The Glennan-Webb-Seamans Project
for Research in Space History
A-I

Atwood, J. Leland. Dates: January 19, June 20 and 24, August 22 and 25, 1989; January 12 and June 25, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 12..25 hrs.; 157 pp. Use restriction: Open.

After describing his upbringing, education, and work at Wright Field beginning in 1928, Atwood (b. October 26, 1904) reviews his work for Douglas Aircraft in the early 1930s and his acceptance of the position of chief engineer at North American shortly thereafter. He then discusses North American's wartime efforts; its early post-war work on airplanes, rockets, and missiles; projects beginning in the 1950s for the USAF and NASA, including Saturn, Minuteman, and Apollo; post-war changes in organizational structure; contracting procedures and problems with various federal agencies; the responsibilities and ramifications from the Apollo 204 fire; his promotions at North American; and relations over the years with Arthur Raymond, Dutch Kindleberger, James Webb, Stan Smithson, Fred Black, and others.

    January 19, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-2    Family background, early education

2    Rating on the civil service examination in 1928; acceptance of position at Wright Field

2-4    Description of projects in the airplane branch of the Air Material Division

4-5    Stress analysis and static testing

5    Decision to leave Wright Field for a commercial venture

5-6    Work with Fred Herman; move to position at Douglas in 1930

6-7    Association with Dutch Kindleberger and Arthur Raymond; contributions in aircraft design

7-8    Acceptance of chief engineer position at North American

8-9    North American's goals in the aviation industry

9-10    Accomplishments in design and production

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

10-11    Contributions to wartime effort; exceptional record of the P-51

11-13    Process of improving combat aircraft

13    Key factors in production costs

13-14    Working relationship with Dutch Kindleberger

14-15    Description of North American as an organization during WWII

15-16    Promotion to first vice president, 1941

16    Broadening managerial responsibilities as first vice president

16-17    Transition from war effort to postwar business projects

17-18    Development of missile and space capability

18-19    Expansion of research within North American

19-20    Contact with Project RAND at Douglas

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

20    North American's contributions to early satellite studies

20-21    Development of rocket capability at North American

21-22    Further discussion of postwar corporate activity; pursuit of military contracts

22-23    Relationship with government and the military during the postwar period

    June 20, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

24-26    Postwar activities of North American; work on the B-45, F-86, and P-82

26-27    Increase in postwar scientific and technological capabilities; contributions by Bill Bailie

27-30    Technological design and development of Air Force Navaho Missile, 1946-48

30-32    Creation of divisions within North American; MACE organization becomes obsolete

32-34    Ramifications of growing demand for missiles; changing relationship with Air Force

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

34-35    Evolution of missile, rocket and guidance activity; Lawrence Waite's role in contract administration and planning

35-37    Impact of Navaho contract upon North American's expertise level and financial status

37    Discussion of R&D money vs. production money during postwar period

37-38    Autonetics contribution to aircraft contracts

38-40    Individual activities and contributions to North American; Bill Bailie, Chauncey Starr

40-41    Atomics International interaction with rest of the corporation

41-42    Management of Autonetics; Lawrence Waite and John Moore

42-43    Atwood's responsibilities as president, 1948; work with Dutch Kindelberger, Arthur Raymond and Stan Smithson

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

43-44    Further discussion of Dutch Kindelberger

44-47    Scope of problem analysation; staff organization within headquarters

June 24, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

48-50    Means of information exchange between divisions within North American

50-52    Elements of decision-making process; review of major programs such as the B-70

52-54    Postwar transition from prototypes to "paper competition"

54-56    Changes in resource allocation; increased contact with Congress and the Military

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

56-57    Further discussion of Congress and the Military

57-59    Nature and evolutions of representation in Washington; hiring of Fred Black as consultant

59-60    Kindelberger's approach to relationship with Congress and DOD

61-63    Description of James Webb document detailing decision on selection of a contractor for the Apollo Spacecraft

63-64    Fred Black's activities in support of NAA's interests; contact with Senator Kerr

64    Establishment of North American facilities in Oklahoma and WestVirginia

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

64-67    Further discussion of MacAlester Plant in Oklahoma

67-69    Increased need for politically oriented staff in the 1950s and 1960s; conflicts with technical decision making

69-71    Question of obtaining information; determination of reliability

71    Post Fred Black arrangements; appointment of Ralph Watson

72    Closing comments

August 22, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

73-74    Fred Black's remunerations at North American

75-77    Importance of knowledge of technical requirements for future programs

77-79    Understanding military needs and requirements; technical evaluation

79-80    Ramifications of shift from corporate to governmental technical judgement

80    Ensuring North American's corporate viability

80-81    Relationship with military and NASA; effect upon organization of technological resources

81-82    North American's contact and relationship with NACA during the 1950s

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

82-85    Increase in business during the early 1960s; organizational and managerial problems

85-86    The S-II as the critical element in the development of SATURN V

86-88    Marshall's role in technical direction and design

89-90    Impact of contract complexities upon North American; interface problems

90-91    Procedures for managing large-scale projects at North American

August 25, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

92-93    Level of involvement in contract process from proposal effort to implementation

93-95    Discussion of program visibility to top management; organizational requirements

95-96    North American's relationships with Air Force and NASA

96-97    Relationship between North American and Marshall; program review meetings with NASA; Mueller's establishment of Apollo Executives Group

98    Problem solving with division presidents

98-100    Solicitation of contract for the command system module; description of contract proposal submission

100    Acceptance of team bids for contracts

100-101    Organizational changes to support CSM contract

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

101-102    Independence level of divisions; impact upon corporate decision-making

102-103    Utility of the contract schedule as a milestone device

103-104    North American and NASA discussions on proper technical approach

104-106    Design requirements on the S-II; CEO involvement

106-108    NASA Tiger Team Evaluation, 1965

108-109    Phillips Report; illumination of organizational problems

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

109-110    Time spent on NASA contract before and after the Apollo Fire

110-112    Atwood involvement in specific engineering problems

113-114    Characterization of contact with James Webb

114-117    Assessment of management effectiveness; personnel changes after release of Phillips Report

117-118    Discussion of Harrison Storms and James Webb

118    Closing comments

January 12, 1990

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

119-121    North American's responsibility in Apollo 204 fire; discussion of North American's management and engineering capabilities

121-123    Adequacy of management tools for tracking progress of problems; schedule and cost implementing of North American Apollo contracts; role of establishing firm product specifications

123-124    Poor communication between North American and NASA

124-125    Specification responsibility at North American

125    Perception of NASA's design instruction as confusing to North American

125-127    General comparison of North American's management of NASA programs with North American's standard practice for producing airplanes

127-128    Perception of NASA management of NAA contracts as "speaking with many voices"

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

128    Difference in contract specifications between the Saturn II and MSC

128-129    Perception of avoidance of specification formalization in CSM

129-130    Minuteman guidance system

130-131    Problems between North American and the Air Force on Minuteman guidance system; comparison with North American and NASA relationship

131-132    Air Force and NASA evaluation of key management personnel: the case of Fred Eyestone, President of Autonetics Division

132    North American's responsibilities after the fire; Thompson Committee

132-133    Replacement of Harrison Storms; Olin Teague's Committee

133-134    Congressional feedback concerning the fire and North American's role

134-135    Congressional Record excerpts relating to Phillips' report

136    Impressions of cause of fire in news accounts

    June 25, 1990

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

137-138    Repairing North American's relationship with Congress after the Apollo fire

138    Atwood invited by Tiger Teague to Lunar Landing commemoration ceremony

138-139    NASA comparison of uncompleted capsule (#17) with burned Apollo capsule; NASA amplification of defects found in capsule 17

139    Atwood's feeling of oxygen in capsule as cause of fire

140    North American pressed by technical problems; Dale Myers and weight problems with the spacecraft

140-141    FBI sent by NASA to look for crimes at North American; recovery of North American in moral and management

141-142    Impression of misunderstanding between North American and NASA in NASA accounts; Atwood's acknowledgement that personality conflicts might have led to misunderstandings

142-143    Atwood's perception that relations between North American and NASA were harmonious prior to the fire; Atwood's assessment of Harrison (Stormy) Storms

143    George Mueller's knowledge of technical and organizational aspects of the Apollo program; invention of "Mueller" Graphs as scheduling aid

143-144    Discussion of concurrence in scheduling

144    Discussion of Apollo fire investigation; NASA's ambivalence in capsule design

145    Larry Greene's discussions with Webb; removal of Harrison Storms

145-146    Evolution of Contracts and Proposals organization

146    Alex Burton: responsibility for military relations

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

147    Continuation of discussion of Alex Burton

147-148    Discussion of Requests for Proposals

148    Explanation of use of outlying offices

148-149    Value of contacts with Air Force Laboratories; additional offices

150    Redesignation of Contracts and Programs to Market Planning

150-152    Value of extensive staff capability at corporate level; Stan Smithson; E.D. Starkweather

152-154    Value of knowledge gained Air Force interests in formulating proposals

154-156    Key people at North American during Atwood's tenure: Stan Smithson, Raymond Rice, Carl Hansen, Larry Waite, Bill Bailie, Harrison Storms and Bill Snelling

157    Closing Comments


Bradshaw, Delmer. Date: August 26, 1988. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Public.

After briefly reviewing his education in electronics, Bradshaw describes coming to Boeing and in 1967 being assigned to the Boeing-TIE program at the Manned Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Houston. He then discusses Boeing's responsibilities in the TIE program and the procedures by which they were established, his work in the TIE program and eventual promotions to configuration manager and then engineering manager, interaction between Boeing and NASA personnel and certain disputes that developed, NASA's acceptance of TIE as a management system, and the background of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-2    Early interests and educational experience

2    Decision as an engineer to pursue a career in aviation and space related applications

2-3    Assignment to Boeing-TIE Program in Houston; initial impressions of the Manned Space Flight Center

3-4    Evaluation of contributions from high level management; George Mueller and Sam Phillips

4-5    Characterization of MSFC in the aftermath of the 1967 Apollo fire

5-6    Types of functions performed by Boeing under the Apollo-TIE Program

6-7    Interaction between Boeing people and MSC in problem-solving

7-8    Boeing's ability to bring in needed staff

8-9    Reliance upon corporate sources for technical expertise

9-10    Competing needs for individual expertise within Boeing and commitment to NASA; solutions to a potential problem

10-11    Striking a balance between scientific and engineering directives

11    Boeing's familiarization with MSC procedures during early TIE Program

12    Bradshaw's initial responsibilities with the TIE Program

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

12-13    Responsibilities after initial simulation work at MSC; configuration management and specifications

13-14    Dissemination of information; meetings with contractors

14-15    Process by which Boeing achieved understanding of configuration requirements and management

16    Record-keeping as integral part of program management

17    NASA's acceptance of TIE as a new management system

17-18    Existence of friction between Boeing and NASA centers during early TIE Program

18-19    Teleconferences and their advantages

19-20    Move from configuration manager to engineering manager; scope of duties

20-21    Task assignments and division of labor

21    The function of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board

21-23    Boeing's parallel readiness assessment

23-24    Closing comments


Bradshaw, Delmer. Date: August 26, 1988. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Public.

After briefly reviewing his education in electronics, Bradshaw describes coming to Boeing and in 1967 being assigned to the Boeing-TIE program at the Manned Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Houston. He then discusses Boeing's responsibilities in the TIE program and the procedures by which they were established, his work in the TIE program and eventual promotions to configuration manager and then engineering manager, interaction between Boeing and NASA personnel and certain disputes that developed, NASA's acceptance of TIE as a management system, and the background of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-2    Early interests and educational experience

2    Decision as an engineer to pursue a career in aviation and space related applications

2-3    Assignment to Boeing-TIE Program in Houston; initial impressions of the Manned Space Flight Center

3-4    Evaluation of contributions from high level management; George Mueller and Sam Phillips

4-5    Characterization of MSFC in the aftermath of the 1967 Apollo fire

5-6    Types of functions performed by Boeing under the Apollo-TIE Program

6-7    Interaction between Boeing people and MSC in problem-solving

7-8    Boeing's ability to bring in needed staff

8-9    Reliance upon corporate sources for technical expertise

9-10    Competing needs for individual expertise within Boeing and commitment to NASA; solutions to a potential problem

10-11    Striking a balance between scientific and engineering directives

11    Boeing's familiarization with MSC procedures during early TIE Program

12    Bradshaw's initial responsibilities with the TIE Program

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

12-13    Responsibilities after initial simulation work at MSC; configuration management and specifications

13-14    Dissemination of information; meetings with contractors

14-15    Process by which Boeing achieved understanding of configuration requirements and management

16    Record-keeping as integral part of program management

17    NASA's acceptance of TIE as a new management system

17-18    Existence of friction between Boeing and NASA centers during early TIE Program

18-19    Teleconferences and their advantages

19-20    Move from configuration manager to engineering manager; scope of duties

20-21    Task assignments and division of labor

21    The function of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board

21-23    Boeing's parallel readiness assessment

23-24    Closing comments

    


Burnett, James R. Dates: June 19, 1989; January 10, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 4 hrs.; 67 pp. Use restriction: Open.

Burnett (b. November 27, 1925) initially discusses his upbringing, graduate education in electrical engineering, and teaching at Purdue in this field from 1950 until his move to TRW as a staff engineer in 1956. He then describes TRW's work on various missile projects at that time and his contributions thereto; his relations with Bob Bennett, Bob Whitford, and others at the company; and the procedures for resolving differences and evaluating progress both internally and with the USAF and subcontractors. Burnett next reviews his work as head of the Titan guidance and control section; the use of many contractors on one project and the problems generated therefrom; key technical challenges of the Minuteman and other missiles and how they were resolved; and his thoughts on the nature of and problems with the government-industry partnership in the ballistic missiles field.

    June 19, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1    Family background

1-2    Interests as a young man; joining Marines; entering V-12 program

2-3    Training in V-12 program

3    Exposure to new developments in electronics; radar

3-4    Post-war interests: feedback control systems, servo-mechanisms, digital computers

4    Earned PhD from Purdue, 1949

4-5    Industry's interest in university work

5    Consultant to Argonne Labs

5-6    Burnett's engineering style

6-7    Burnett's introduction to Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation by Bob Whitford; transition from university life to work in industry

7    Family life; wife Anne

8-9    Initial projects at TRW: Atlas, Titan and Thor control systems; Gene Armstrong

9-11    Comparison of TRW organization with university experience; TRW more interdisciplinary

11-12    Working for Bob Bennett; Bob Whitford, George Gleghorn, Bob Walquist

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

12-14    Trouble shooting in computer developments; interchangeable inertial guidance system

14-15    System specifications

15-17    Technical direction meetings

17-18    Response of associate and subcontractors to technical direction; cost-plus fixed fee contracts

18-19    Formal procedures for resolving difference of opinion

19-21    Burnett becomes head of Computers and Control Department; first management experience

21    Ensuring staff competence and expertise

21-23    Working with contractors; tension between people with university background and people with industry back-ground

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

23-25    Progress reviews of subcontractors by Benny Schriever and Si Ramo; selecting the best personnel for the project

25-27    Problem solving with the Air Force, contractors and internally

27-28    Senior staff, weekly staff and Black Saturday meetings to resolve internal problems

28-29    Independent review committees; encouraged by Schriever

29-30    Contributions of independent review committees

30-33    Experiences with AC Sparkplug, Stark Draper and Draper Labs; philosophical differences with Draper

33    Closing comments

    January 10, 1990

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

34    ARMA guidance system for Thor and Atlas Missiles: all inertial system

34-35    Comparison of Minuteman guidance system with ARMA; invention of disk type memory

35-36    Engineering and strategic assessment of fully guided missiles; concern about missiles' vulnerabilities

36-37    Concentration on inertial system; Advanced Ballistic Ranger Systems Program (AIRES)

37    Original Burroughs computer: core memory programming

37    Burnett as head of Titan guidance and control section; AC Sparkplug guidance system

38-40    Comparison between Draper and Autonetics guidance systems; Minuteman and Polaris reliability requirements

40-41    Burnett's contact with Draper; Draper's distinctive jargon

41-43    Technical direction meetings; implementation of technical directives and contract changes

43-46    Contracts defined testing programs; encouraged "inventions to order"

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

46-47    Systems, materials and process inventions: swivel nozzles on solid rockets, aluminized propellant, cork as exterior insulation

47-48    Staging problems with Atlas and Titan

48    Burnett's involvement in Minuteman Guidance Specifications

49    System integration: Burnett's preference of one contractor for whole job on Minuteman; solving problem of hydraulic connection leak

49    Multi-contractors on Atlas; Titan rocket "plumbers nightmare"

49-51    Key technical challenges of Minuteman: firing from silos, ISP problems, third stage thrust termination

51    Concerns with Minuteman re-entry vehicle

51-52    Minuteman launch control and basing system: Air Force requirement for unmanned silos

52    Maintaining management control of Minuteman; personal visits to contractors with Sam Phillips

53    Time spent with contractors: review progress charts, contractor control rooms, inspection of hardware

53-54    Burnett's ideas of good program manager characteristics

54-55    Contacts maintained on Minuteman project: President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), Schriever's committee

55    Burnett's role to brief PSAC and Schriever's committee on Minutemans' progress

55-56    Burnett's role in budget negotiations with DDR & E

56    Boeing as assembly and test contractor for Minuteman

56-57    Boeing's role and ability in production control

57-58    Condition for Boeing being chosen to do launch control systems: TRW to technically direct subcontractor RCA

58    Boeing's willingness to learn from TRW on Minuteman: application of techniques to other aspects of corporate system business

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

58-59    Systems requirement process: new analytical techniques

59-60    Specifications and configuration control for Minuteman weapons system

60    Boeing "Masters" of the art of scheduling

61    Air Force 375 regulations

61    Minuteman as team effort among associate contractors: Thiokol, Autonetics and Boeing

61-62    Recent DOD procurement practices: lack of authority of SPO directors, difficult for SPO directors to form teams with their contractors

62-63    Members of Autonetics Management removed from Minuteman program, not moving production at proper rate

63-64    TRW top management evaluation of mid-level managers; quantitative and qualitative goals; quality management: satisfied customers, product reliability

65    Nature of government-industry relationships in ballistic missile program: cooperation among top executives and among corporate technical staff

65-66    Contact with fleet ballistic missile program: cooperation to harden electronics to nuclear effect

66    Cooperation and competition between the military services

66-67    Minimize expenditures in procurement: get job done quickly, decide and follow schedule and budget money to be used to develop alternate technical options

67    Closing comments


Demitriades, Paul. Date: February 28, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Open.

After a brief overview of his graduate education in accounting and economics, Demitriades discusses his work as an industrial engineer at Boeing beginning in 1959 on such projects as Bomarc and Saturn. He then describes his association with the Apollo TIE program from 1967 to 1969, including the development of the program plan upon which the TIE contract awarded to Boeing was based and his and others contributions thereto; Boeing's work as the TIE contractor, his role as a program manager in this work, and particular problems that arose with NASA HQ, NASA centers, and contractors; and some of the management techniques utilized in the TIE contract. Demitriades next compares TIE and USAF management techniques, and gives his thoughts on political problems inherent in working in Washington, D.C.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1    Description of educational background

2    Boeing management techniques for large-scale projects

2-4    Defining a program plan for the Apollo-TIE contract

4-5    Use of a matrix in organization of program elements

5-7    Structure of Apollo-TIE contract within NASA; center-contractor relationship

7-9    Description of formal review system; program integration function in TIE

9-10    Key elements in management assessment

10-12    Three party working agreement between NASA HQ, Apollo-TIE contractor, and centers

12-14    Process of enabling contract changes; management of data and information flow

14-16    Advanced management techniques used on Apollo-TIE

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

17    Identification of critical points and milestones; Flight Readiness Review

17-19    Balance between informal and formal methods of communication in the project process

19-21    Description of Apollo program management flow chart

21-22    Comparison of Apollo-TIE and Air Force management techniques

22    Political aspects of work in Washington, DC

22-24    Interaction between Boeing TIE/Washington staff and Headquarters staff

24    Closing comments


Doll, Edward. Date: June 23, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 16 pp. Use restriction: Not established.

After reviewing his upbringing, master's and doctorate programs at CALTECH in electrical engineering and engineering respectively, work as assistant head of the fusion department at Los Alamos from 1944 to 1946, career as an electrical engineer at North American Phillips from 1946 to 1949, and work in the physics department at Stanford Research Institute from 1949 to 1955, Doll (b. September 24, 1912) discusses his move in 1955 to the Guided Missile Research Division at Ramo-Wooldridge. He then describes the organizational structure of the firm's missile programs; its relations with contractors; the role of James Fletcher and others in these programs; and his own responsibilities as head of the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman project offices. Doll next discusses his move to NASA in 1963 and relations with some of the key figures there.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1    Family and educational background

1-2    Employment at Los Alamos; military testing of nuclear weapons

2-4    Initial responsibilities at Ramo-Wooldridge; work in the Guided Missile Research Division

4    Involvement in the contracting process

5-6    Key problems associated with the Atlas Program; relationship with Jim Dempsey

7-9    Organizational structure of the Atlas Program; work with Jim Fletcher

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

9-10    Discussion of missile program officer; reporting structure

10-12    Initial work at NASA; recollection of experiences with Robert McNamara and Harold Brown

12-13    General Schriever's recommendation that Doll replace Brainerd Holmes; discussions with Si Ramo concerning the move

13-14    Relationship with Rocketdyne and Kurt Debus

14    Recollections of Wernher von Braun and Eberhardt Rees

15-16    Nature of work with the Air Force from 1955-63


Downey, Peter. Date: February 28, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 17 pp. Use restriction: Not established.

After briefly reviewing his education and early work experience at Boeing, Downey discusses his initial responsibilities at Cape Kennedy with the Apollo-TIE program as a monitor of the spacecraft portion of the testing program. He then describes his relations with various contractors and the program's other offices, the process of establishing and implementing goals at Boeing, and the growing complexity of contracting with the federal government.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1    Education background and early work experience

1-2    Business development prior to TIE

2-3    Assessment of the fire's impact upon the progress of the Apollo program

3-5    Initial responsibilities and activities at Cape Kennedy

5    Difficulties of review and analysis procedures

5-6    Boeing's integration process for the STAC of Apollo Saturn V

6-7    Assessment of NASA's level of internal review of its activities

7-8    Contact and interaction with the Rockwell people

8-9    Necessary level of knowledge of management systems needed for Apollo-TIE

9-10    Use of teleservicing system for improved communication

10-11    Nature of contact with program offices in Houston, Huntsville and Washington

11    Systems integration and contact with Bellcomm

11-12    The role of new business activities within Boeing

12-13    Contribution of creative people to new business activity

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

13-14    Discussion of schedule orientation towards events

14-15    Nature of proposal preparation and review

15-17    The issue of conflicts of interest and changes in contractor-government relationship

17    Closing comments


Duff, Brian. Dates: April 24 and 26, May 1 and 24, 1989. Interviewer: John Mauer. Auspices: GWS. Length: 4.5 hrs.; 82 pp. Use restriction: (2) Public, (2) Not established.

Duff initially reviews his recruitment by Julian Scheer to the public affairs office of NASA, the open space program and its impact, and impressions of working daily with Jim Webb. He then discusses the differences between line and staff officers at NASA, his transfer to Houston and work there, and the division of responsibilities between the centers and NASA HQ. Duff next covers his close relationship with Scheer, his move to HEW and later Amtrak when Scheer left NASA, conflicts between the manned and unmanned space flight divisions of NASA, and his return to NASA's public affairs office.

April 24, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-2    Duff's summary of his pre-NASA experience; his original hiring at NASA by Julian Scheer; his summary of what that job involved

2    Duff's relationship with Julian Scheer

3    Evolution of the open space program under Scheer; NASA's public relations style; development of live coverage of recovery

3-4    Duff's disagreement with Donald (Deke) Slayton about live coverage from space, and his appeal to Robert Gilruth

4    The open space program

4-5    Duff's disagreement with Deke Slayton over having a pool reporter in mission control, and his appeal to Robert Gilruth

5-6    Apollo 13; Roy Neill of NBC as pool reporter, and his public contradiction of Walter Cronkite on the air

6    Reasons for having an open space program; advantages of an open space program

6-7    Duff's disagreement with Pete (Charles) Conrad and about the open space program, and arguments against it

7-8    Duff's exchange of memos with Hans Mark; Mark's attitude toward the open space program; the Imax project at the National Air and Space Museum

8-9    Imax and the problem of exclusivity

9-10    Duff discusses the concept of a government agency covering itself by collaborating with world news agencies; NASA Select; NASA feeds to the networks; evolution of the networks' reliance on NASA, beginning with Mercury

10-11    Discussion of the period when Duff first came on board at NASA; his relationship with James Webb; his travels with Webb; his view of how Webb operated in the public forum; Webb's speeches; the Webb personality

11-12    Technology utilization as a benefit of the space program

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

12-13    Establishment of technology utilization center at Wayne State University

13-15    Webb's speech for Senator Stennis in Mississippi

15-16    Webb's relationship with the White House and Congress, especially George Mahon

16-17    Webb's trip to Lubbock with George Mahon; political appeal of the space program

17-18    Webb's trip to Kansas City with Stuart Symington

18-19    Duff recounts what it was like to work with Webb on a day-to-day basis; Webb's view of public service and the management of a large organization like NASA; Webb's view of the contributions of the space program to society

19    Webb's dealings with Mendel Rivers and George Mahon

20    Webb's personal style - a sense of chivalry

20    Webb's part in public affairs at NASA and in developing the open space program; Webb's relationship with Julian Scheer

20    The role played by the open space program in building NASA's constituency

21    The "glass slide" incident, illustrating Webb's view of the rationale for an open space program; the need for public support of the program

22    Duff discusses how public relations is a long-term exercise in building good feelings with constituencies; the success of Apollo public relations as an example

22-23    The Apollo 204 fire, as contrasted with the Challenger accident, from a public relations point of view

April 26, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

24-25    Duff describes his views of being a staff officer versus a line officer

25    The effect of a strong personality and longevity of tenure on an employee's personal influence, as exemplified by the career of Julian Scheer

25-26    Line officers and staff officers: permanently delegated authority versus surrogate authority

26    Duff's travels with James Webb in his capacity as a public affairs staff officer

26-27    Duff discusses the reasons why he was sent to Houston; Paul Haney's problems in Houston; the relationship of a NASA field center to Headquarters

27-28    How public affairs operates in a field center in relation to Headquarters; how Duff's understanding of this relationship influenced his decision to go to Houston

28    Paul Haney's relationship with Robert Gilruth

28    Duff's concerns about going to Houston and how he would be perceived by the staff; his conversations with Robert Gilruth and Christopher Kraft

28-29    Duff's views of how a public affairs officer should operate; further discussion of Paul Haney's problems with Headquarters and with the press

29-30    The situation in Houston when Duff arrived; his treatment as a celebrity

30    Duff's refusal to be an on-the-air commentator, and his determination to keep a low profile as public affairs officer in Houston

30-31    Duff describes how he handled commentator duties upon his arrival in Houston; how he viewed his function in Houston; his refusal to be a "publicity hound"

31-32    Duff's acceptance by the Houston senior staff

32    Duff's views of working with engineers versus scientists; the staff in Houston in their new role as celebrities

32-34    Duff's HQ-Washington background as an asset in acceptance in Houston; Duff recommends pool reporters in mission control and live TV press conferences in space; resistance to these measures from astronauts (McDivitt and Slayton); congratulatory telegram from the White House

34    The NASA institutional hierarchy; line authority versus functional authority

34-35    Duff discusses communications breakdowns within NASA; institutional chains of command; function of ombudsman; public affairs as an agency-wide, versus field center, function

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

35-36    Duff discusses the degree of involvement of the president in NASA affairs; field center public affairs officers in relation to Washington; Duff's return to NASA during the "shuttle crisis" (period before shuttle flight was achieved) and reasons why he was called back

36-38    Duff describes the feeling of teamwork and sense of camaraderie among NASA employees; further discussion of Paul Haney's problems with Washington; Washington's role in relation to the field centers; the "planting a tree Israel" issue

38-39    Duff discusses the small size of NASA and its public affairs staff - everyone knew each other and enjoyed working together; the impact of a launch on the agency, especially public affairs; the NASA Alumni League

May 1, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

40    The relationship between Julian Scheer and George Mueller, and its impact on the administration of NASA

40-41    Duff refutes Mueller's contention that NASA had an adversarial relationship with the media

41    Discussion of Julian Scheer's strong personality; Duff suggests that Scheer possibly had an adversarial relationship with individual reporters

41-42    Scheer's relationship with George Low; Scheer's reputation; Scheer's lasting effect on NASA public affairs

42    Effect of Scheer's resignation on Duff's decision to leave Houston and take a position with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

42-43    Duff's relationship with George Low; Duff contrasts Low's style with James Webb's style

43-44    Duff describes the situation between Houston and NASA HQ; the dynamic tension between field centers and Headquarters; "Headquarters hummers"

44-45    Effects of travel and telecommunications (especially the NASA television system) on relationships at NASA

45-46    Duff leaves NASA and goes to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and then to Amtrak

46-47    Duff contrasts HEW with NASA: teamwork, achieving objectives, internal fighting, sense of esprit de corps

47-48    Division within NASA between manned space flight and space science from a public affairs point of view; role played by Carl Sagan in this debate

48-48    Further discussion of the tension between manned and unmanned space flight (engineers and scientists), and public affairs' handling of it; Carl Sagan's desire for an advocacy-oriented public affairs program

49    Duff goes back to NASA for a third time

50    Duff describes the situation in NASA's public affairs upon his return for the third time

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

50-52    Further discussion of situation in NASA's public affairs office; Duff's once-a-week press briefings; the Shuttle Press Manual; the flow-of-information technique

52-54    Duff describes how he got the press and NASA senior managers to cooperate during the shuttle pre-flight period; stopping the flow of bad press

54-55    Effect of Duff's tactics on negative coverage of NASA; solutions to some shuttle engineering problems, and the effect on negative press

55    Duff describes the high point of the NASA public affairs program; the distinction between a briefing and a press conference

55-56    Discussion of the Challenger accident; press coverage of the Challenger accident and the Apollo 204 fire

56-57    Duff describes how a public affairs office should handle catastrophes

57-58    General discussion of Duff's experiences of press coverage problems in NASA and at Amtrak; how public affairs should handle problems in general

May 24, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

59-60    Duff discusses his return to NASA for the third time, as director of public affairs, during the "pre-shuttle" crisis; negative press coverage of NASA at this time

60    Engineering problems NASA was having with the shuttle: tiles, zipper effect

60-61    Duff discusses the reasons for his being hired for a third time

61-63    Duff discusses James Webb's (and his) view of public affairs and public service

63    Duff discusses the downgrading of the public affairs position between his second and third terms at NASA

63-64    The effect of party politics on NASA public affairs; examples: Elliott Richardson at HEW, and White House staffs

64-66    The corporate view of public relations (James Beggs and Alan Boyd); contrast with public service view of Webb and Richardson: Duff describes what it was like to work for Frosch, Gilruth and Lovelace

66-67    Taking the Enterprise to the Paris Air Show; Beggs' reaction

67-68    More anecdotes: working for Frosch, Lovelace and Beggs

68    Duff's conflicts with James Beggs

69-70    Voyager from a public affairs viewpoint; Duff's relationship with Hans Mark; Mark's view of public affairs

70-71    Beggs' view of Duff's style; what Beggs wanted in a public affairs officer; discussion of corporate style

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

71-73    Description of George Will incident

73-74    Aftermath of Will incident; Duff's discussion with Beggs about it; Will's reaction

74-75    Factors leading up to Fonda incident: lack of a NASA constituency among women and minorities

75-76    Reasons for inviting Jane Fonda to pre-launch party before Sally Ride's first flight

76    Description of the pre-launch party and the Fonda incident

76-78    Analysis of the Fonda incident; Beggs' reaction to it

78-79    Aftermath of the Fonda incident; Duff's firing

79    Transition period during which Duff phased himself out of NASA; the Bluford flight

79-81    Duff's summary and assessment of his NASA career; Apollo 13 as the peak

82    Closing


Elms, James. Dates: January 13 and July 1, 1987; March 2, May 5, and September 16, 1988; January 12, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 14.25 hrs.; 224 pp. Use restriction: Open.

Elms initially reviews his upbringing, undergraduate education in English at CALTECH and the University of Chicago, first job at Convair in 1939 and 1940, service in the Army Air Forces during World War II working on such projects as missile guidance systems, and post-war graduate studies at UCLA under Louis Slichter and at CALTECH in physics. He then discusses his career at North American from 1950 to 1957, including impressions of Dutch Kindelberger, work on such projects as the MG-4 fire control unit, the organizational structure of the firm, and North American's relations with the USAF. Following this, Elms covers his move to Martin to work on the Titan, initial impressions of the firm, the USAF's and Ramo-Wooldridge's roles in the missile programs, and his careers at AVCO-Crossley and Ford Aeronautics. He next covers his tenure at NASA's Manned Space Flight Center beginning in 1963, including involvement in the 1963 reorganization, relations with George Mueller and others, and management philosophy and practices; and then his subsequent career at Raytheon. Finally, Elms reviews his return to NASA as Mueller's deputy, assuming the directorship of the Electronics Research Center in 1966, and the background of its evolution into the Transportation Systems Center.

    January 13, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-11    Elms' personal biography, family, high school

5-12    Friendships with George Johnsen, Billy Martin and Glenn Brink

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

13-19    CALTECH (continued)

17-18    Decision to transfer to University of Chicago

18    C. C. Lauritsen, Edward Teller, Louie Pipes

19-20    University of Chicago, Gregory Bard, Mortimer Adler

20-25    Decision to travel in Europe, life in Paris, trip to London

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

25-27    Italy, social life and friends in Europe

28    Return to United States; meets Patricia Pafford, future wife

28    Berkeley; meets Luis Alvarez

28-29    Employment with Convair (Consolidated Aircraft); Walter Munk

29    Navy aeronautical engineering training program

30-31    Rejected for Army Air Forces flight training; marriage; called up for military service

    July 1, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

32-34    Elms' Army Air Forces WWII training and assignments

34-35    Wright Patterson Field Armament Lab: V-1, V-1 type research

35    Re-enrolled at CALTECH; job at Gianinni and Co

36-37    AAF bureaucracy; Armament and Ordnance Labs; Elms' gadget for machine gun

37-38    Introduction of computers into fire control

38    Elms' initial management experience

38-39    Army Air Forces interest in guided missiles; Elms' work on guidance system

40-41    Institute of Geophysics with Louis Slichter; Mohorovicic discontinuity data

41    Elms takes job at North American

41    Army interest in transporting V-1, V-2 to US after war

42    CALTECH studies

42-43    Working with Slichter

43-44    CALTECH studies and professors

44-45    Elms' work on gravimeter

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

45-46    Birth of children; personal finances

46-49    Work with Slichter at UCLA; masters' studies

49-50    Move to NAA; Dutch Kindelberger hires Elms, Hoffman, Edlefsen, Chauncy Starr and establishes Astrophysics, Space, Rocketdyne and Autonetics divisions; John Moore

50-52    North American; Kindelberger's handling of design flaw in F-100 airplane

52    Elms' heart attack

52-54    Kindelberger relations with Air Force; development of P-51, F-86, F-100; relations with Ernie Breech, Lee Atwood, James Smithson

54-56    Reuther attempt to organize North American; John Moore and Kindelberger; Kindelberger advice on reorganizing organizations; Gilruth and Elms' reorganization of Houston

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

56-57    Ernie Breech; Ford Motor Company

57    Kindelberger's influence on Elms as manager

57-58    Kurt Debus; Apollo security

58    Security problem at Martin on Titan

58-60    Kindelberger management style, effect on Elms

59    Elms and Bank of America

60-61    Ernie Breech as manager; retirement speech; TWA rescue

61-62    Elms' position at North American, assignments

62    E-7 fire control system

63-64    North American contract to build NATO interceptor airplane; MG-4

61-62    John Moore; Elms' work on meter to measure voltage and phase

63-64    E-7 system cost overruns; MG-4 development; AF relations; government restrictions

65    Elms' borrows Joe Geissler to work on MG-4

65    Staff of Elms' fire control unit; Robert Case, Rulon Shelley

66    Move to Martin; Ron Greenslade

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

66-67    Quality of work at North American; Elms' as project manager

67-68    Tension between Air Force procurement regulations and contractor's freedom of operation

68-69    Freedom of research in four experimental units created by Kindelberger at NAA

69    Development of E-7, MG-4, compared

69    Chronology of Elms' titles at North American

69-70    Development of NASARR radar

70-71    Relations among divisions within North American

71    Integration of fire control and flight control systems with aircraft

72    Intracompany advising at North American; Warren Swanson

72-73    Marketing at North American; Bill Fort

73-74    Booz Allen Hamilton evaluation of North American; Norm Parker

74-75    NASARR; Elms' technical contribution to it

    March 2, 1988

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

76-78    Elms' recollections of Dutch Kindelberger's management style at North American

78-80    Research and product development at North American; relationship between financial and engineering personnel; decision-making by line management

81    Air Force support for development of E-7 by North American

81-84    Elms' considers leaving North American Autonetics to work with Martin; influence of Sputnik launch; General Benny Schriever; Colonel Paul Blasingame; George Trimble; Lee Atwood; Colonel Albert "Red" Wetzel; Dalimil Kybal

84-85    Elms' decision to accept position at Martin on development of Titan missile; Bill Purdy; Larry Adams; Roy Jackson; Albert Hall

85-86    Elms' finds Martin inexperienced in electronics integration within aircraft; hires Ron Greenslade; resignation from North American submitted to John Moore; Gene Shelley

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

86-88    Departure from North American; Gene Shelley; relationship among staff of Autonetics, fire control division

88-89    Elms and Greenslade innovations in Martin management; Titan missile testing

89-90    Ramo-Wooldridge involvement in missile program; PET (Production Environmental Test)

91    Elms' experience with North American contrasted to Martin

91-95    Elms recruited by Newman; friendship with Jack Reith; J.J. Kerley; Reith's management style

94-95    Elms applies Martin and North American experience to reorganization with Bob Gilruth of Houston NASA Center

    May 5, 1988

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

96-98    Martin ballistic missile program; role of Ramo-Wooldridge, Elms' and Ron Greenslade's organizational restructuring

98-100    R-W role; reliability testing, PET (Production Environmental Testing), Titan explosion

100-105    Relationships among Martin, R-W, Air Force, and sub-contractors; Paul Blassingame; Gen. Benny Schriever

106    Electronics Research Center

106-107    Ron Greenslade's repair of Apollo computer at Raytheon Elms'career path; advantages of work with Jack Reith at AVCO-Crossley

108    Crossley aeronautics work; Karl Kober, Ernst Steinhoff

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

108    Crossley business areas

109    Jack Reith's death

109-113    Impact on Elms of Reith's death; discussions with Gerry Lynch of accepting position with Ford Aeroneutronics; Political atmosphere within Crossley after Reith's death; Elms' decision to leave Crossley

112    Elms' work at Ford Aeroneutronics on signal radio sent to moon; development of Ford Aeroneutronics

113-115    Elms' responsibilities at Ford Aeroneutronics; the company's work in guidance and control; computers; Shillelagh missile; role of financial personnel within Ford

115-118    Private industry's need to be educated about contracting with government, military; J.J. Kerley; financial advisor to TWA, Ford, etc.; Internal Research and Development

118-119    Elms' decision to leave Ford for NASA; influence of Brainerd Holmes

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

119    Elms' decision to accept NASA position

119-121    Elms' working relationship with Bob Gilruth

121-123    Organizational problems at NASA Houston; need for organizational ability as factor in Holmes' recruiting Elms; Wes Hjornevik; Max Faget; efforts to restructure Houston organization by Elms, Gilruth

    September 16, 1988

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

124-128    Early relationship with Robert Gilruth

128-130    Examples of Gilruth's management style

130-133    Discussion of Manned Spaceflight Center reorganization, 1963

133-135    MSC's relationship with North American; influence of Charlie Feltz on NASA contracts

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

136-139    Developing technical direction at MSC in conjunction with private contractors

139-141    Brainerd Holmes' perceptions of weaknesses at MSC

141-142    Further discussion of the NASA/contractor relationship

142-143    Creation of the Program Office by Brainerd Holmes; relationship between the Engineering and Program Office

143-145    Division of responsibilities between the NASA HQ and the Centers

145-146    George Mueller's assessment of the organizational hierarchy

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

146-147    Use of Martin organization; advantages of having Gemini and Apollo Program Offices

147-149    Results of 1963 reorganization; Elms' role in management andorganization of resources

149-151    How reorganization affected individuals and parts of the organization

151-156    Elms' role in public relations at MSC

156-157    Relationship with the science editor of the Boston Globe; Macelany

157    Contact with the press while at MSC

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

157-160    Jim Chamberlain's contributions to the Gemini program

160-161    Examples of Elms' management style in the procurement process

160-163    Reaction to Neil Armstrong's Gemini flight; spinning in the Agena

163-164    Responsibility for problems with systems interfacing

164    Discussion of general management philosophy

164-165    Gilruth's post-reorganization role

165-166    Tackling daily problems at MSC

166-167    Elms' contribution to building design

167-169    Prioritization of Center business

TAPE 3, SIDE 1

169-170    Necessity of micromanagement in solving problems

170    Relationship with George Mueller and Bob Seamans while deputy director

171-172    Role in procurement activities; the Center's role in awarding primary contracts

172-173    Reasons for leaving Houston; move to Raytheon

173    Ed Bowles affiliation with Raytheon

173-174    Assessment of the move back to industry

174-175    Location of the Office of Space Information Systems at Raytheon in Santa Barbara

175    Working with Brainerd Holmes at Raytheon

175-176    Attitude of Raytheon concerning Elms' heart attack

176-177    Opportunity to run Electronics Research Center

177-178    Frequent travel to Los Angeles while working at Houston

178-179    Assessment of possible management weaknesses at NAA prior to the Apollo fire

TAPE 3, SIDE 2

179-180    Apollo fire review process

180    Dealing with political accountability; influence and effect of Congress

180-181    Accidents as an indication of management problems in government and industry

181-182    Approaches to project execution

182-183    Meetings of the Apollo Executives Group

183-185    Remembering advice from Henry Ford II

185-186    Reasons for leaving Raytheon; serving as assistant consultant to James Webb

187    Position as Mueller's deputy

187-189    Discussion of individual leadership qualities

189    Responsibilities as Mueller's deputy

    January 12, 1989

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

190-193    Sense of Electronic Research Center's mission at its inception in 1966

193-194    Assessment if ERC reputation and effectiveness

194-195    Awareness of early planning for ERC

195-196    Elms' role in committee selection process

196-198    Decision to close ERC; switch to TSC

198-200    Discussion of proper spheres of activity for industry and government

200    Committee agreement on course of action at ERC

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

200-202    Usefulness of Advisory Committee to ERC

202-203    Personnel; requirements and inherent limitations; development of in-house core of researchers

203-204    ERC/contractor relationships

204-205    ERC working relationship with NASA Centers

205-206    Purpose of Office of University Affairs

207    Procurement requirements and the contract process

208    Importance of student interns at ERC

209    ERC/military relationship

209-210    Discussion of ERC's role as a government-wide resource

210-211    Importance of technology utilization

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

211    Center's role in post-Apollo fire investigation and recovery

211-212    Differences between Webb and Paine administrative styles

212-214    Process of transition from NASA to Department of Transportation

214-217    Interest in saving ERC

217-220    Congressional reaction to transition; ERC-Congress relations before & after DOT change

220-221    Policy and management decision at ERC and TSC

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

222-224    Definition of Center technical direction; ERC sense of competition and role vis-a-vis industry

224    Closing remarks


Fletcher, James. Date: May 15, 1989. Interviewer: John Mauer. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Public.

Fletcher focuses primarily on various aspects of the space shuttle program during his two terms as head of NASA beginning in 1971. He describes the competing designs offered for the shuttle; how and why the design adopted was selected; and his role, as well as the roles of key government and private sector personalities, in the selection process. Fletcher also discusses the budget problems generally facing NASA and NASA's role in technological progress.

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-3    Situation at NASA when Fletcher becomes administrator in 1971; future planning, budget, relations with OMB

2-5    General discussion of space shuttle planning; alternate designs; impact of budget issue; role of contractors; Dale Myers, George Low and Wernher von Braun

4-6    Rejection of fully reusable shuttle concept; impact of OMB cost criteria

5-6    Mission models; studies by Aerospace Corporation, Mathematica, Inc.

6-7    Fletcher's criticism of systems analysis

7-8    Fletcher's presentations of the case for the shuttle to OMB and to the White House

8    Impact of aerospace industry employment on shuttle discussions

8-9    Fletcher's view of White House stance on the shuttle; recollections of George Shultz, Peter Flanigan, John Ehrlichman

9    Fletcher's view of shuttle capabilities

10-11    Elimination of space tug concept

10-11    Impact of 1972 budget cuts on NASA; role of Caspar Weinberger

11-12    Discussion of eliminating NASA

12    Ford Administration support for space program; role of Roy Ash

12-14    Role of Ed David in planning for shuttle; establishment of PSAC Flax Committee

14-15    Fletcher's recollections of Don Rice and his perspective on the shuttle

15    Discussion of broadening NASA's role in technological development; role of George Shultz

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

15-16    NASA's role in technological development

16-19    Development of shuttle design; relative role of OMB and NASA; roles of Fletcher, Myers, Low, Richard McCurdy

19-22    Process of selecting among alternate shuttle designs; roles of George Shultz, Bill Anders, Wernher von Braun, Ed David; emergence of parallel burn configuration as favored approach

22-23    Proposals for glider-type approach; Rockwell study

24-25    Emphasis on cost concerns; Mathematica studies

25    Opposition of Don Rice to shuttle development

25-29    Meetings that reached final decision on Shuttle design; roles of George Shultz, Don Rice, Oscar Morgenstern


Gilruth, Robert. Dates: March 21, May 14, June 30, and October 2, 1986; February 27 and March 2, 1987. Interviewers: David DeVorkin (5), Martin Collins (3), John Mauer (2), Linda Ezell (2), and Howard Wolko (1). Auspices: GWS. Length: 17.75 hrs.; 375 pp. Use restriction: Public.

Gilruth initially reviews his upbringing, education, and Jean Piccard's influence on him at the University of Minnesota. He then discusses various aspects of his career at NACA from 1937 to 1958, including working at Langley Field during World War II on various aerodynamic problems, directing the guided missile research station at Wallops Island after the war and its work on missile projects, being promoted in 1952 to the Assistant Chief of Research at the Langley lab and its involvement in such projects as the X-15, and working beginning in 1957 with Hugh Dryden and others on a possible manned satellite program as a member of the Special Committee on Space Technology. Gilruth next describes various facets of his career at NASA from 1958 to the early 1970s, including initially working on the Space Task Group; the various proposals reviewed to put a man in space and the evolution of the Mercury program; contacts with and impressions of such key figures as Jim Webb, John Kennedy, Jerome Wiesner, and T. Keith Glennan; and moving to the Manned Spacecraft Center in 1962 and his involvement there with the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs.

    March 21, 1986

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-10    Early family background

1    Nashwauk, Minnesota

2    Ethnic heritage

2-4    Influence of maternal grandfather

4-5    Parents

5-6    Early interests

6-7    First interest in aeronautics; reading AMERICAN BOY MAGAZINE

7-8    Father's problems with the Board of Education in Hancock, Michigan

8-9    Move to Duluth, Minnesota

9-10    Sister, Jean Marian Gilruth

10-24    Duluth Normal School

10-11    Classmates

11-12    Teachers, especially Miss Horn

12    Building model airplanes

12-13    Influence of Mr. Rappold

13-14    Tools and materials readily available

14-16    DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE model airplane contest, 1925

16    Building a radio

17    Reliving the contest; preparatory class with Mr. Rappold

18    Building a "Baby Rog", based on Merle Hamburg's articles in the AMERICAN BOY

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

18-19    Improving model designs

19-20    Impressions of first book on aeronautical engineering, by Max Munk, at age 13

20-21    Inventing a feathering propeller for model airplanes

21-22    Experimenting with airfoils

22-24    Learning of NACA through a SATURDAY EVENING POST article

25-28    Duluth Central High School

26    Mechanical drawing and mathematics courses

27    Goal to design airplanes

27    Awareness of MIT and names like von Karman

28    Traveling during summers

29    Junior college, two years

29    Building models, reading AERODIGEST and AVIATION MAGAZINE

30    Interest in sports

30-32    Lewis Rodert's courses in aeronautics at the junior college

32-47    University of Minnesota

33    Switching to a pure engineering curriculum at the University

33    Joining an engineering fraternity, Theta Tau

34    Classmates in aeronautics

35-36    Theoretical versus experimental work; lab work

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

36-37    Engines

37    Working with classmates

38    Job placement in aeronautics upon graduation 1935; classmates

38-39    Gilruth's disinterest in learning to fly

39-40    The department's interests and goals

40-42    Desire to work for NACA, knowledge of NACA

43    Fellowship in aeronautics after graduating

43-44    Ackerman's hot air balloon experiment

44-46    University of Minnesota graduate program

46-47    Course work in structures and metallurgy

47    Thesis topic for master's degree, 1935-36

48    Topics for further sessions

48    Jean and Jeannette Piccard

48-49    Influence of Methodist upbringing

49-54    Titles of miscellaneous papers and reports by Gilruth

54-57    Thoughts regarding the Challenger 51-L accident

     May 14, 1986

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

58-73    Gilruth's graduate years at the University of Minnesota

58    Description of Gilruth's research fellowship

58-59    Gilruth's first balloon project with Ackerman

59    Jean Piccard's arrival at the University of Minnesota

59    Century of Progress Exhibition and Balloon Flight

59-60    Working with Jean Piccard as part of the research fellowship; his duties and projects

60    Jean Piccard's showmanship qualities; presentation of self-regulating pressure valve; talks to citizens groups, clubs and organizations

60-61    Funding for University projects; support from private concerns such as General Mills

61-68    Jean Piccard; Gilruth's recollection of Piccard's personal life and professional activities

61    Work at Hercules prior to University appointment

62    Robert M. Silliman and the first telemeter

62-63    Gilruth's recollection of August Piccard, Jean's brother

63    Jean Piccard's wife Jeanette and her involvement in Jean's work

63    Piccard's influence upon Gilruth's professional career

63-64    Further discussion of pressure valve

64    Gilruth's examples of the "Piccard philosophy" in his early days at NACA

65    Gilruth's first wife Jean Barnhill and her work with Jean Piccard

65-66    Piccard's negative experience with National Geographic

66    Gondola and balloon design

66-67    Jeanette Piccard as a consultant for the Manned Spacecraft Center

68    Gilruth's assessment of Jean and Jeanette Piccard's personal and professional relationships

69-73    Work with Professor Barlow on airplane design and stress analysis; the Roscoe Turner airplane

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

73-74    Barlow and the wind tunnel; Gilruth's project responsibilities

74    Gilruth's design philosophy

74-75    Piccard's influence upon his Master's Thesis

75-76    Junior Aeronautical Exam, 1936; selected as junior engineer at NACA

76    The state of American aviation during the 1920s and 30s; the direction taken by NACA in 1937

77-125    Gilruth's career with the NACA

77-80    Gilruth's first appointment at NACA in Flight Research Department; working for Floyd Thompson

80-81    Assignment with Hartley Soulé; determination of rational standards for flying and handling qualities of airplanes

81-82    Testing the Martin B-10B, B-15, B-17

82-83    Design problems with the DC-3

83    Gilruth's report "Requirement for Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes"

83-84    Use of report by Army Air Corps and Navy

84-85    British interest in report

85    Key people in British aeronautical establishment at Farnborough (1943)

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

86-87    Gilruth's advancement in NACA; discoveries in longitudinal stability and lateral control

87-88    Work at Langley Field; importance to British and Americans

87-88    Pilot feedback on airplane performance

88    Description of acceptable flying conditions

88    Test pilots from Grumman; Mel Gough, Chief test pilot

89    Improvements in instrumentation; the importance of the yaw vane

89-90    Correcting the problem of rudder lock

90-93    Gilruth's administrative duties at NACA; research and publishing of reports

93-94    NACA budget and staff organization prior to WWII

94-95    Enlisted reserve duty during WWII

95-96    WWII and NACA expansion

96    Gilruth's working relationship with Cortland Perkins at WrightField

96-97    The problem of "stick freezing"; Gilruth's analysis and solution

98-99    Conditions simulation in a wind tunnel

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

99    Pushing closer to the speed of sound

99-101    Gilruth's invention of the wing flow technique in 1945

101-102    Gilruth put in charge of a guided missile station on Wallops Island

102    John Stack and the slotted throat tunnel

102-103    Description of Gilruth's free flow wing technique

104    NACA missile research

105    Tiamat subsonic missile at Wallops Island

105    Gilruth's systematic models; breaking the sound barrier

106-107    Testing model missiles; how ailerons worked through the speed of sound

107-108    New work with PARD [Pilotless Aircraft Research Division]

108-110    NACA-Military relations; Special Committee on Self-Propelled Guided Missiles

110-112    The Ramjet program; its development and subsequent failure

112-113    Gilruth's impressions of life in Hampton

TAPE 3, SIDE 1

114    Experimentation with hydrofoils

114-15    Vannevar Bush and airfoil drag calculation

115    Mrs. Gilruth's activities during WWII

115-116    Relationship between NACA and the community of Hampton

116-117    Relationship between NACA and Muroc

117-118    Gilruth's appointment as Assistant Chief of Research in 1952

119    Pentagon reorganization, 1952-53

119    Exploratory work at NACA; development of the Northrop Snark missile

119-120    Direction of NACA during the mid-1950's

120    Gilruth's assessment of the beginning of the Soviet-American space race

121    Civilian Upper Air Panel and the V-2

121-122    NACA observer on the Civilian Air Panel; William O'Sullivan

123    Location of O'Sullivan's papers

123-124    O'Sullivan's project "Echo"; his personal and professional life

124-125    Discussion concerning further interviews

    June 30, 1986

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

126-127    Work at Langley with the Flight Test Group, under Floyd "Tommy" Thompson (1937)

127    Physical and organizational layout of Langley; new developments such as the "Free Flight Tunnel"

128    Discussion of key people at Langley during the late 1930s; Dick Rhode, "Tommy" Thompson, and Charlie Donlan

128-129    Pre- and post-war aircraft testing at Langley; similarities and differences between the two periods

129    Problems with military aircraft such as the P-47 and P-38; Testing of foreign aircraft: Hurricane, Spitfire, and the Japanese Zero

129-130    Explanation of specific flight test procedures

130    Gilruth's recollection of test pilot Mel Gough

130-131    Aircraft acquisition procedures

131-132    Use of telemetry and resulting changes in flight testing

132    Drop-testing with models at Wallops; going through the speed of sound

132-133    Wing flow experiments with the P-51

133-134    Stick freezing and the dive recovery flap

134    John Stack and Ray Wright's development of the slotted throat tunnel

134-135    Flight of an X-l model through the speed of sound

135-137    Ezra Cotcher and the development of the first supersonic aircraft

137    Douglas D-558-l: Navy subsonic jet

137-138    The supersonic D-558-2: the first high speed rocket aircraft with a swept wing

138-139    Flying the X-series; Gilruth's recollection of Scott Cross field, a NACA test pilot

139    Lewis and Ames Laboratories during WWII: their use of full scale and hypersonic wind tunnels

139-140    Gilruth's measuring of Mach numbers reached with the P-51

140-141    Gilruth's professional relationship with theoretical aerodynamicist von Karman

141-142    Description of drop-testing procedures; Gilruth's research of transonic effects

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

142    Investigation of aileron effectiveness (Wallops Island)

143-144    Relationship between industry and NACA during the early l940s; industry lobbying for an increased budget at NACA

144    Further references to Ezra Cotcher and the X-l

144-145    Bell Aircraft and the ill-fated X-2

145    Gilruth's recollection of key people at Bell such as Bob Stanley and Paul Emmons

145-146    Gilruth's assessment of interaction between the military, industry and NACA

146-147    Testing of the Lockheed Electra upon the request of the Air Safety Board

147    Difficulties with the swept wing; loss of aileron control

147-148    Gilruth's evaluation of the Bell P-39

148    Gilruth's own "design evolution" from the late l930s to the l950s

148-150    Gilruth's Technical Report 755; assessment of proper flight specifications and handling qualities (1943)

150-151    The Structures Group at Langley headed by Gene Lundquist

151-152    Measuring the lift, drag and moment using the P-51 and the Wing Flow Technique

152-153    Gilruth's encounter with the transonic

153-154    Gilruth's synopsis of his years as a student and his work with the NACA

155    End of Session

    October 2, 1986

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

156-158    Discussion of possible topics for the interview; papers written by Gilruth and how they might give insight into Gilruth's role in NACA and NASA

158-159    Appointment at Wallops Island; missile testing

159    Finding the missile range site

159-160    Military reaction to Wallops Island missile range; their relationship with the NACA

160    As a member of several NACA committees; Dr. Lewis' perception of Wallops

161    Circumstances surrounding appointment at Wallops; relationship with key people at Langley; Floyd Thompson and Gus Crowley

161-162    Role in establishing Wallops; early responsibilities

162-163    Wallops as a division of Langley

163    Committee support for tripling the budget; advocacy by major corporations such as North American

163-165    Working relationship between Langley and Wright Field Cortland Perkins as the contact person at Wright Field

166    Description of project Bumble Bee; Merle Tuve as a program developer

166-167    Advances in telemetry as a result of the Bumble Bee Program

167    Discussion of decision-making processes

168    Determination of staff competency; evaluation procedures and initiation structure for new staff members

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

169-170    Discussion of hiring procedures; Civil Service engineering test

170-171    Screening process; the 6 month probationary period

171-172    Management promotion; the case of William J. O'Sullivan

172-173    Evaluation of managerial qualities; the question of technical ability as a necessity for technical management positions

173    Support for Wallops Island; interest in aerodynamic data

173-174    Committees associated with NACA, such as the Flutter Committee, Aerodynamics Committee, and the Guided Missile Committee

174-175    Rocket testing; the collection of aerodynamic data on various models

175    Why NACA did not test the V-2

175-176    Difference between Army information and NACA atmospheric tables

176    Hypersonic re-entry problems; Wallops heat transfer studies

177    Pre-Sputnik studies of manned space flight; work at Langley

177-178    Evolution of Manned Space Flight Program; Air Force involvement

178-179    Appointment to assistant director in 1952

179    Development of the X-15 research airplane

179    Harvey Allen; the first proposal to use blunt body design for manned satellites

179-180    Discussion of various proposals for the configuration of manned satellites; Max Faget's theory

180-181    Reasons for choosing blunt re-entry vehicle

181    Importance of the space race; attempts to "outdo" the Soviets

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

181-182    The choice of blunt re-entry design; Hugh Dryden's role

182-183    Testing Allen's design using solid rockets

183-184    Discussions with Jerome Wiesner and the President's Science Advisory Committee (during the Kennedy Administration)

184-185    Impact of the Big Joe experiment; tension between Kistiakowsky and NACA

184-187    Press coverage of rocket launches; conflict between NACA and the Air Force

185-186    Consultation with influential scientists concerning NACA's technical work

187-188    Civilian-Military relationship in development of re-entry vehicle

188    List of seven elements of design essential to the manned environment

189-190    Interaction with Huntsville concerning the ejection system

190-191    Transition from NACA, a non-contracting agency to NASA, a contracting agency

191-192    Personal interaction with companies such as McDonnell-Douglas; realization that contracting was a necessity

192    Starting the Space Task Group; Gilruth's analysis of his career move

192-193    Further discussion of the US-Soviet space race; its impact upon the evolution of the American space program

193-194    Eisenhower and Kennedy: differences in perception of the space program

194-195    Effect of contracting upon research centers

195-197    Question of where to build a manned spaceflight center; Houston chosen as the site

197-198    Assessment of Homer Newell's interpretation of Silverstein and Dryden's goals to put man in space

198    Van Allen Belts; the question of radiation safety

199    Closing comments; points of further discussion

    February 27, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

200-202    Impact of second Sputnik on technical community and on Eisenhower Administration; impetus to man in space program

202-203    Gilruth's confidence that US could put man in space

203-204    Lifting Body Conference at Ames (1957); PARD report on ballistics

204    Creation of Special Committee on Space Technology

204    Hugh Dryden

204-205    NACA Budget support for man in space

205    Wind tunnel research

206-210    Gilruth made director of Wallops; development of mission

207    Acquisition of solid rockets from Navy at Chincoteague

208    Use of existing radar; Doppler radar

208-209    Testing models at Wallops

209-211    Improving rockets: Monsanto, Atlas

210-212    NACA mission to acquire new knowledge; support to industry and military

211    Improving Doppler radar

212    Wallops Island budget

212-213    Committee on Aerodynamics

213    Hypersonic research

213    Atlas rocket

214    Industry confidence in Wallops R & D

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

215    Round 3

215-217    Planning for man-in-space at Langley; anticipation of NACA becoming a space agency; testimony by Gilruth to Congress

216-217    Special Committee on Space Technology

217-219    Atlas, Titan

217-218    Ballistic design development; Hugh Dryden

219-220    Race with Soviet Union for man in space

220    Escape system design

220-221    Gilruth's philosophy of engineering

221-223    Appointment of Doolittle as NACA chair; compared to Hunsaker

223-225    "Young Turks' Dinner"; John Stack; Hugh Dryden

226-229    Dryden support for manned space effort, for re-entry approach; Glennan rather than Dryden made NASA director

226-227    Gilruth testimony to Congress on manned space; Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration

228-229    Gilruth works on plans, budget for effort at Langley

229-230    Military interest in manned space

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

230-231    Gilruth begins organizing man in space effort at Langley Field; "borrowing" from defense services

231-233    Staffing

233-234    Importance of Gemini program on development of Apollo effort

234-235    Hot summer of '58; team planning for what became Mercury

235-237    Opponents of manned space; Gilruth's conviction that program would be manned

237-240    Hugh Dryden

241    Problems in moon flights

242-243    Don Putt (Air Force) and Dryden

243-245    Recruiting staff for Mercury; Wes Hjornevik

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

246    Relationship with contractors

247-249    Atlas "belly band" improvement

249-251    Wiesner Committee; Jim Webb; opposition to manned space

251-252    Killian Committee meeting

252-253    Project Mercury startup; staffing; Floyd Thompson

253-255    Space Task Group formed; Donlan assistant director

255-257    Gilruth's resistance to permanent move to headquarters

257-258    Original staff and start up of Mercury

258-259    Flexible Mercury administrative structure compared to Apollo

259-261    Atlas, other rocket development

TAPE 3, SIDE 1

261-262    Press attention to Mercury

262    Staffing of Space Task Group

262-263    George Low

263-264    Abe Silverstein

264-265    New Projects Panel

266-269    Gilruth's philosophy of developing ideas, supporting staff; Guy Thibedeau

269-270    Gilruth fires a staff person without authority

270-271    Accessibility of management

271-273    Nature of management in scientific enterprise; selection of managers

273-275    Gilruth appointed assistant director of Beltsville Center (not built by Dryden)

275    New Projects Panel suggestion of three-man capsule

275    Kennedy's announcement of moon program

TAPE 3, SIDE 2

276-278    Kennedy's announcement of moon program; Jim Webb and Gilruth

278    New technology required for moon program

279    Gilruth's sense of difficulties facing moon program

280-281    Gilruth's meetings with Kennedy

281-282    Testimony to Wiesner Committee on effects of weightlessness

282-283    Wiesner Committee delays first US man in space launch

283-284    Contingency planning for Mercury program; inherent dangers

284-286    Challenger disaster compared to Mercury

286-287    Openness of management under Gilruth

287-291    204 fire; review panels by NASA and Congress

    March 2, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

292-293    RFP process for Mercury; Gilruth's previous experience in contracts

293-296    Gilruth's style, technique as manager

294-296    Wes Hjornavic

296-297    Canadian personnel hired for Space Task Group

297-298    C.B. Moore; advocates for using manned balloons to test spacecraft systems

298-302    Gilruth's relations with James Webb

299-300    Gilruth's relations with T. Keith Glennan

302-303    Liaison with scientific community; POISE committee

303-304    Siting of Lunar Sample Lab in Houston

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

304    James Van Allen

304-305    Scientific critics of man-in-space

306-307    Scout rocket

306    Little Joe rocket

307-309    Delay in John Glenn flight

307-308    Jerome Wiesner Science Advisory Committee

309    Change in terminology from "capsule" to "spacecraft"

310    Redstone and Atlas rockets, management relationships with von Braun and Air Force

310-311    Impact of Lunik 1 on public and on US man-in-space staff

311-312    Establishment of Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, later the Johnson Spacecraft Center

312-314    Political reasons for construction of MSC in Houston rather than in Virginia

314-316    Relocation to Houston of STG and Mercury personnel

315    Importance to Gilruth of proximity to Washington, DC

317    Gilruth marriage; personal relocation to Houston

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

317    Construction, moving into MSC

318-319    Gilruth's personal life, sailing

319-320    NASA staff retreats

320    Robert Seamans made NASA business officer

320    Gilruth's relationship with Glennan

320-321    Gilruth's relationship with Hugh Dryden

321-322    Relationship between MSC and contractors, e.g., General Electric

323-324    Gilruth's relationship with Brainard Holmes

324-325    Gilruth's relationship with George Mueller

325-326    Gilruth's sense that Apollo moon-landings should end

326-327    Space station concept

327    Technological obstacles faced by Apollo

327-329    Contracting for Apollo, Gemini, Mercury

329-330    Relations between NASA HQ and centers

TAPE 2, SIDE 2

330-332    Relationship between Gilruth and von Braun

332-333    Movement of staff from Mercury to Gemini and Apollo

333-334    NASA budget

334-336    NASA planning for post-Apollo

336-337    Competition for projects between centers

337-339    Skylab; space stations

339    NACA administrative structure compared to NASA

340-341    Gilruth's experience compared as administrator in NACA and in NASA

341-342    Development of research airplane, X-1, thin wing, swept wing

342-343    NACA relations with military in WWII

TAPE 3, SIDE 1

343    NACA criticized for insufficient attention to jet propulsion

344-345    Gilruth's attention to advance planning

345-349    Debate among scientists over earth orbit rendezvous, direct descent, and lunar orbit rendezvous: John Houbolt, Stark Draper, Charles Frick, von Braun

346,    Importance of computer development to lunar orbit

349-351    Rendezvous plan; IBM

352-354    Problem of payload weight

354    Possible failure points in Apollo

355-356    Place of astronauts in MSC organizational structure

356-358    Procedures for MSC reporting and communication among offices

357-358    Selection of managers for communication skills

TAPE 3, SIDE 2

358    Gilruth's relationship with George Mueller

359-361    Gilruth's role in Shuttle development

359-360    Skunk Works

360-362    Development of Skylab, space station ideas

362-365    Gilruth's role in budget process; testifying to Congress

365-368    Space Shuttle plan

366    George Mueller

369    Gilruth witnesses launches

370    Apollo 10; decision not to land on the moon

371-372    Astronaut selection; Deke Slayton

372    Al Shepard's second flight

TAPE 4, SIDE 1

372-373    Gilruth takes position as Fletcher's director of key personnel development; wife's illness

373-375    Gilruth's reactions to launching Apollo 11

375    Gilruth's satisfaction with his career


Glennan, T. Keith. Dates: June 6 and October 31, 1986; February 6 and 20, May 29, and September 7, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins (6), David DeVorkin (1), and Allan Needell (4). Auspices: GWS. Length: 12.75 hrs.; 195 pp. Use restriction: Open.

Glennan (b. September 8, 1905) initially reviews his upbringing, undergraduate education at Yale in science, and work in the motion picture industry and briefly at Lockheed before moving to the Navy's Underwater Sound Laboratory in 1942. He then discusses his career as Operations Manager and later as Director of the lab, including the projects worked on, scientists with whom he came into contact, and relations with other labs. Following this, Glennan describes his work beginning in 1945 for ANSCO and as president of Case Institute from 1948 to 1950, and the growth of the university during this period. Glennan next covers his service as an AEC Commissioner in 1951 and 1952, including impressions of Lilienthal, Teller, Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and others; AEC support of universities and the nuclear power industry; and relations with the General Advisory Committee, Military Liaison Committee, and Congress. Finally, he reviews his return to Case as president from 1952 to 1957 and subsequent career as NASA's first administrator, including the circumstances of his recruitment; selection of assistants; relations with Eisenhower, Congress, scientists, DOD, and the media; and how and why certain programs and goals were developed during his tenure.

    June 6, 1986

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

1-3    Childhood and Family Background Description of family members; father's work on the railroad

3-4    Early memories of Eau Claire, Wisconsin; influence of high school teachers

4-6    Relationship with brother Gordon

7    Problems with family finances

7-8    Friendship with the Midelfort family

8-10    Discussion of college education plans; acceptance at Yale

9-11    Summers at Three Forks, Montana Years at Yale

11-13    Organizational structure at Yale; enrollment in the Sheffield Scientific School

13-14    Description of course work; interest in electrical engineering

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

15-17    Relationship with the Adams family

17-18    Working for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company; setting up the York Hall Scholarship Fund

19-20    Employment decisions after graduation

21    Work as an engineer at ERPI

21-23    Management courses at college; interest in management positions

24-27    Installation of sound systems with ERPI

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

28    Transfer from Seattle to Los Angeles; move to England

28-29    Influence of boss Gard Knox

30-32    Further discussion of job as service manager in England

    October 31, 1986

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

33-38    Career at ERPI

33    Return from England; appointment to position as manager for the Southeastern District

34-36    Innovative management techniques

37-38    Managing Audio Cinema Studio; discussion of influential people such as Whitford Drake, Gard Knox and Herbert Wilson

38    Glennan's notion of success

39-48    Years at Paramount

39-40    Examples of management style at Paramount as studio manager; development of pre-cutting technique

40-41    Work with studio designer Bill Peirera; building a new Paramount

41    Interaction with unions; negotiations between studio management and union representatives

42-43    Discussion of politics during the 1930s; movie industry view of President Roosevelt and the New Deal

43-44    Description of unionism in the movie industry

44    Management style at the studio

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

45    Salaries at the laboratory during WWII

45-46    Further discussion of Paramount; special problems in a large organization

47    Clarification of the relationship between ERPI and Paramount

46-48    Fired from Paramount; tensions which brought about this situation

49-51    Lockheed Experience

49    The unemployment experience; employment options

49    Employment at Lockheed; description of the company's operation during WWII

50-51    Duties as hole coordinator; assistant to the general manager

50-52    Organizational inadequacies at Lockheed

52    Return to studio management - employment at Sam Goldwyn's

52    Employment with the Underwater Sound Laboratory

52-53    Desire to contribute to the war effort

53    Attempts to contact Verne Knudsen, director of the Underwater Sound Laboratory near San Diego, CA

53    Assistance from Tim Shea, head of Columbia University Division of War Research

53-55    Shea's offer to Glennan - position as operations manager of a new Underwater Sound Laboratory in New London

56-57    Initial reaction to the new position; description of specific managerial responsibilities

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

57-58    Communications and operations research

58    Interaction between research laboratories; friendly competition

58-59    Association with Tate, Van Bush, Ross, and Bennett - comparing notes

59-60    Relationship with the Bureau of Ordnance

60    Project assignments to the various laboratories

61    Relationship with Merle Tuve and the Rad Lab

62-63    Pragmatic approach to management; Glennan's first experience with managing a research and development enterprise

63-64    Discussion of events and motivational themes

64    Brief mention of scientists and physicists at Underwater Sound Lab

65-66    Contact with associates after the war; especially at Case Institute

65    Discussion of Glennan's continuation of public service

66    Management as a public service

66-67    Role of government in R & D

68    The relationship between university, government and industry during and after WWII

68    Refusal of a job offer at Harvard as laboratory director

    February 6, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

69-74    WWII Period

69    Working for the Columbia University Division of War Research; recommendation for the Medal of Merit

69-70    Description of accomplishments at the Underwater Sound Laboratory

70-71    Various employment opportunities as the war ended ANSCO Years, 1945-48

71    Process for choosing ANSCO - turning down lucrative Hollywood contract with David Selznick

71-72    Federal government's relationship with ANSCO; appointment of an alien property custodian

72    Experience with German managers at ANSCO

72-73    Evolution of the product line at ANSCO - from cameras to instrumentation

73    Scientific involvement at ANSCO

73    Explanation for turning down Selznick contract

74    Reasons for leaving ANSCO; revitalized interest in public service

74-79    Case Institute of Technology Period

74-75    Interest in presidency at Case; influence of Chuck Williams

75-76    Visits to Case; interview with Frank Quayle

76    Negotiations for salary level

76-77    Discussions with former Case president Wickenden

77    Comparison of Yale and Case engineering programs

78    Discussion of problems which confronted Case as an educational institution

79    Recommendations to the search committee chairman from Colpitts, Tate and Bush

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

79    Description of the self survey process

79    Relationship between science and engineering at Case

80-81    Changes made to broaden the base of engineering education; faculty response

82    Postwar power base in metallurgy and chemistry

82    Faculty concerns about curriculum changes; perceptions of Glennan's intentions

83    Board of Trustees' expectations of Glennan as Case president

83    Faculty consultation with private industry

84    Discussion of various funding sources at Case

84    Relationship between the Case physics department and the AEC

84-85    Importance of government support on the Case campus

85    The overhead policy debate

85-86    Actions resulting from self survey

86    Rebuilding Case campus; long range planning

86-87    Faculty member Mel Kranzberg

87-88    Reorganization of the engineering department

88    Reorganization of the university structure

88-89    Concept development and implementation of research centers

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

89-90    Network of university presidents; interaction at various meetings

90    Donations to Case in order to broaden the base of engineering education

91    Choosing education as a vocation

92    The beginning of scholarly work on operations research; discussion of key contributors such as Russ Ackoff, Leonard Arnoff and West Churchman

93    Management problems in operations research

93-94    Interaction with industries; serving on the board of directors for Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company

94    Case status as a private university during the early years

94    Management interests at Case; the development of an engineering administration program

95-96    Case association with developments at Stanford; Fred Terman's electronics laboratory

96-97    Case relationship with Lewis NACA facility

97-98    Involvement with the McMahon Bill; circumstances surrounding the creation of the AEC

98    Relationship with David Lilienthal

98-100    Job offer with AEC; discussions with President Harry Truman, Gordon Dean, and Carroll Wilson

    February 20, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

102-103    Years on the AEC Accepting position as commissioner on the AEC; discussions with Louis Strauss

104    Preparation for move to Washington, DC

104-105    Discussion of AEC physical location and frequency of meetings

106    Respective roles of David Lilienthal and Carroll Wilson

106    Staff requirements; hiring a personal assistant

107    Role and responsibilities as a Commission member

108    Discussions with Eugene Zuckert

109-110    Evaluation of Lilienthal's management of the AEC

110    Main goals and concerns of the Commission

110-111    Relationship with Gordon Dean

111    Special areas of interest and expertise as a Commissioner

112    Ernest Lawrence; lobbyist for a new weapons laboratory

112    Evaluation of the MTA project at Livermore

112    Increase of military research and development

113    Dispute over siting of Savannah River Production facility

113-114    Further discussion of the MTA Project

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

115    AEC meetings with the GAC

115-116    Description of GAC;s advisory role to the AEC

116-117    Concern for basic research support; relationship between the various research programs

117-118    Commission support of basic research in the universities

118    The importance of building an indigenous scientific base

119    The origins of the computer center at Brookhaven

119    Reasons for AEC support of the university program in basic science

119-120    AEC involvement in choice of research projects

120    Joint AEC-ONR support for rocket research

120    AEC relationship with RAND Corporation

121    Interest in working out the government-industry relationship

121-122    Proposal to create the Atomic Industrial Forum; its influence on industry

123    US policy concerning technical control of nuclear materials and technology

123-124    Significant increases in budget; results of rapid AEC growth

124-125    Relationship with the military Liaison Committee headed by Bill LeBaron

125    Discussion of the development of strategic forces and atomic weapons

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

126    Relationship with Albert Thomas, chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations

127    Personal impressions of Oppenheimer, Rabi and Eger Murphree

127-128    International cooperation during early years of the space program

128-129    Interactions with Walter Zinn and Lloyd Berkner on the AEC

129    The effect of Glennan's AEC experience upon his later activities at Case

129-131    Description of resignation from the AEC

131-132    Further discussion of Oppenheimer and his position on atomic weapons

132-133    Discussion of possible decision to initiate thermonuclear research

133-134    Joint Committees lack of knowledge concerning nuclear stockpile

134-135    Ramifications of the McCarthy era

135-136    Experience with high level government officials while on the AEC

136-137    Use of Washington contacts and experience after returning to Case

    May 29, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

138    Glennan's appointment to AEC General Advisory Committee

139    Disagreement with Edward Teller

139-140    Glennan's service on National Science Board

140-141    Glennan's service on Institute of Defense analysis; James Killian

142    Impact of Sputnik

143-145    Glennan's appointment as NASA administrator; Eisenhower; Killian; Don Quarles

145-146    Selection of Hugh Dryden as deputy

147    Long-range planning body

147-148    Outside evaluation of NACA proposals for NASA

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

148-149    Outside evaluation (continued)

149    Appointment of Glennan's general manager, Dick Horner

149-150    Initial tasks facing NASA; hiring

150    Relationship between Glennan and Eisenhower

150-151    ABMA absorbed by NASA

150-151    Eisenhower concern for rocket heavy lift capability

152-153    Glennan's resistance to public relations-directed space programs; Vega; Air Force; Bennie Schriever

153-154    National Security Council and space policy

154-155    Initial briefings of Glennan by NACA staff

155-156    Procurement; relations with contractors

156-157    Salary issue in hiring top-level managers for NASA

158    Television show on NASA by Ed Murrow and Fred Friendly

158-159    NASA committee system for review of RFPs

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

159-160    Relationships with Congress; executive privilege debate

161-162    RFP review continued; quality control; Golovin; RAND Corporation; McDonnell; Gilruth

163    Glennan's approach to management

163-165    International aspects of NASA's work

166-168    Dissatisfaction among scientists with space program

166    Kempton Committee

168    Public and Congressional interest in man-in-space

    September 7, 1987

TAPE 1, SIDE 1

169-173    Glennan letter to Eisenhower in 1959, re launch vehicle failures; necessity of distinguishing from Air Force missile capability

173-176    NASA relations with press under Glennan; Friendly and Murrow television documentary; friendship with Dick Harkness; Scotty Reston; Roscoe Drummond; public interest in space

176-178    Efforts to distinguish between military programs and open NASA civilian activities; concern about NASA management; Symington Committee

TAPE 1, SIDE 2

178-179    Development long-range plan; relations with Symington

179-181    Glennan's conservatism in program development

182-183    Air Force Discoverer program

183    Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board

183-185    Consideration of NASA activities in foreign policy; Space Council; "dish" placement; relations with US State Department

185-187    NASA involvement in U-2 activity; Gary Powers

TAPE 2, SIDE 1

187-188    Lack of civilian/military coordination in space activity, launch vehicles, for e.g.

189    NASA Management staffing difficulties

190-193    Glennan efforts to modify Space Act

193-195    Recruitment of Bob Seamans for NASA


GWSPI, part 1, A-I || GWSPI, part 2, J-R || GWSPI, part 3, S-Z


Rev. 09/06/96

©1996 National Air and Space Museum