crisis. Discusses his own transfer to ST program manager position. Describes own views on Headquarters-center relations. Discusses importance of defining management structures and relations at inception of a NASA project. Describes scientists' feelings toward ST in 1982-3. Describes Marshall's relations with scientists and origins of STOPAT. Discusses causes of 1982 crisis. Discusses effect of Congressional budget process on ST cost overruns. Discusses effect of two-center management on ST. Describes the nature of aerospace contracting. Discusses impact of ST program on Perkin-Elmer corporate organization and style. Contrasts contract management of NASA and DOD. Describes the qualities of the ideal NASA contractor. Discusses ST budget structure. Describes his own responsibility for ST progress. Discusses effect of post-1982/3 reorganization on ST program. Discusses status of ST science instruments at Goddard and TRW/Lockheed contracts.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Career before joining Goddard; work as patent advisor at ONR
1-2 Goddard positions: Congressional Relations; Industrial Applications; Administration and Management; associations with Bud Sisco and Todd Groo
2-3 Chairmanship of Frosch's mid-1970s NASA HQ reorganization panel; position as Calio's deputy in Applications division
3 Merger of HQ Applications and Science divisions; Keller as deputy administrator in the new division
3 Contrast between Marshall and Goddard working styles; Goddard management under John Clark and Harry Goett
3-4 Keller's work as joint Congressional Relations/Technology officer at Goddard
4 Goddard perceptions of the LST proposals of the late 1960s; LST as an OAO follow-on
5 Reasons for designation of Marshall as the lead LST center: pressure to close one of NASA's centers; Goddard's awareness of LST following that decision
6 Keller's initial awareness of ST following the 1981 HQ reorganization; first recognition of 1982 problems
7 ST project instincts concerning the public handling of problems; PI's concerns for ST's future
7-8 Scope of ST project's problems in 1982
8 Chronology of the emergence of the 1982 crisis: initial Marshall completion estimates; Fletcher's Congressional testimony
8-9 Don Fordyce's appointment to the Perkin-Elmer ST project management; January 1983 Fordyce-Speer presentation to HQ
9 Keller's transfer of himself to the ST program manager position following the Fordyce briefing
10 Keller's views on NASA HQ-center relations; HQ role in projectmanagement
11 Relationships between center project offices, HQ program offices, and the NASA Administrator
12 Distinction between NASA HQ access to center projects, and management of them
12-13 Importance of defining management structures and relations at the inception of a NASA project
13 Effect on ST project of Marshall's affiliation with the Office of Manned Space Flight
13-14 Organization and conception of the NASA HQ ST management staff concept implemented as STDD in 1983; decision to staff STDD with corporate contractor personnel
14-15 Scientists' feelings toward the ST project in 1982-3; Jim Westphal
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 Keller's impression of Marshall's relations with scientists
15-16 Origin and mission of STOPAT
16 Scientists as competent engineers; Keller's accessibility to scientists
16-17 Selection of BDM as the contractor for the STDD systems management position; Jim Welch's role
17-18 Root causes of the 1982-3 crisis: NASA HQ's attitude concerning possible cost overruns or delays
18 High-risk nature of NASA's basic advanced technology development mission
18 Keller's estimates of the financial toll of ST's management difficulties
19 Effect of Congressional budget process on ST cost overruns
19-20 Effect of two-center management on ST; difference between contract management and systems engineering
20 Management skills and technical capabilities of NASA's centers and laboratories
20-21 Cost of management of ST by Marshall vs. by industry
21 Effect of early program cost-cutting on the quality and final cost of ST subsystems; Perkin-Elmer, Harris
22 Nature of aerospace contracting; factors influencing the size of contractor bids and the pace of contract progress
22-23 NASA program managers' responsibility to follow the business situation of their contractors
23 Effect of Jerry Richardson and Don Fordyce on Perkin- Elmer; impact of ST program on P-E corporate organization and style
23 Contrast between NASA and DOD contract management
24 Qualities of the ideal NASA contractor
24-25 NASA contractor bid selection considerations; underbidding
25-26 Present organization of ST project; justification for STDD; qualities of Jim Welch
26-27 ST budget structure; placing ST operations at Goddard
27 Role of Charles Pellerin
27-28 Keller's responsibility for ST progress
28 Congressional response to 1982-3 ST reorganization
29 Effect of reorganization on ST program; staff turnover over history of ST program
29-30 Corporate memory on ST program: Roman, Reetz
31 Progress at Perkin-Elmer; FGS performance
31-32 Status of ST science instruments at Goddard
32 Status of TRW, Lockheed contracts
33 Lockheed flight software development
Keller, Sam. Date: February 11, 1985. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Keller describes ST project at Perkin-Elmer since 1982 crisis. Discusses sources of ST schedule slippage at Lockheed. Discusses relations between Lockheed and ST scientific community. Contrasts engineering and scientific perspectives on adequate testing. Discusses Lockheed's internal organization and ST's place within that structure. Discusses his own efforts to promote cooperation between Lockheed and ST scientists. Discusses STOPAT's effect on scientists' sense of involvement with project engineering. Discusses art of project management.. Describes ST decision-making hierarchy. Discusses Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis problem in Wide Field/Planetary Camera. Discusses ST's fiscal standing and ESA's contribution to cost. Discusses expansion of STScI and Giacconi's management style. Discusses NASA's relationship with STScI. Describes attractions and compensations of work within NASA's upper administrative ranks.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 ST Project performance at Perkin-Elmer since the 1982 crisis and the installation of Don Fordyce; Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) delivery; Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) performance
2-4 Sources of ST schedule slippage at Lockheed: ST Spacecraft Automated Test System, ST verification and acceptance testing
4 Relations between Lockheed and the ST scientific community; differences in working styles
5 Scientists' motivations in approaching ST system decisions; scientists' desires for extensive integration testing
5-6 Engineering vis a vis scientific perspectives on adequate testing
6-7 Lockheed's internal organization; location of ST within the Lockheed corporate structure; roles of Peline, Wright, Powell
7-8 Keller's efforts to promote cooperation between Lockheed and the ST scientists; the influence of the Program Manager
8-9 Current fraction of Keller's time devoted to ST; impact of Jim Welch, Jim Odom, and contractor staff changes on ST
9 STOPAT's effect on the ST scientists' sense of involvement with project engineering; scientists' contributions to ST engineering
9-10 The art of project management; management by conciliation
10-11 BDM's role in ST management; the balance between contractor and government personnel in space science projects
11 The size of NASA HQ's space science mission oversight staffs
11-12 The ST project management information system software
12-13 The ST decision-making hierarchy; relationship between the level of decision-making on a problem and the ST Level 1 requirements
13-14 The WF/PC Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH) problem
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 The Science Working Group and the QEH problem
15-16 ST's fiscal standing; ST cost/schedule performance since 1982
16 ESA's final percent-of-cost contribution to ST
17 Expansion of STScI; Giacconi's management style
17-18 Role of the NAS Hornig and Code Committees in shaping NASA's relations toward STScI; confusion concerning STScI's charter
18-19 NASA's space science new start decisions; the role and limits of scientific advice; the role of NASA administrators
20 Interplay between personality and policy in space science
21-22 Attractions and compensations of work within the NASA upper administrative ranks
King, Ivan. Date: May 2, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
King discusses astronomers' attitudes toward NASA space science in 1960s. Describes effect of O'Dell's being named as LST Project Scientist. Describes his first involvement with LST. Discusses his work as consultant to LST Imaging Instrument Development Team. Discusses Team's interface with contractors. Discusses allotment of observing time to ESA. Discusses lobbying efforts and political awareness in 1970s. Describes his own involvement in writing proposal for Wide Field Camera as part of Faint Object Camera proposal. Discusses his election to presidency of AAS in 1977 and his role in ST lobbying at this time. Describes meeting to discuss plans and goals for STScI. Discusses strengths of AURA/Johns Hopkins proposal. Discusses relation of support for STScI and attitudes towards Goddard. Discusses perception of adversarial relationship between astronomers and NASA. Discusses ST Working Group's effectiveness in representing scientific community within NASA. Describes Faint Object Camera design and recommended changes in it. Complications arising from European involvement in FOC development with respect to guaranteed observing time.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Professional astronomers' attitudes towards NASA space science in the middle and late 1960s
2 Geographic variations in astronomers' interest in space science
2-3 Effect of NASA's naming O'Dell to be LST Project Scientist on the credibility and visibility of the project among astronomers
3-4 King's first involvement with LST: assisting Nancy Roman's evaluation of applications for positions on the LST Phase A/B working group
4-5 Robert Danielson's hiring of King and JPL planetary worker Bill Baum as consultants to LST Imaging Instrument Development Team; King's concept of serendipity observations
5-6 King's application of his LST/ST experience to his ground-based work
6 The Imaging IDT's interfaces with contractors
6-7 King's concern with the point spread function of the ST optics
7-8 Specific scientific interests of the Imaging IDT members; specialties of McCord, Labeyrie, Richardson, Serkowski, Schaff, Smith, Schroeder, Angel, Danielson, Baum
8 Detectors as a focus of Imaging IDT efforts
9 Awareness among astronomers of the allotment of ST observing time to ESA in return for its contributions to the Project
9-10 King's involvement with the Bahcall-Spitzer lobbying campaign on behalf on LST; astronomy's political awareness in the 1970s
11 Influence of the initial early launch date projections on IDT decisions
11-12 King's involvement with Allen Sandage and Steve Strom as an observational astronomer working with the Princeton Wide Field Camera (WFC) instrument proposal team
12-13 King's involvement with the writing of the Princeton WFC proposal
13-14 King's decision to enter the 1977 ST Announcement ofopportunity bidding as part of the Princeton WFC proposal, as part of the Faint Object Camera (FOC) proposal, and as interdisciplinary scientist as a means to secure his role on ST
14 Rationales for Princeton's loss in the WFC bidding
14-15 King's election to the AAS presidency in 1977
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 King's use of his AAS presidency to keep up involvement with ST policy making through the Science Working Group and AURA
16-17 AURA's difficulties managing Kitt Peak during and after the STScI proposal period; role of John Teem
18 King's involvement with ST lobbying during his 1977 period as AAS president-elect
18-19 Astronomers' recognition of the separate nature of NASA and NAS funding
19-21 King's work with John Teem of AURA and Gerry Tape of AUI to set up a meeting of prominent astronomers to define for NASA and for the bidding consortia what the astronomical community expected of the ST science institute
21 King's perceptions of the relative strengths of the ST science institute bidding consortia
21-22 Strengths of the AURA/Johns Hopkins institute proposal
22 Workings of the Source Evaluation Board for the institute proposals; Princeton's disappointment at its loss in the bidding
22-23 King's memories of ideas for an overall space science institute
23-24 The assumption in some space circles that support for the ST institute in the community was related to distrust of Goddard; Hinners' opinion
24-25 Astronomers' perception of an adversarial relationship between themselves and NASA over the institute; use of the Hornig Report as leverage to further the astronomers' intentions
25 NASA's use of closed working groups for policy making
25-26 The ST Working Group's effectiveness in representing the scientific community within NASA
26-27 Technical improvements on the early FOC design made at the recommendation of the FOC Instrument Science Team, of which King was a member; issues of greatest importance to King
27 FOC as a long-slit spectrograph
28 Morale of the FOC Instrument Science Team in early Phase C
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28-29 Reviews FOC design changes resulting from Instrument Science Team recommendations: f/96 mode, field pixel dimensions, byte addressed field, speckle capability
29-31 Complications in assigning Guaranteed Observing Time to the European members of the FOC Instrument Definition Team
31 Cross-nationality cooperation and coherence of the FOC scientists; morale of the group
31-32 King's responsibilities to NASA as a member of the FOC team; role as NASA's view of FOC progress independent of ESA
32 Awareness of the ESA-FOC effort among US astronomers
32 Role of Hedrik van de Hulst in the FOC effort
32-33 Large number of European ST-related committees
33 Franco Pacini and the FOC guaranteed observing time debate