A new book profiles John Boyd, an air combat purist who wasn’t afraid to make enemies.

Michael W. Hankins, a curator in the National Air and Space Museum’s aeronautics department, is the author of Flying Camelot: The F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia. The McDonnell Douglas F-15 and the General Dynamics F-16 are two of the most successful fighters ever built, and variants of both aircraft are still part of the U.S. Air Force fleet. In Flying Camelot, Hankins digs into the sometimes fractious history that led to the design of both fighters, and he notes the contributions of the so-called Fighter Mafia, an informal group within the Department of Defense that championed technology that was cheap, simple, and efficient. Hankins provides a balanced portrait of the Fighter Mafia’s leader, John Boyd, a brash Air Force colonel who believed all fighters should be designed through the prism of dogfighting. Hankins was recently interviewed by Air & Space Quarterly senior editor Diane Tedeschi.

How would you describe the fighter pilot subculture within the military?

I’ve boiled it down to five main characteristics. The first is aggressiveness. Second, individuality is key. Fighter pilots like to be alone in the sky with their aircraft. There are two-seat fighters—and some people like them—but they seem to be controversial. Sometimes this individuality includes a skepticism of authority figures. Third, fighter pilots often use heroic imagery—knights and mythological heroes—to describe themselves. Fourth, fighter pilot culture tends to be skeptical of new technologies unless they directly contribute to the fighter’s mission of air-to-air combat. Finally, fighter pilots like to compete, but at the end of the day, they are a close-knit, protective community.

Can you offer an example of how nostalgia and skepticism of new technologies fueled debates within the Air Force?

The debates around the F-16’s design really capture this idea well. The Fighter Mafia were very focused on looking at previous wars or, rather, their interpretation of those wars, especially World War I. They pointed to past dogfights as examples for why they thought the F-16 should have the smallest radar possible—or maybe no radar at all. They preferred skilled pilots using their eyes to fire guns (instead of having them rely on guided missiles and radar). Air Force leaders, by contrast, wanted a more high-tech, versatile approach. These arguments sometimes got fierce and personal.

What are your impressions of John Boyd?

Above all, Boyd [who died in 1997] is complex. Some people praise him as a genius and a hero, and others find him alienating and difficult. He made valuable contributions to the Air Force. One of the goals I had for the book was to look at Boyd in this broader context and to understand why he generated such fierce loyalty—and animosity.

What is the legacy of Boyd and the Fighter Mafia?

Boyd and the Fighter Mafia were selling a powerful idea: Defense technology could be both cheaper and more effective, and that we used to have it right but had lost our way. In the late 1970s, coming out of the difficult Vietnam War experience, the desire for more efficient, less complicated technology found a lot of traction, and it’s still with us. For example, current arguments about new technologies being too complex and expensive are echoes of the Fighter Mafia. With the recent end of the war in Afghanistan, many people seem to be asking similar questions about military capabilities as they did after Vietnam, so I wouldn’t be surprised if we see a resurgence of the Fighter Mafia’s ideas.

How did the era of the Air Force’s Century Series fighters (the F-100, F-101, F-102, F-104, F-105, and F-106) influence the design of—and desire for—the F-15 and F-16?

The F-15 and F-16 in many ways are a reaction against the Century Series fighters. The Century airplanes were primarily designed as interceptors—go as fast as possible in a straight line, either to deliver a nuclear weapon or fire a missile at an incoming Soviet bomber—not as turn-and-burn dogfighters. Thankfully, the Century aircraft never had to perform those nuclear missions, but they seemed to struggle in the types of combat that were more common during the Vietnam War. The F-15 was thus optimized for air-to-air combat in ways the Century fighters were not. The Fighter Mafia wanted the F-16 to be even more optimized for dogfighting, but the Air Force modified it into an effective multi-role aircraft.

Do you have a favorite Century Series fighter?

All the Century Series airplanes have a certain “cool factor,” but if I’m forced to pick one, I’ll go with the Lockheed F-104. It’s sleek, and it looks like something out of science fiction.

Has dogfighting become extinct?

Not extinct, but I’d say it’s endangered. The last time the United States scored a victory against a crewed enemy aircraft was in 2017, and before that, 1999. But other countries have seen more air-to-air fighting, and during the recent conflict in Syria, there were apparently occasions when American and Russian fighters got into dogfights and locked on to each other before backing down. We seem to be in the middle of a transition in the history of aerial warfare. Who knows what air combat will look like as new technologies such as hypersonic weapons, autonomous aircraft, and cyber warfare become more mature.