Lane, A. L. Date: October 9, 1984. Interviewer: Joe Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 13 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Lane recalls association with Large Space Telescope (1971-72), involving tracking moving targets and solar calibration. Discusses CCDs used on Galileo and those on ST. Recalls return to JPL, work on Voyager and ST Announcement of Opportunity (1975-76). Comments on ST's tracking abilities.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Involvement in Large Space Telescope project with Bill Brunk in '71-'72
2 Focus on tracking moving targets
3-4 Dealing with problem of solar calibration for ultraviolet reflection spectroscopy due to variability in solar constant
4-5 Awareness of rapidity with which space technology was developing; looking for and matching available technical capabilities to task at hand
6-7 Discussion of CCD's
8 Differences between CCD used on Galileo and that used on ST
9 Return to JPL; discussion of adjustment to move
9-10 Work on scanning spectrometer using tunable acoustoptic filters in '74-'75
10 Work on remote pollution monitoring at Ames; move to Voyager project
11 Discussion of Announcement of Opportunity [AO] for ST in '75-'76; selection of John Caldwell as planetary member of interdisciplinary group; discussion of own work on IUE; interest in involvement in guest investigator program with ST
12-13 Comments on ST's tracking capabilities for planetary work
Lane, A. L. Date: November 10, 1984. Interviewer: Joe Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Lane discusses ST's role in planetary observation and comments in detail on IUE: its tracking mechanism, possible observations of Mars and concerns about its weight. Continues discussion of IUE's tracking and uses. Compares orbit and complexity of IUE and ST; hopes for resolution of ST tracking problems and for ability to make real-time planetary observations.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
14-15 Comments on ST's role in planetary observation
16 Comments on interaction between Planetary Office and Astrophysics Office; planetary tracking mechanism on IUE
17-18 Discussion of weight concerns on eventual IUE camera system resolution capabilities
18-19 Discussion of work on proposal to use IUE to observe Mars in UV
19-20 Use of satellite ephemerides as tracking guides for Mars observations
20-21 Discussion of problems using same method for Venus and Moon; theoretical solutions and trial and error
22 Overlap of IUE and Pioneer-Venus observations
23 Bill Fastie
24-26 Work on IUE commissioning team
26-27 Value of off-setting guidance technique to variety of tracking problems
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
27-28 Continued discussion of IUE tracking work
28 Comparison of geosynchrony of IUE with precessing orbit of ST
29-30 Resolving ST's planetary tracking problems
30-31 Interest in making ST observer interactive for real time planetary observations
31-32 Skip Schiffer
32-34 Discussion of session on planetary astronomy from earth orbit at Boulder DPS meeting
34 Complexity of ST compared to IUE
34-35 Involvement of individuals with experience acquiring data from space in ST advisory groups
35-36 Discussion of plans for submitting ST proposal as individual
Lasker, Barry. Date: December 8, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.25 hrs.; 21 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Lasker discusses his education and early astronomy career, compares research at various US observatories and recalls initial contacts with ST. Discusses proposals of AURA and Johns Hopkins (1979) for STScI, including the cooperation of Computer Science Corporation with Hopkins. Continues evaluation of proposal process; Lasker's contacts at Hopkins and the oral review procedure (1980). After the award of the Institute to the Baltimore site, Lasker recalls the need to select a director. He concludes by evaluating the Institute's purposes and the effects of its having started up relatively late in the ST project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Lasker recalls education and early career in astronomy at Yale, Princeton, U. of Michigan, Chile; interstellar medium
2 Initial contact with Space Telescope and Art Code; discussion of orbiting telescopes during 1960s
2-3 Compares research philosophies of astronomical institutions on US East and West Coasts
3 Philosophies at Mt. Wilson, Palomar & CALTECH
3-4 Life and work at Cerro Tololo in Chile; isolation from ST development
4-5 AURA's early involvement with ST
5 Bidding for Space Telescope Institute site
6 AURA proposal for Space Telescope
6-7 Collaboration of Johns Hopkins on its proposal with Computer Science Corporation
7 Responding to NASA draft Request for Proposal (1979)
8-9 Lasker evaluates final proposal
9 Contacts with Bob O'Dell; restrictions on contacts with NASA and NASA contractor personnel
9-10 Continues evaluation of proposal; role of John Teem
10 Writing proposal in Baltimore and Silver Spring, MD
10-11 Contacts at Johns Hopkins
11 Competitors for Institute site
12 Director not named in proposal
12-13 Staffing the Institute
13 Proposal review by ESA
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Oral reviews (1980)
15 Award of Institute to Baltimore site; early staffing decisions
16 Acquaintance with Pete Simmons
16-17 Concern for rapidly acquiring a director
17 Striking balance between doing research and taking care of Telescope
17 Independence of directors at AURA institutions
18 Discusses relatively late start-up of Institute
19 1981 ST Festival at Goddard
20 Reaction to siting Institute at Baltimore
21 Difficulty of writing proposal to uncertain specifications
Laurance, Robin J. Date: May 26, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 25 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Laurance recalls early education and career. Describes his move to European Space Research and Technology Center in 1973. Describes early contact with LST. Describes his own role as engineering representative working with various preliminary study teams. Discusses his own responsibilities as member of LST study team. Discusses his own involvement in defining other areas of European participation to insure sufficient level of involvement in LST. Discusses selection of ESA construction of Solar Arrays. Discusses ESA's decision to concentrate on High Resolution Camera, later called Faint Object Camera. Discusses evolution of FOC concept in response to problems. Discusses negotiations leading to final Memorandum of Understanding mandating ESA participation in ST. Discusses ESA's contributions to cost of ST. Discusses Phase A of FOC project. Discusses his own acceptance of position as FOC manager. Describes efforts toward drafting plan governing exact distribution of ST responsibilities between NASA and ESA in 1977. Discusses organization of ESA ST project and distribution of construction contracts.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Academic background; early work at Hawker Siddeley with the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) effort
1-2 Family background; interests in science and flight electronics
2-3 Move to the European Space Research and Technology Center (ESTEC) Systems Studies Group, 1973; involvement with advanced program studies
3 Laurance's contact with LST through a preliminary study of possible European Space Research Organization (ESRO) participation in the LST Project
3-4 Organization of ESRO/ESA's preliminary studies: Laurance as engineering representative working with preliminary study teams of scientists, one of which examined LST
4 Origins of the initial proposal for ESA participation in LST
5 Reports made by the ESA LST study group to the Launching Programs Advisory Committee, led by H.C. van de Hulst
5-6 Laurance becomes engineer to the LST study group through his specialization in studies incorporating Space Shuttle interfaces
6-7 Membership of the LST study team: Manno, Labeyrie; division of responsibilities among the members
7 Early study group considerations of photon-counting detectors
7-8 Increasing the field of view of the ESA Faint Object Camera (FOC) later in its design history
8 Individuals and research agendas favoring a wider FOC field
8-9 Realization that building one Scientific Instrument will not provide ESA with a sufficient level of involvement in LST; Laurance's 1974-5 efforts to define other areas of participation
9-10 Rationales behind selection of ESA construction of the Solar Arrays as a means of increasing ESA's ST contribution: funding limits, interface complexity
10 NASA's designation of the Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS) and the Wide Field Camera (WFC) as primary instruments, not to beconsidered as candidates for ESA construction, 1974-5
10-11 ESA's decision to concentrate on the High Resolution Camera, later renamed the FOC
11 Initiation of large-scale detector development efforts and cost studies; definition of the FOC concept: May -June 1975
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Nancy Roman directs in 1975 that the ESA High Resolution Camera be called the FOC; scientific rationale for the change
12 Changed priorities for the FOC concept: visible wavelength performance, wider field of view
12-13 Beginning of FOC hardware development in problem areas, October 1975: intensifiers, magnetic field production, memory
14 Management of the early FOC hardware development contracts
14-15 Impact of US Congressional pressure on NASA on FOC progress
15 Discussions of ESA's possible provision of the FOC detector to the US for use in the Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS)
16-17 Detailed negotiations leading toward the final Memorandum of Understanding mandating ESA participation in ST; ESA's requirement that the FOC be guaranteed a flight berth on ST
17 Origins of the ESA 15% of total ST cost contribution figure
18-19 Transfer of the ESA ST effort in Phase A from ESTEC to the Scientific Directorate; Laurance continues his ST efforts in parallel with his Large Infrared Telescope study work
19-20 Breakdown of FOC contracts let in Phase A, late 1976: data, optics, detectors, with integration handled by ESA
20 Management of the Phase A FOC contracts
20-21 Approval of the FOC project by the Launching Programs Advisory Committee as the major ESA space science initiative for 1976
21 Establishment of a full project structure under Jan Burger for ESA's ST effort, including FOC, the Solar Arrays, and Operations
21-22 Laurance accepts the position of FOC Manager, under Burger
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Efforts toward drafting the Project Plan governing the exact distribution of ST responsibilities between NASA and ESA, 1977
23-24 Organization of the ESA ST Project; Laurance's engineers' efforts in support of the Solar Arrays as well as the FOC
24 Continuity in staff in the ESA ST effort; ESA response to staff turnover in the NASA portion of the ST Program
24-25 Distribution of the final ESA FOC construction contracts: BAe to build the PDA (the detector assembly), and Dornier/Matra to build the camera module (the remainder of the instrument)
Laurance, Robin J. Date: May 27, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 15 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Continuation of interview on May 26, 1983. Laurance describes FOC management style and on-going problems with project. Continues description of origins of ESA role in ST. Discusses FOC interface with Marshall and relations between FOC Project engineers and Instrument Science Team. Describes his own reaction to cancellation of NASA-ESA solar polar orbit project. Describes complementarity of Wide Field/Planetary Camera and FOC. Discusses his own work with NASA review board sent in 1976 to certify ESA's ability to handle FOC project. Discusses impact of early FOC computer and data architecture on Goddard's design for data handling.
TAPE 2, SIDE 1 (Cont)
25 FOC management style: small teams of full-time engineers supervise the contractors, drawing extensively on specialized support from other ESA divisions
25-26 Early problems with the PDA: insufficient gain
26 Full-time personnel supervising the camera module contract
26-27 Laurance's general policy of not placing FOC Project staff members in the contractor plants, other than during testing
27 Extensive travel the FOC Project structure demands of FOC staff
28 Primary pacing problem on the PDA: the Westinghouse detector tube; Westinghouse's failure to properly package the tube
29-30 Second round of PDA problems: Flaws in the construction of the tubes themselves
30-31 Origins of the ESA role in ST, continued: Laurance locates files indicating that NASA made the initial overtures, and that James Fletcher pushed for an ESA involvement beyond the proposed 10%
31-32 Relationship between ESA's percent contribution and the degree of its participation in the science institute
32 Dates of various FOC staff appointments and contract milestones in 1977 and 1978
32-33 The formal and practical process by which the FOC Project interfaces with NASA centers, and OTA and SSM contractors
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34 The FOC interface with Marshall as part of the NASA-ESA ST quarterly reviews
34-35 Relations between the FOC Project engineers and the Instrument Science Team
35 Laurance's reaction to NASA's cancellation of the NASA-ESA solar polar orbit project as it related to the ST joint effort
36-37 The complementarity of the Wide Field-Planetary Camera and the FOC; the degree of planning behind this result
37 Changes in the relative importance of the ST scientific instruments: the prominence of the FOC in recent planning
38-39 Laurance's work with the NASA review board sent in 1976 to certify ESA's ability to provide a FOC equivalent to that which would have resulted from an open US competition
39-40 Fluctuations in the number of peripheral capabilities added to the basic FOC design
40 The impact of the early FOC computer and data architecture on Goddard's general designs for scientific instrument data handling
Leckrone, David. Date: August 14, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3.25 hrs.; 54 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Traces Leckrone's work as a staff astronomer at the Goddard Space Flight Center (1972- ). After a discussion of family and education, Leckrone describes his work operating OAO 2. He extensively covers his involvement with the Space Telescope project, including work with the complementary Spacelab/Starlab shuttle-based telescope, and his position as ST Instrument Scientist (1976- ). Topics covered include ST's place within Goddard's activities, relations between Goddard and Marshall Space Flight Center, ST as a national observatory, the 1977 ST Announcement of Opportunity, the place of civil service astronomers in the astronomy community, and ST budget issues from 1977 through 1984.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Early interest in astrophysics
3 Graduate work at UCLA under Lawrence Auer; dissertation on helium abundance
4 Discussion of helium abundance problem
5 Application to work at Goddard on OAO-B; encouragement at UCLA to work in space astronomy
6 Work on OAO data
6-7 Collaboration on University of Wisconsin OAO-2 project
7-8 Discussion of work on degradation of photometric system
8 Discussion of progression from PI system in earlier space projects towards national facility concept on ST; development of public service aspect of space projects at Goddard
9 Factors driving move from PI system to national facility: complexity of organizing use of synchronous observing satellites vs. those in low-orbit; expense
9-10 Early plans for LST: Phase A studies in early '70s
10 Initial thoughts on plans for LST; rivalry between Goddard and Marshall; plans to place smaller telescope on Spacelab orbiter complementary to LST
11 Attitudes toward LST in early stages
12 Goddard's loss of LST to Marshall
13 Goddard's interest in becoming lead application center for LST
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Participant on the Mission Operations Working Group for Shuttle Astronomy
14 Goddard's participation in selling LST to Congress
14-15 Bob O'Dell
15-17 Decision to become Instrument Scientist
17 Taking over for Stan Sobieski
18-19 Need for someone to look after ensemble of scientific instruments
19-21 Defining the job of Instrument Scientist
21-22 Perception of ST as observatory
22-23 Discussion of scientists' expectations of performance capabilities vs. actual contracts
23 Mediation of differences between expectations and actuality
24-26 Discussion of factors conducive to producing and resolving such discrepancies
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26 Solar system tracking
27 Involvement of STScI in solar system tracking
28 Ad Hoc Committee for Review of ST Proposals, 1977
29 Leckrone's role in peer review of proposals
30 Ranking proposals
31 Fly-by planetary missions vs. reliance on ST for planetary observation
32-33 Ranking instruments
33 Challenges of Phase C/D
34 CCD technology and Galileo project; selection of Digicon detectors
35 WF/PC; Faint Object Camera; shifts in scientific goals
36 Important things ST will accomplish scientifically
36-37 Leckrone's involvement in operations
37 Service on Technical Advisory Committee for Source Evaluation Board of STScI; AURA proposal
38 Opposition to NASA control of STScI
38-39 Perception of NASA by outsiders
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
39-42 Perception of NASA by outsiders (cont'd)
42 Effect of IUE on outsiders' understanding of Goddard
43 Discussion of decision to organize STScI outside of NASA
44 Jesse Greenstein and NASA
44-45 Influence of budget crunch in 1980
45 Black Saturday
46 Earlier budget crises: '77-'79; deferment of difficult tasks to ease current budget restraints; Bob O'Dell and Black Saturday
47 Conflict of project scientist role and management role
47-48 Comparison of different managing styles of O'Dell's successors
48 Stability of scientists' requests throughout ST development
49 Discussion of Welch committee report in '83
49-50 "Systems Engineer" as defined by astronomer vs. understanding of term at Marshall
50 Discussion of STOPAT
50-51 Use of Science Working Group
51 Comparison of STOPAT and Science Working Group
51-52 Dealing with the dual roles of scientist and manager
52-53 Dealing with problems of long-term project: changes in management and perception of program goals
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
53 Problems with long-term project (cont'd)
54 Science verification as additional topic to be pursued in future interview
Longair, Malcolm. Date: June 14, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Longair describes his involvement with Space Telescope as the one of the Interdisciplinary Scientists on the ST Science Working Group (1977- ). Topics discussed include the functions of the Interdisciplinary Scientist; the optical astronomy community's relations with NASA; ST's capacity to produce scientific breakthroughs; and the roles of the ST SWG, the Space Telescope Advisory Committee, and the Space Telescope Observatory Performance Assessment Team. Longair discusses in detail the rationale for an ST Science Institute, and the role of STScI. In addition, he describes Edinburgh Observatory's bid to host the European ST Coordinating Facility.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Longair joins ST as Interdisciplinary Scientist
2 Functions of the Interdisciplinary Scientist
3 Changes in scientists' intended observations with ST since 1977
3-4 Longair's experience working in many wavelengths
4-5 Causes for astronomers' move to multi-wavelength investigation, away from band-specialization
5-6 Proposals for a dedicated ground ST support telescope
6-7 Rationales for an academic ST Science Institute
7 Astronomers' attitudes toward government labs
8 Need for trust between STScI and user community
8-9 Efforts to raise European awareness of ST
9-10 View of Science Working Group (SWG) as custodian of the ST Project's final goals
10 ST Project response to SWG pressure
11 Sources of perturbation of the ST Program: technical, managerial, funding
12 Problems of "low-cost" science; 'selling' science
13 View of STScI's balance of service with research
13-14 Credence given to threats of ST cancellation
14-15 Distribution of ST observing time: 'Key Projects'
15-16 Space Telescope Advisory Committee (STAC)
17 Bearing of directed ST observing projects on the American astronomical tradition
18 Longair as European interest advocate at STScI
19 Planetary science on ST; Principle Investigators (Pis) as planetary advocates; planetary science as a separate scientific community
20-22 Edinburgh's bid to host the European Coordinating Facility (ECF) for ST
22-23 Reasons for awarding ECF to Euro. [!] Southern Observatory
23-24 Longair's role in the Edinburgh bid
24 Comparison of ST impact to Tycho's observations
24-25 ESA ST Science Working Group
25-26 ST Observatory Performance and Assessment Team
26-27 ST's potential to produce scientific breakthroughs
28 Contribution of the PIs; ST's effect on PI careers
29 Longair's impact as ST scientific 'propagandist'
Lowrance, John L. Date: March 28, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 42 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Lowrance describes his role in developing television tube-type detectors, particularly the SEC Vidicon, for space astronomy applications. After briefly discussing work on weather satellite imaging (1961-66), Lowrance reflects on his association with Princeton and Lyman Spitzer, Robert Danielson, and John Bahcall (1966-77). Topics discussed include OAO 3; the Stratoscope program and its relation to Space Telescope; development of various detectors including the Isocon, the SEC Vidicon, and the SIT Vidicon; the role of the SEC Vidicon in ST planning 1969-76; Goddard Space Flight Center's role in ST detector development; the origins and early development of CCD detectors; and the selection of CCDs as the ST detector. In his conclusion, Lowrance comments on industry and government motives and interests in detector development, and on his activities after ending his ST involvement in 1977.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Adapting TV tubes for photometry
2 SEC Vidicon introduced as a visual band detector for space astronomy cameras on OAO 1; Lowrance's work with TV tubes at RCA
3 Early Princeton tube projects: Stratoscopes, OAO
4 Lowrance undertakes direction of some early Princeton camera detector tube work, 1966
5 Considerations in planning space optical astronomy after OAO; rationale for ST
5-6 Evolutionary ties between Stratoscope II and ST
6-7 Investigation of the Image Isocon
7 Detector design drivers: image storage, long exposure times, UV resolution
8 Princeton selects the SEC Vidicon for development
8 Proposals for film as an ST detector
8-9 Trial use of an SEC on Mt. Wilson 300-inch telescope
9 Reduction of internal background noise in the SEC
10 Use of SEC on Palomar 200-inch for quasar spectroscopy
11 Pressure on astronomers to maximize results from limited observing time in relation to their willingness to risk time on new technologies
11-12 Martin Schwarzchild; Lowrance's conference on TV sensors in astronomy
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Spread of conferences on electro-optical imaging
13 Electro-optical detectors at Imperial College, London
13 NASA as chief sponsor of SEC Vidicon development
13-15 Experiments with the silicon target (SIT) Vidicon
15-17 NSF-supported work with ground-based two-dimensional imaging using the SIT
17 Westinghouse's limited interest in developing SECs
18 Increasing the Vidicon tube to 70mm; Vidicon work carried on solely through NASA funding
18 NASA's interest in funding SEC development to produce a detector for the LST camera
19-20 SEC seen in early 70s as the only feasible LST detector; Goddard Space Flight Center's (GSFC's) interest in supervising SEC research
20-21 CCDs; reasons for the selection of CCDs over the SEC for ST; long-term results of CCD selection
22 GSFC's interest in supervising SEC research, cont
22-23 Ken Hallam; origin of LST's wide-field camera idea
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23 ST detector selection made competitive; Oct 76
23-24 JPL and the selection of CCDs for ST's Wide Field/ Planetary Camera (WF/PC)
24-25 Reasons for choosing CCDs, cont
26 Spinoff of ST CCD development to ground astronomy
27 CCD proposal; use of a CCD within Princeton's ST SEC Vidicon camera
27-28 Astronomy as a demanding user of electro-optics
28 Planetary science concerns for ST red response
28-29 Bob Danielson's role in Stratoscope and LST design, and SEC Vidicon detector development
30 Danielson's influence on early LST design
30-31 Early study of manned spaceflight's role in ST
31-33 Mid-1970s Princeton work with Intensified CCDs under NSF funds; current Princeton CCD efforts
33-34 Princeton studies of CCDs for X-ray detection; small NASA-funded studies of mosaic-butted CCDs
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34 Activities of Lowrance's team after ST
34-35 Lowrance's involvement with CCD design
35-37 Lowrance's work on a proposal for a second-generation ST scientific instrument (SI) with Tectronics second-generation, 2000x2000 CCDs
36-37 Industry's low interest in developing astronomical detectors
37-38 "market pull, invention push" in detector work
38 Digitizing detector output
39 NASA funding and goals as driver of RCA CCD work
39 Film as an ST detector
40 Bob Danielson, cont.; Stratoscope influence on ST
41 Benefits of NASA's investment in the SEC Vidicon
41-42 WF/PC CCD performance; value of instrument proposal documents for historical research
Macchetto, Duccio. Date: April 10, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 38 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Macchetto recalls involvement with ESA (1973) and IUE, early space astronomy interests. Compares ESA procedures with those of NASA. Recalls Large Astronomical Satellite and cooperation of ESRO with NASA on ST. Discusses design of Faint Object Camera and cooperation with UK on its detectors. Macchetto discusses at length the design of FOC and division of responsibilities for it. He also recalls review of FOC and proposed changes, as well as communications with Goddard about FOC. After describing FOC capabilities, he turns in detail to US-European cooperation on ST, including the establishment of software and data clearinghouses and Williamsburg conference of 1976. Concludes with reflections on ST projects generally and STOPAT in particular.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Converting ideas into programs at ESRO [now ESA]: current procedure
4 Past procedure; comparison with NASA's procedures
5 Early ESA involvement, beginning July 1973; previous X-ray payload work, UV payloads, IUE; early interest in UV astronomy and its application to interstellar medium
6 Discussion of risks in early space astronomy; Work on IUE as both deputy project manager and project scientist
6-7 Early talk of Large Astronomical Satellite and founding of ESRO; development of IUE
7-8 ESRO-NASA cooperation on Space Telescope project
8 UK involvement in assembling detectors: Alec Boksenberg
9 Diversification of detector capabilities: Antoine Labeyrie - Faint Object Camera; John Lawrence - Wide Field/Planetary Camera
10 American/European cooperation and allocation of observing time; role of Nancy Roman in 1974 in collaborative arrangements with ESRO's Victorio Manno
11 Involvement with mission definition group
12 Collaboration agreement [Memorandum of Understanding]: instrument design responsibilities, hardware contributions, operational responsibilities
12-13 Work as Phase A project manager
13 Faint Object Camera [FOC]: evolution of design to get highest spatial resolution at faintest limit
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Review of FOC project
15 Concern over energy requirements of FOC and possible duplication of other candidate instruments
16 Changes in FOC design to conform to review committee recommendations
17 Final design specifications
18-19 Meeting in Williamsburg, January 1976, to discuss collaborative effort: instrumentation, division of responsibilities
20-21 Memorandum of Understanding, signed October 1977 Allocation of observing time
21 Relation between MOU and Project Plan
22 Phase C/D of FOC
22-24 Instrument Science Team [IST]: review of FOC and proposed changes
25 Implementing proposed changes
25-26 Ongoing communications with Goddard
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26 Communications with Goddard re: FOC matters; with Marshall re: general ST matters; evolution of FOC design to exploit fully ST capabilities
27 Coronagraphic capability of FOC
27-28 Use of photon detectors with ground-based telescopes for general data collection as well as for dry run on ST
29 European involvement in STScI; development of European Coordinating Facility [ECF]
30 Idea to establish network of communications centers to coordinate data collection and analysis on an international basis
31 Idea realized on national bases: Starlink, England; Astronet, Italy; similar programs developing in France and Germany
31-32 Establishment of ECF answers need for software clearinghouse, data reduction resource center and ST archive
32-34 ESA's views on NASA's handling of operations; on questions concerning development and organization of STScI
34 Selection of Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy [AURA] proposal
35 Reflections on working on ST project
36 Space Telescope Observatory Performance and Assessment Team [STOPAT]
36-38 Concluding remarks; suggestions of others to interview re: FOC project, ESA/IDT/IST relationship, AURA proposal
McCandless, Bruce. Date: January 8 & 9, 1986. Interviewer: Joe Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 34 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After recalling his first contact with the ST project, McCandless discusses at length the use of ST mockups in low gravity to develop repair procedures and tools, including special ratchet and torque wrenches. These developments occurred at Marshall with the involvement of Goddard. McCandless also discusses designs of Orbital Replacement Units and the effects on them of spatial constraints and 1980 budget cuts. Tells of other tools (including J-hook, McTether) developed for ORUs and the 1979 Lockheed model of ORUs; stresses importance of using mockups for tool and ORU design. Also considers the relationships of astronauts with Marshall, scientists and ST contractors. Concludes with discussion of selection and training of Extra-Vehicular Activity crews.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 McCandless recalls first contact with Space Telescope project
1 Use of ST mockups at Marshall and Lockheed
2 Recalls use of partial ST mockup in low gravity environment at Lockheed
3 Early contacts with Space Telescope Project Office personnel; ST mockups
4 Recalls other activities between 1978-1981
5 Practicing Telescope repairs; hand tools adapted for zero gravity
6-8 Ratchet wrenches adapted for zero g and gloved hands; contributions of Essex Company
9-10 Development of electrically-controlled torque wrench; involvement of Goddard
10 Development of ST repair techniques on mockup in Marshall Center water tank
11-12 Practice in Marshall water tank for repairs of Solar Max; reluctance of Johnson Space Center to attempt repairs
12 Improvising repair procedures for Solar Max
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Preliminary Work Breakdown Statement Element Assessment Review at Lockheed
12-13 Design of J hook
13 Assesses Lockheed's design of Orbital Replaceable Units
13-14 Recalls need for expanding definition of what qualifies as ORU
14 1980 Telescope cost-cutting and ORUs
15 Increasing complexity of hardware design from mockup to replacement unit; spatial restrictions on replacement units
16 Thermal expansion/contraction
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
16-17 McCandless demonstrates prototype of McTether tool
17 Development of power ratchet, foot restraint for Telescope repairs
18 McCandless discusses 1979 Lockheed model of Orbital Replacement Units; Power Control Unit
19 Discusses template for replacement unit tooling; advocacy ofusing mockups early in design process
20 Proposed device for continuous mechanical capture of units removed from ST in orbit
21 Mockup of Fine Guidance Sensor
22 Participants in early water tank work
23 Selection of Extra Vehicular Activity crews
24 Assignment of EVA crew members to specific projects
25-26 McCandless discusses EVA training at Lockheed
26-27 Concerns about strain on wire connectors; additional efforts to increase ease of maintenance of ST
27 Testing flight solar arrays
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
28-29 Astronauts' lack of direct authority over contractors and Marshall personnel
29 Need for consensus among astronauts, contractor, Marshall; importance of astronaut input on hardware, procedure designs
29-30 McCandless' participation in quality control awards; efforts to increase contractor morale
31 Attempts to publicly acknowledge participants in Apollo II, MMU
31-32 Formal training for shuttle ST deployment crew
33 Participation of shuttle commander in training
33 McCandless' contacts with Bob O'Dell
34 Contacts with scientists and Telescope instrument design process
Meserve, Kent. Date: November 1, 1983. Interviewers: Paul Hanle, Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: .75 hrs.; 14 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Mr. Meserve discusses events during his tenure as Perkin-Elmer Corporation's (P-E's) project manager for its Space Telescope (ST) Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) contract, ca. 1979-1982. He describes the organization of P-E ST effort, and discusses communications between the P-E team and NASA managers at the ST project office at Marshall Space Flight center, and the ST program office at NASA HQ. Mr. Meserve discusses the challenges involved in grinding and coating the ST primary mirror, and comments on the relationship between those challenges and ST's funding and schedule status. He describes the contribution of other managers and scientists who came into contact with P-E's efforts, including Don Fordyce and ST Telescope Scientists William Fastie and Daniel Schroeder. Finally, he comments on P-E's work with small, cutting-edge technology development companies during the ST project, and further describes some of the challenging features of ST design, especially the use of Orbital Replaceable Units for the ST electronics and Science Instruments.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Organization of Perkin-Elmer's (P-E's) Space Telescope (ST) project work
1-2 Functions of the P-E Project Manager for ST
2 Systems engineering at P-E
2-3 Communications between P-E ST managers and NASA's ST project office at MSFC
3-4 NASA HQ's awareness of ST developments at P-E; MSFC's role as ST lead center
4-6 Systems engineering on the ST project during Meserve's tenure as P-E's ST project manager
6 Challenges involved in figuring and polishing the ST primary mirror, ca. 1980
6-7 Interaction between ST's budget situation and P-E's mirror-polishing efforts, ca. 1980
7-8 Managing the ST mirror-polishing team: space optics production as craft-oriented manufacturing
8-9 Coating the ST primary mirror: technical challenges, pre-coating test program
9 Budget and schedule status of P-E's ST efforts, late 1982
9-10 Recruiting Don Fordyce to take over as Meserve's successor as P-E ST project manager, 1982
10 Potential for securing additional funds from MSFC, ca. 1980-82; MSFC ST project manager Fred Speer
10-11 P-E-MSFC communications, cont.; Don Fordyce's experience managing previous NASA projects
11-12 P-E's previous programs for NASA: Copernicus, Stratoscope
12 Role of ST Telescope Scientists William "Bill" Fastie and Daniel Schroeder in P-E's ST efforts
12 Informal exchange of ideas among various elements of the ST project
12-13 Working with small subcontractors to acquire limited-run, cutting-edge technology needed for P-E's ST effort: managementdifficulties
13 Challenges of designing ST's Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs)
13-14 Other contributors to P-E's ST effort
Mitchell, Jesse L. Date: December 10, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 5 hrs.; 66 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Mitchell discusses the events and issues he encountered during ten years as Deputy Associate Administrator and later Associate Administrator of the Space Science division at NASA HQ. He describes the origins of NASA's science project management structure, noting in particular the conscious efforts top administrators made to balance scientific and engineering representative at all levels of management. He recounts later alterations made to the system with the constriction of NASA budgets and the advent of facility-class instruments. He also comments on the origins of the many-layered committee structure through which NASA taps the expertise of academic scientists. Dr. Mitchell also discusses numerous issues from the early development history of the Large Space Telescope/Space Telescope project. He describes technical concerns such has the integration of large precise optical systems and recounts NASA's efforts to alleviate those concerns through preliminary technology research; he also covers the related debate within NASA over the size of the jumps to be made in going from a 1-meter OAO to the 3-meter LST. Throughout these discussions Mitchell further relates the influence of non-technical factors on the decision-making process, discussing ground-based astronomers' enthusiasm for LST, scientist advocates of the LST program, changing attitudes toward NASA in Congress, and the interplay of concerns within NASA itself as they affected the eventual approval of the LST project for formal preliminary development in the early 1970s.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Work at NACA's Langley Research Center, 1950s: X- aircraft, IGY sounding rockets, air density scientific satellite concepts
2 Serving as space advisor to the first Presidential Science Advisor, James F. Killian
2-3 Planning for standardized orbiting astronomy observatories: Joe Purcell, Art Code, Jim Kupperian
3 Moving to NASA, 1961: Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) project
3-4 OAO as a key program, forcing NASA to develop the technical and managerial skills essential to worthwhile space astronomy research
4-5 Devising the NASA science program management system: Homer Newell, John Clark, Jack Townsend
5 Conscious pairing of scientists and engineers in NASA science management; Abe Silverstein
5-7 Evolution of the NASA science management system: from Principal Investigators (Pis) building proprietary instruments to Guest Observers (GOs) on facility-type instruments
7-8 Scientists' reactions to potential of space astronomy, early 1960s
8 Younger astronomers' interest in space astronomy
8-9 Infra-red and ultraviolet communities' enthusiasm for space astronomy: Gerard Kuiper, Lyman Spitzer, Art Code
9 Astronomers' misunderstandings about federal research budgeting: transferability of funds
9-10 Early plans for an evolutionary approach building from OAO through a 60-inch ASTRA observatory to an eventual 120-inch Large Space Telescope (LST), 1960s
10 Scientist advocates for LST: Spitzer, Leo Goldberg
10-11 Other proposed projects competing with LST for astronomers' support, late 1960s: radioastronomy
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Personal and professional costs for scientists and engineers practicing large-scale space astronomy
12 Congressional understanding of the risks and rewards of space science, early 1960s: OAO as example
12-13 Justifying OAO costs before Congress, 1967
14 Excitement implicit in developing technologically advanced space science missions
14-15 Changes in NASA space science planning in the late 1960s: bureaucratization, aversion to high-risk, high-payoff missions
15 NASA's straightened fiscal climate, late 1960s
15-16 Forcing astronomers to prioritize their proposals: Greenstein Committee, Goldberg's Astronomy Missions Board
16-17 NAS Space Science Board's (SSB's) role in setting NASA priorities
17-19 Origins of the Astronomy Missions Board, 1967: role of the l966 Ramsey Committee report
19-20 Debating large vs. small programs within NASA
20-22 Academic astronomers' confidence in NASA's civil service scientists; early proposals for an academic space science or LST science institute
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Academic and civil service astronomers, cont
23 Proposals for lunar-based telescopes, 1960s
23-24 Early Langley studies of large orbital telescopes
24-25 Origins of the 120-inch aperture dimension for the LST
25-26 Space science at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC); Marshall's interest in LST
26-28 NASA HQ's decision to award MSFC a number of large science missions to offset the decline of MSFC's Apollo workload, ca. 1970; HEAO, LST
28 Wernher von Braun and Ernst Stuhlinger's interests in LST
28-30 Designating MSFC as lead center for the LST project, 1972; assigning Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) supporting responsibilities
31 Complicated heritage of LST technologies: no one NASA center had experience in all required areas
31-32 GSFC management style contrasted with that of MSFC
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
32-33 Lyman Spitzer's role in sharpening support for early LST planning: 1969 NAS ad hoc committee report Large Orbiting Telescopes
33-34 NASA field center representatives to Headquarters' 1969 Astronomy Planning Panel
34-35 Influence of the Astronomy Planning Panel's report
35 Origins of the close relationship between LST and Space Shuttle planning efforts, late 1960s
36-37 Early plans for precursor telescopes to bridge the gap between the 36-inch OAO 3 and LST
37-38 Influence of shuttle-based maintenance and refurbishment capabilities on LST planning
38-40 Discarding the precursor telescope concepts in favor of a 120-inch LST as the OAO successor
40-41 Building a constituency within NASA to support LST
41-42 Gaining George Low's approval to begin a formal LST Phase A development program
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
42-43 Late 1960s orbiting telescope technology studies' cumulative effect: an informal LST Phase A
44-45 Technological challenges facing the LST project in Phase A: integrating a large diffraction-limited optical system
45-47 Importance of proof-of-concept mirrors in demonstrating LST's feasibility
47-48 Percentage of NASA Phase A programs which proceed to definition, fabrication, and launch; HEAO
48-49 Dangers of concentrating heavily on infrequent, big- ticket space science projects; planetary and astrophysics responses to such concerns
49 LST Project Scientist C.R. "Bob" O'Dell; O'Dell's credentials as an astronomer of academic stature
50 Cancellation of the initial HEAO project, December, 1972; influence of HEAO events on LST planning
51-52 Listing LST Phase B funding as a discrete line item in NASA's Fiscal 1974 budget request
52-53 Selecting competitive bidding as the LST procurement procedure
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
53-54 Justifying LST to lay audiences
54 Phase B LST Science Working Group's advocacy role
54-55 Securing academic astronomers' support for LST
55-56 Greenstein Report and congressional response to LST funding requests; influence of HEAO events
56-57 Incorporating OMB into LST planning, ca. 1972
57-58 Introducing congressional staff to the LST concept and its future funding requirements, early 1970s
58-59 Nancy Roman's contributions toward the realization of Space Telescope
59 Marc Aucremanne's contributions to the project
59-61 Differences in sociology and political skill among the various wavelength communities in astronomy: Riccardo Giacconi and the X-ray astronomers
61-62 Space Telescope's visceral appeal: a tool for answering fundamental questions
62-63 Other contributors to LST/ST throughout the project's history
63-64 Princeton astronomers' significant role in realizing ST: Spitzer, Robert Danielson
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
64-65 Lyman Spitzer as ST's significant visionary
65-66 Key to successful space science management: keep science as the first priority in all decisions
Moore, Jim. Date: May 18, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 31 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Moore recalls his Goddard career and early involvement with ST; Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, ST instrumentation. Describes ST instrument testing. Reflects on becoming ST manager in 1983; discusses design of STAR, Wide Field/Planetary Camera and its clone. Comments at length on delivery of instruments to Lockheed, development of instrument test procedures there and at Goddard; software problems. Continues with discussion of system tests and integration of instruments into ST at Lockheed; scheduling and performing thermal/vac tests. Recalls Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis problem with WF/PC and its solution and notes more recent problems with Faint Object Camera and Faint Object Spectroscope. Moore considers effects on ST of launch delays and staff turnover. Concludes by reviewing development of ST ground emulator, use of prototypes and design of second generation ST instruments.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Moore's Goddard career; joining ST project; ST instrument testing
2 Experience with Orbiting Astronomical Observatory
3 Moore's acquaintance with scientists
3 Recalls early proposals for Large Space Telescope
3-4 Moore's early work for ST
4 Instrument Verification and Acceptance Program
4-5 Instrument compatibility tests
5-6 Challenges of joining ST as a manager in 1983
6 Discusses risks in ST's early plans
7 Development of STAR instrument
7 Development of second Wide Field/Planetary Camera
7-8 Funding for Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2
8 Design and funding of WF/PC clone
9 Goddard's preparation of instruments for flight; difficulties operating instruments simultaneously
9-10 Delivery of instruments in flight condition to Lockheed Corp
10-11 Problem of using different software at varying stages of instrument testing
11 Need for common testing language; development of Spacecraft Automated Test System
12 Difficulties of final integration of software and ST hardware
13 Goddard's testing of components and assembled instruments
13-14 Development of Long Form Functional Tests of instrument components
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Instrument calibration at Goddard
15 Verification and Acceptance Program; testing instruments singly and with other instruments
15-16 Development of systems compatibility tests
16-17 Goddard's testing experience and philosophy
18 Comparisons of Goddard's and contractors testing experience
19 Integration of instruments into spacecraft at Lockheed; beginning of systems testing
19-20 Thermal vacuum testing of spacecraft
20 Scheduling tests at Lockheed
20-21 Difficulties of bringing together new team members and various contractors for spacecraft testing
21 Moore compares ST's size and complexity to that of other space projects
21-22 Difficulties of scheduling tests and meeting deadlines
22 Moore discusses time pressures; 24 hour schedules
23-24 Attempts to solve Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis
24-25 Installation of light tunnel inside WF/PC camera to solve QEH problem
25 Moore reflects on option of pointing camera at sun to solve QEH problem
26 Alternative solution to QEH in WF/PC clone
26-27 Recent problems, testing of Faint Object Camera and Faint Object Spectroscope
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27 Moore worries about effects on personnel of launch delays
27-28 Concern with loss of knowledge, efficiency with personnel changes
28 Development of ST emulator on ground for trouble-shooting and for testing second generation instruments
29 Construction of, other uses for ground emulator
29 Anticipated use of Quarter Panel for fitting new instruments to ST
30 Design of second generation ST instruments, including Wide Field/Planetary Camera
30-31 Moore discusses costs of building, using prototypes
Nein, Max. Date: June 5, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Nein describes his involvement with telescope technology studies and with Space Telescope technology research and development at Marshall Space Flight Center (1964-73). Topics discussed include relations between space station and space telescope studies, the Medium Aperture Optical Telescope concept, NASA funding structures for telescope research, technical challenges of ST mirror design and of the greater ST system, the contract structure of the ST project, maintenance and refurbishment of ST in orbit, and the influence of manned servicing on ST design. Nein also reflects on Ernst Stuhlinger and others at Marshall and elsewhere who contributed to early studies and research for ST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Background with Army Ballistic Missile Agency
1-2 Work on Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) studies of man-maintained space telescopes, and on Skylab's Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM)
3 Early thoughts on space telescope mirrors
3 Lunar-based telescope studies
4 Organization of MSFC telescope studies
4-5 NASA funding for telescope technology research
5 Active optics research at MSFC and Langley
6 Consistency of basic problems in mirror design even with continued technological innovation
6-7 Thermal expansion and contraction of mirrors
7-8 Evolution of mirror materials science: CerVit, ULE
8-9 Technological hurdles ("tall poles") facing late 60s -early 70s space telescope planners
10 "tall poles", cont.: Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs)
10-12 Lessons learned during ST construction: actual vs. anticipated technological hurdles
13 Maintenance and Refurbishment (M&R) planning
13 Contractor arrangements for space observatory construction
14 OAO influence on ST design
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 Plans for constructing a 1.8-meter Medium Aperture Optical Telescope (MAOT) before building a full-scale 3-meter Large Space Telescope (LST)
15-16 Nein's telescope technology work after ending his direct ST project involvement
16 Anticipated ST development time in the early 70s
16-17 ST M&R planning: biyearly ground refurbishment
17 Modularity in ST design
18 MSFC in the late 1960s
18-19 NASA HQ branches which funded telescope studies
20 Ernst Stuhlinger's role in MSFC's astronomy effort
20-21 Scientists and NASA managers involved in early ST design work
21 Popular enthusiasm for space astronomy
22-23 Reasons for pursuing the initial LST concept
23-24 Contractor and NASA management figures involved with early 1970s ST efforts
25 Manned maintenance as a lasting influence on ST design and physical layout
26 Early space telescope detector concepts
Noah, Don. Date: January 8, 1986. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 21 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Noah discusses his ST responsibilities, contacts with Marshall and Safety Review process. Describes in detail some ST safety concerns: unintentional radio reception in Shuttle bay and antenna deployment. Describes safety testing of flight hardware. Also discusses his technical support from Johnson Center and evaluation of test data at Johnson. Noah explains documentation of safety concerns and the waiving of particular requirements. Discusses safety of on-orbit repairs, recapture issues and hazardous fluids on ST. Comments on his assistance to contractors and contractor compliance with safety requirements; explains allocation of his time to ST and how safety reviews are scheduled.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Noah's position and ST responsibilities; safety review process
2 Contacts with Marshall Project Office
2-3 Preliminary safety review (1978)
3 Phase 1 Safety Review; panel members
4-5 ST safety concerns; unintentional radio frequency and antenna deployment
5 Possible hazards of ST radio reception in Shuttle bay
6 Plans to inhibit unintentional deployment of ST appendages
6-7 Technical support on safety at Johnson Center
7-8 Structural testing of flight hardware
9 Satisfaction of safety panel's action items
9-10 Evaluation of tests data by Johnson specialists
10 Documenting satisfaction of safety requirements
11 Waiver by NASA HQ of RF inhibit requirement
12 Waiver of precautions against mercury contamination from ST
13 Safety review of on orbit repairs; crew input
14 Phase 2 Maintenance Mission & Safety Compliance Data
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 Filing documents relating to ST safety
16 Discussion of hazardous fluids on ST
17-18 ST recapture issues
18 Noah's allocation of time to ST
19 Assistance to contractor preparing for Shuttle payload safety reviews
19-20 Contractor compliance with safety requirements
20-21 Other payloads for which Noah is responsible
21 Scheduling safety reviews
22 Closing
Norman, Memphis. Date: September 6 and 12, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 32 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Norman reviews his involvement with Space Telescope as an OMB specialist in evaluating space technology budget proposals. Topics discussed include the preparation of a typical NASA budget for submission to Congress, NASA-OMB budget negotiations, and supplemental budget requests. Topics directly involving ST include OMB's stress on extensive Phase A/B technology evaluation, the costs of long-term space science missions, the effect of the Viking landing on NASA budgets, the status of planetary and space science in the 1970s, methods of prioritizing space science missions, and potential budget conflicts between ST and various planetary science probes.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Preparation of a typical budget for Congress
2-3 Agencies' means of appeal of OMB decisions: Budget Review Board (BRB) as appeals court
4 OMB's spring planning review sessions with NASA
4-5 Limits on OMB contact with Congress; agencies testify for their own budgets
5-6 Administration-Congress consensus on NASA funding
6-7 Supplemental budget request procedures
7 NASA's responsibility to Congress as well as the executive; OMB as executive branch coordinator
7-8 OMB as an advocate of extensive NASA pre-proposal (Phase A/B) space mission technology research
8 NASA Phase B projects as discrete budget line items: ST in 1974
9 OMB directives to cut ST costs: 1973-4
9-10 Cost pressures on space science in 1974: Viking, Voyager
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-11 Viking cost escalation: effect on science funding
11-12 OMB pressure on NASA to cut costs on major space science missions
12-13 Viking costs as a spur to cheaper space science
13 ST experience reinforces Viking lessons
14 Support costs of long-term space science missions
15 NASA's increased reliance on Phase A/B technology research for major science missions
16 Use of competitive parallel contracts in Phase B
16-17 Potential NASA use of fixed-cost contracts
17 NASA cost projection methods
18 Cost overruns: ST examples
18-19 Shift in emphasis from planetary to astronomical space science: latter 1970s
19-20 Difficulty in establishing a logical 'next step' in planetary science: latter 1970s
20-21 Planetary science as a means of better understanding terrestrial systems
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21-22 Bibliographic information on OMB
22-23 Prioritizing proposed space science missions: scientific urgency and technological readiness
23-24 Balancing the national astronomy effort
25 OMB's contact with the science community: NSF
25-26 Astronomers' enthusiasm for ST
26-27 Potential tradeoff between ST and Jupiter Orbiter-Probe (JOP)/Galileo, 1977
28 Potential tradeoff between ST and Pioneer-Venus
28-29 Divisions between planetary science and astronomy
29 OMB directors' influence on NASA mission budgeting
30-31 Relationship between OMB and NASA Comptrollers
31-32 OMB's role in 1983 ST Project rebaselining
Norris, T. Bland. Date: April 19, 1984. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 58 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Mr. Norris reviews his early career as a civilian engineer with the US Navy, including his work on the Poseidon SLBM development program. He describes his thirteen year (1961-74) first NASA career as a program manager for NASA's expendable launch vehicle families, including the Titan III-Centaur and Atlas Centaur. Mr. Norris then discusses i detail his second career as a NASA space science program manager and ultimately as head of NASA HQ's Physics and Astronomy Division (1976-79), with particular reference to Space Telescope (ST). He comments on the internal lobbying which made ST a NASA priority, and then the external lobbying campaigns which eventually secured the support of OMB and Congress for the program. He comments on the management structure of the ST program, and the functioning of that structure in practice. He describes events surrounding the creation of the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI), and discusses NASA HQ's reaction to the Institute concept. Mr. Norris comments on European participation in ST, describing the Congressional mandate for international participation in the program, and NASA's efforts to secure foreign partners. Finally, he comments on growth during Phase C/D of the ST program (1977- ), with particular attention to the internal NASA cost review committee he chaired in 1979, and to the 1983 ST rebudget as he saw it his post-1980 position with Perkin-Elmer Corporation, an ST associate contractor.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 NASA Administrator James Fletcher's efforts to create a long-range agency plan, ca. 1972
2-3 Debating long-range priorities within the Office of Space Science (OSS): balancing planetary and astrophysics science
3 Prioritizing programs across scientific disciplines
3-4 Lobbying the NASA Administrator during the internal NASA mission proposal selection process
4 Effect of manned spaceflight on space science funds
5 Establishing the NASA budget: NASA HQ interactions with OMB, NASA field centers
5-6 NASA's internal budget construction process
6-7 Presenting the final NASA budget to OMB
7-8 OMB's ability to influence the number and scope of line items in the NASA budget
8-9 Presidential intervention to settle NASA-OMB disputes: example of the Space Station, fiscal 1986
9 Presidential role in Space Telescope (ST) funding decisions, Fiscal Years 1977, 1978
9-10 Norris' background: aeronautical and mechanical engineering as a civilian Navy employee, 1951-56
10-11 Work with USN shipboard rocket installation, 1956-8
11-12 Developing structural systems and underwater launch equipment for the Polaris SLBM, 1958-61
12 Norris joins NASA as a program engineer in the Agena upper stage procurement office, late 1961
12-13 Serving as NASA Program Manager for Thor-Delta (1962-66) and Atlas Centaur (1966-69) launch vehicles
13-14 Norris becomes Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) manager at NASA HQ 1969-1974
14 NASA OSS control over its own launch vehicles through the middle 1970s
14-15 Developing the Titan III-Centaur planetary launch vehicle
15-16 Cost accounting for NASA space science programs: factoring in inflation over multiyear programs
16 Norris becomes Deputy Director (1974-76) and then Director (1976-1979) of the Physics and Astronomy Division of NASA HQ OSS
16-17 Dividing responsibilities in the Astronomy Division with Al Schardt: Norris as a program management specialist
17-18 Organization of the Astronomy Division, ca. 1975; managers of the various discipline branches
18 Nancy Roman's contributions as discipline scientist for UV-optical astronomy
18-19 ST advocates within NASA HQ: Roman, Noel Hinners
19 Hinners' concerns during his tenure as NASA Associate Administrator
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
20-21 Meeting with NASA Administrator Fletcher to plan an ST program organization and lobbying strategy
21 Reorganizing management in the Astronomy Division: Norris becomes Division Director, 1976
21-22 Bringing J. Warren Keller into the Division as ST Program Manager, late 1976
22-23 Capping the number of civil service staff Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) could apply to its Phase C ST efforts
22-23 Management philosophy at MSFC and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the lead and associate NASA centers for ST
24 Relations between GSFC and MSFC
24-25 Establishing GSFC's role in the ST project
25-26 Origins of NASA's Science Working Group (SWG) advisory structure for major science missions
26-27 Reorganization of NASA's space science leadership at the Associate Administrator level, mid-1970s
28-29 Composition and functions of the Phase B ST SWG
29 Bringing ST Phase B funding before Congress as a distinct line item for Fiscal Year 1975
30 NASA HQ's defense of ST before Congress
30-31 Lobbying for ST by potential contractors and by ST astronomers: John Bahcall, Noel Hinners
31 NASA Congressional liaison office and ST
31-32 Supporting contractors' lobbying on behalf of ST
32-33 Backgrounds of the contractors' lobbyists
33 Contractors' access to the OMB
33-34 Norris as an advocate for Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI)
35 Norris' conception of an ST Institute, ca. 1978
35-36 ST Project Scientist C.R. "Bob" O'Dell and STScI
36-37 O'Dell's relations with NASA HQ scientists and with the astronomy community
37 Noel Hinners and STScI
38-39 NASA's J. Warren Keller-chaired committee on implementing the ST Institute concept, 1977
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
39 Phrasing the STScI Request for Proposals (RFP) so that consortia proposing to operate STScI had to propose a site as well as a management plan
39-40 Discussing the Institute concept with OMB
40-41 Origins of the Keller implementation committee
41 Opposition to STScI within NASA HQ
42 Origins of international participation in ST
43 Negotiating the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing European Space Agency (ESA) participation in ST
44 US scientists' reaction to ESA's role in ST
44-45 Congressional support for ESA participation in ST
45-46 Discussion of a role for the Soviet Union in ST
46 International participation as a further complicating factor for ST engineers to manage
46-47 OSS reactions to the exclusion of all ST funds from NASA's Fiscal Year 1977 budget proposal
47-48 Effect of delays on securing ST Phase C/D approval on the program's total cost
48-49 Norris chairs a review of ST Phase C cost growth, 1979
49 Reserves budgeted in the original ST Phase C appropriation
49-50 Origins of 1977-79 ST cost growth: technical challenges of the ST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) contract
50 Systems analysis at Perkin-Elmer
50-51 Cost growth as part of the expected history of leading edge, high-risk technological projects
51-52 NASA management efforts to contain ST cost growth, preventing it from stripping funds from concurrent projects
52 Conclusions of the Norris cost review committee; NASA's response
52-53 Changes in upper-level ST management, ca. 1979
54-55 Management of the ST budget reserves, 1977-79
55 MSFC management culture
55 Norris joins ST OTA contractor Perkin-Elmer, 1980
55-56 Perkin-Elmer's perspective on the ST rebudgeting exercise of 1982-83
57 Perkin-Elmer's performance on the OTA contract after the 1983 rebudgeting
57-58 Current status of the ST program ca. 1984